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SUMMARY
Traditionally, much of the transportation funding in the United States has originated
from the federal government. This was especially true in the 1960s and 1970s when large
portions of the nation's high capacity road network was put into place, resulting from the
Interstate Highway and Defense Act passed in 1956. However, federal funding for trans-
portation has been steadily declining in recent years. In addition, state revenue from the
preferred method of funding, the state gas tax, has been following the same trend. As a
result, many states have been actively searching for alternative sources to fund their trans-
portation needs. At the metropolitan or municipal level, for example, governments have
used the sales tax as a popular source of transportation funding. Dallas, Denver, Phoenix,
Charlotte, Minneapolis, Salt Lake City, and Seattle have recently passed sales tax initia-
tives to fund transportation investments. In 2010, the Georgia General Assembly followed
suit, passing the Transportation Investment Act of 2010 into law. The legislation divided
the state into 12 separate regions, allowing a public referendum for a 1 percent sales tax
increase in each of the 12 regions.
This thesis presents a case study of the Atlanta region, identied as the most diverse and
complex region created by the legislation. The region contains 4.18 million residents and
is comprised of the City of Atlanta, Cherokee, Clayton, Cobb, DeKalb, Douglas, Fayette,
Fulton, Gwinnett, Henry, and Rockdale Counties. The Regional Transportation Roundtable,
represented by one county commissioner and one mayor from each of the counties, was tasked
with producing a project list for the entire 10-County region. The unanimously approved
$6.14 billion project list contained 157 separate projects, 52 percent of which was transit
investment. The ocial campaign for the Atlanta region collected close to $8 million in
donations to run an expensive advertisement campaign. On paper, the big name support
for the proponents seemed to be all they would require to secure 50 plus one of the votes
x
in the Atlanta region. Not only did the proponents have the wallets and hearts of the
business community, they had the support of inuential legislators, local ocials, the Mayor
of Atlanta, and the Governor of Georgia. However, the opposition countered with a unique
mixture of representation. The Atlanta Tea Party, the Georgia Sierra Club, and the DeKalb
NAACP along with legislators and local ocials ran a strong grass-roots campaign with
a successful marketing strategy. The opposition repeated one phrase that resonated, the
largest tax increase in Georgia's history. Polling results leading up to the referendum
suggested a close race. However, on July 31, 2012, the Atlanta region overwhelmingly
rejected the referendum 62 to 38 percent. The number of ballots cast increased by close
to 1.5 times the number of ballots cast in the 2010 primary election and over 2 times the
number of ballots cast in the 2008 primary election. The geographic results show a radial
trend of increased no votes as the distance from the center of the city increased. Not one
county of the 10-County region voted in favor of the referendum. Notably, the city of Atlanta
passed the referendum 58 to 42 percent.
Beginning over a year before until ve months following the public referendum, 48 in-
terviews were conducted. Participants included a mix of legislators with various levels of
involvement in the drafting of the legislation, high level ocials of multiple transportation
agencies, local politicians involved in the project selection process, representatives from the
business community, members of the campaign, and prominent members of the opposition.
Those interviewed identied a number of contributing factors to the failure of the referen-
dum (see section 4.10 for a complete list of contributing factors). However, the consensus
among those interviewed was that not one of the factors caused the failure of the referendum.
Instead, the referendum was signicantly inuenced by the following overarching national
issues:
• The economy;
• The anti-tax movement;
• The looming presidential election;
• Distrust with all levels of government.
xi
These were the driving force in a perfect storm of factors which led to the ultimate failure
of the referendum on July 31, 2012.
A summary of lessons learned include the following (see section 4.10 for a complete list
of lessons learned):
1. Design more exibility in the legislation and project selection process; Improve the
legislation and process by placing an open-ended date for the referendum, allowing
an opt-out criterion if politically necessary, allowing for a fraction of a penny sales
tax, minimizing time between approval of the project list and the referendum, and
ensuring that all members of the process understand the fundamental reasoning for
the legislation through criteria or restrictions in the legislation;
2. Design process so that long-term support from legislators, local ocials, and public is
maximized. Address critical stakeholders early in the process;
3. Never use disincentives. When using incentives, the line between a disincentive and
an incentive must be far enough apart to not be blurred;
4. Create regions such that the areas share a similar transportation vision. Smaller
regions are more likely to share a transportation vision and goal for regionalism. Con-
struct a project list with a small amount of projects with a cohesive transportation
vision that is designed to later be marketable by the campaign;
5. Analyze the constituency to determine proper percentages of transit and roadway
projects. Analyze the constituency to determine proper criterion percentages such as
economic development and congestion mitigation;
6. In an anti-transit region, create the rst project list with only a few transit capital
projects with construction ideally in the rst six years of the sales tax. During the rst
referendum, attempt to minimize transit funding while choosing transit projects which
will only fund actual construction. Ensure that all transit projects will be completed
on-time and on-budget. If necessary, build in additional time into the process so that
public trust in government is obtained;
xii
7. Avoid placing controversial projects on the project list. Avoid placing pet projects
and projects which are not regional in nature on the project list;
8. The size of regions should be minimized to ensure a similar transportation vision for
each region and resulting project list;
9. The size of the project list should be minimized. Project lists and criteria should match
the transportation vision agreed upon and be maintained throughout the process;
10. Allow for real public involvement and ensure strong levels of public involvement
throughout the process;
11. Create a marketing strategy for the campaign which resonates with the public through
a cohesive transportation vision. Avoid overselling the message. Minimize campaign
presence to voters less likely to vote in favor of the referendum. Balance campaign
spending toward more grass-roots eorts. Minimize noticeable campaign spending
during an economic recession;
12. Address public concerns about overall trust in government by education and improving
on-time and on-budget delivery of current projects.
Other regions in the nation looking to attempt similar referenda can consider many of the
lessons provided in this thesis. In addition, the following summarized recommendations
should be considered by regions attempting similar referenda:
1. Flexibility should be allowed in the legislation and process;
2. Ensure the project list criteria and composition matches public opinion and critical
stakeholder opinions throughout the process;
3. The size of regions should be minimized to ensure a similar transportation vision for
each region and resulting project list;
4. The size of the project list should be minimized. Project lists and criteria should
match the transportation vision initially agreed upon and be maintained throughout
the process;
xiii
5. The process timeline must be minimized to reduce opportunity for public criticism;
6. Public involvement should be conducted throughout the process and must match the
results in the process and project list;
7. Key issues such as transit governance and public distrust in government must be
addressed prior to passing a transportation funding initiative;
8. Regionalism begins with a common interest to work toward, such as a common trans-
portation vision. Ideally, regions should be divided along similar transportation vi-
sions.
The Georgia General Assembly did not pass a transportation funding initiative during the
2013 legislative session. Currently, the Atlanta region remains in a transportation crisis.
Historically, similar initiatives across the nation have passed during a second attempt. Cit-
ing this, many are hopeful Atlanta will pass a second attempt. However, the second attempt
codied in the legislation required action during the 2013 session to begin the process; the
requirements were not met or seriously attempted. In addition, given political barriers,
the next attempt is likely a decade away. The next initiative for transportation funding
in the region will likely have a dierent structure laid out in new legislation. The Atlanta
region should consider limiting the geography of the regions to provide for a more cohesive
transportation vision in the Atlanta region. To remain politically feasible, a likely initiative
should include additions which address the entire state of Georgia. Until a new transporta-
tion funding source is acquired, the Atlanta region will continue toward a path of limited





Traditionally, much of the transportation funding in the United States has originated from
the federal government. This was especially true in the 1960s and 1970s when large portions
of the nation's high capacity road network was put into place, resulting from the Interstate
Highway and Defense Act passed in 1956. However, federal funding for transportation has
been steadily declining in recent years. In addition, state revenue from the preferred method
of funding, the state gas tax, has been following the same trend. As a result, many states
have been actively searching for alternative sources to fund their transportation needs. At
the metropolitan or municipal level, for example, governments have used the sales tax as a
popular source of transportation funding. Dallas, Denver, Phoenix, Charlotte, Minneapolis,
Salt Lake City, and Seattle have recently passed sales tax initiatives to fund transportation
investments.
In the state of Georgia, county level sales tax initiatives have been highly successful
for education and transportation funding. The state of Georgia recently enabled a regional
sales tax increase for the purpose of funding transportation projects for a 10-year period.
The sales tax along with a project list for potential funding was brought to a public vote in
twelve separate regions comprising the entire state. Nine of the twelve regions failed to pass
the ballot measure. This research examines the factors that caused this to happen, with
particular attention given to the most complex and diverse region of the twelve in the state,
the Atlanta region.
1.1 Research Objectives
The objective of the research is to document the process and outcome of the public refer-
endum, describe the factors that contributed to its failure in the Atlanta region, and distill
lessons learned that will inform the development of eective strategies in Georgia and other
states. The following are specic questions that the research aims to answer:
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• What historical barriers are aecting transportation investment and progress in the
Atlanta region? To what extent has this improved over time?
• What were the inuencing factors on the legislation as well as the prior attempts at
legislation? How did the Atlanta region end up with the existing legislation?
• What factors inuenced the project selection process in the Atlanta region?
• Which portions of the legislation and process it enabled would stakeholders, politicians,
and legislators (close to the process and outcome of the referendum retrospectively)
change?
• What does the geographic location of voter results imply about the results of the
referendum in the Atlanta region?
• How could the process implemented in the Atlanta region be altered to achieve a
successful referendum measure?
• What lessons should be learned from an Atlanta case study? How should other regions
attempt future transportation referenda?
1.2 Research Methodology
Beginning over a year before until ve months following the public referendum, 48 interviews
were conducted. Participants included a mix of legislators with various levels of involvement
in the drafting of the legislation, high level ocials of multiple transportation agencies,
local politicians involved in the project selection process, representatives from the business
community, members of the campaign, and prominent members of the opposition. Interview
guides were developed for participants identied in groups, such as members of the executive
committee or legislators. The remaining guides were tailored based on the level of participant
involvement. The guides asked a number of specic open-ended questions of each participant,
regardless of background or group. Additional questions based on the respective participant
were also included. Interview guides contained topics to be discussed but also allowed for
the freedom to suggest others. Methodology for interviewing as qualitative research and
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using interview guides was followed throughout the interview process [101, 75, 98]. Several
stakeholders were interviewed multiple times based on their particular involvement. If a
member was consistently involved in the development of the legislation, project selection
process, or public referendum, the member was interviewed multiple times throughout the
process. Appendix A shows the various interview guides over a number of time frames
during the data collection period. Interviewees were selected based on their level and type
of involvement in the legislation, project selection process, and public referendum. The
interviewees were contacted either via email or phone and asked for a personal interview 30
minutes in length. All interviews were tape-recorded and later transcribed in accordance
to methodology in current literature [75, 98]. The ability to go o-the-record was allowed
and described before the interview. The participants were given a copy of the interview
guide at least a week in advance of the scheduled interview. The majority of interviews
were conducted in person. Only four interviews were conducted via telephone. Each of the
participants is described in a manner which shows their respective position while maintaining
their anonymity. In addition, results of the election were analyzed to determine geographic
voting patterns. This data originated from the Georgia Secretary of State Elections Division.
1.3 Thesis Organization
The next chapter provides a literature review as well as a brief history of transportation in
Georgia and the Atlanta region. This overview focuses on the types of investment that were
made during dierent time periods and the resulting infrastructure improvements made in
the state and Atlanta region. The overview also details prior legislative attempts as well as
the passage and structure of the Georgia Transportation Investment Act of 2010. Chapter 3
presents a case study of the Atlanta region as it pertains to the referendum. In particular, the
case study focuses on the project selection process, the resulting project list, the campaigns
for and against the referendum, the results, and the political aftermath. Chapter 4 interprets
the results of both the data analysis and the case study and provides lessons learned with
respect to transportation referenda. In other words, this chapter discusses what should
be done dierently if another referendum is placed on the ballot in the future. The nal
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To provide context for the thesis, this section will introduce relevant literature on sales tax
initiatives.
2.1.1 The Decline of Federal Funding
During the creation of the Interstate Highway System, U.S. transportation policy was dened
by system expansion, growth of vehicle miles traveled (VMT), and transit investment. At
that time, federal funding was growing with increased gas tax contributions [8]. Many
highway bills passed through Congress and the federal transportation program expanded.
This high level of federal investment in transportation trickled down to the state level,
producing a pattern of lower overall levels of state and local transportation contributions
for infrastructure investments [8].
The previous decades of federal funding has reached an end with a peak in VMT in 2007,
the completion of the Interstate Highway System, and the reduction of gas tax revenues
due to increased vehicle fuel eciency and ination. Given the negative national political
environment for tax increases, Congress is reluctant to raise the gas tax to help counteract
the dwindling gas tax revenues [8]. As a result, the federal highway program currently has
no long-term funding mechanism. This issue is only a small portion of the larger discussion
on the U.S. national debt, now exceeding $16 trillion. The broader implications make the
possibility of increasing or even maintaining federal transportation funding unlikely [8].
2.1.2 The Decline of the State Motor Fuel Tax
Similar to the federal gas tax, the Georgia state gas tax is steadily declining due to increased
fuel eciency and ination. The Georgia General Assembly is reluctant to raise the state gas
tax and counteract this decrease because of the unfavorable political climate for tax increases
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[95, 97]. Given these barriers, a silent shift has occurred. Federal and state policymakers
are pushing funding power down to the local governments.
Devolution in Transportation Finance
There has been a gradual devolution of transportation nance from the traditional sources
of federal and state gas taxes in the form of user fees to the local governments in the form
of local sales taxes [41, 42, 95]. Studies acknowledge that the United States is experiencing
a revolution in transportation nance. In a 2003 report, the earlier successful measures
are attributed to earmarked revenue for specic projects. The later projects are typically
allocated for less specic project groupings and programs. Studies also mention a trend in
California counties of generally lower sales tax revenues toward operations and maintenance
for existing infrastructure when compared to new capital investments. Wachs found that
rural counties are more likely than urban counties to allow local control of sales tax revenue
due to their likelihood of spending revenue on roads rather than transit investment [95]. In
California, opportunities to plan regionally were harmed when large portions of the sales
tax revenue were sent to the local counties [37, 95, 40]. In all but ve of California's
transportation sales taxes, exibility was listed as a problem given the earmarked revenue
and its limitation on the transportation authority's ability to shift priorities over time [28,
95]. The report argues that the federal policy and rise of the local sales tax are in direct
conict [95]. As the federal level is devolving transportation nance to the regional level, the
state governments are devolving transportation nance to the local level, undermining the
inuence and impact of regional organizations such as metropolitan planning organizations
(MPOs) and regional agencies. The devolution has signicant implications for metropolitan
transportation planning and transportation policy [42, 95]. In a 2003 report, Wachs argued
a dozen reasons to increase the gas tax instead of implementing popular alternatives such
as the sales tax [94]. A report in 2006 pushed the importance of promoting equity and
eciency in transportation nancing by arguing the importance of expanded and continued
reliance on user fees [96].
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2.1.3 The Local Option Sales Tax
Regardless, many local governments are attempting local option sales tax initiatives. In
Georgia, the local option sales tax has been enormously popular on a county-wide basis.
The Georgia Special Purpose Local Option Sales Tax (SPLOST) law of 1985 allowed an
optional one percent sales tax to fund projects proposed by the county government. The
SPLOSTs were favorable compared to attempts at increasing property taxes and became a
politically favorable method for obtaining alternative funding for county governments [57].
In fact, by 1997, 149 of Georgia's 159 counties had utilized a SPLOST for their additional
funding needs [57].
According to a recent study, of the 721 sales tax referenda attempted in Georgia from
1998 to 2009, 94 percent passed. This number included both education (ESPLOST) and
transportation (TSPLOST) initiatives [57]. Just counting the TSPLOST initiatives, the
number still remained at 92.9 percent passing. When broken down into metro area versus
non-metro areas, the passage range was actually lower in the metro areas [57]. Figure
1 shows the average ratio of voters who supported SPLOST referenda for transportation
funding from 1998 to 2009.
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Figure 1: 1998 - 2009 Average Ratio of Voters in Favor of TSPLOST Referenda [57]
2.1.4 The Regional Sales Tax
Several regions across the nation have attempted regional sales tax initiatives. Table 1
shows regional sales tax initiatives from 2001 to 2011 [24]. A comprehensive database of
regional sales tax initiatives is not currently available. Relevant information was compiled
from an advocacy group known as Center for Transportation Excellence, a group which
oers a number of documents for cities, counties, and regions looking to attempt similar
alternative funding mechanisms. The identied initiatives were used as examples for Georgia
as they reviewed their alternatives. Representatives of the business community mentioned
the Center for Transportation Excellence as one of their main sources for information and
documentation on prior regional sales tax initiatives.
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Table 1: Sales Tax Initiatives Greater than 1 County/City Areas from 2001 - 2011 [24]
Year Location Use Areas Taxed Outcome Results
2008 Seattle, Washington Transit 3 Counties Passed 58 - 42 %
2008 Espaï¾÷ola, New Mexico Transit 4 Counties Passed -
2008 Alburquerque, New Mexico Transportation/Transit 3 Counties Passed -
2008 Aspen, Colorado Transit 2 Counties/6 Cities Passed -
2008 California Transit 2 Counties Passed 68 - 32 %
2008 Spokane, Washington Transit 7 Cities Passed 65 - 35 %
2007 Seattle, Washington Transportation/Transit 3 Counties Failed -
2007 Weber County, Utah Transportation/Transit 3 Counties Passed -
2006 California Transit 2 Counties Failed -
2006 Minnesota Transportation Statewide Passed 57 - 43 %
2004 Denver, Colorado Transit 8 Counties Passed 58 - 42 %
2004 San Antonio, Texas Transportation/Transit 8 Cities Passed 58 - 41 %
2004 Aspen, Colorado Transit 2 Counties/6 Cities Passed 77 - 22 %
2002 Northern Virginia Transportation 4 Counties/5 Cities Failed 55 - 45 %
2002 California Transportation/Transit Statewide Failed 58 - 41 %
2002 Washington Transportation 2 Counties Passed 57 - 43 %
2.1.5 Case Studies of Local and Regional Sales Tax Initiatives
A 2001 study on local option transportation taxes in the United States determined marked
trade-os between accountability and exibility. The report mentions that one of the most
dicult challenges facing initiatives is reassuring the public that new tax revenues won't
be squandered. The report lists a number of ways to increase accountability:
• Time limits to reassure voters that they will have the ability to cancel a tax at a certain
point. Short time frames do not allow regional projects that are normally risky.
Short time frames do allow for a focus on smaller and cost-eective investments which
improve the likelihood of governments to deliver on their promise and boost changes
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for later voter renewal of the tax;
• Binding project lists that either name a program or specic projects on the list;
• Super majority voter approval to protect against a motivated minority passing a tax
not favored by the majority of citizens;
• Risk management strategies to avoid revenue shortfalls that can harm the government's
ability to deliver on its promise;
• Long-term nancing planning for maintenance and operations funding [41].
The study found that these are valuable recommendations but have unintended conse-
quences. For instance, voter approval creates an unwanted incentive for leaders to focus
on popular projects instead of regional projects which results in equity concerns. Also,
the binding project list has limited the exibility to change the project list with shifting
opinions. The report lists the following ways to increase exibility:
• Primacy of regional plans;
• Expert review with alternatives evaluation process and review by state expert review
panel;
• Establish clear planning goals;
• Allow for citizen oversight [41].
A study in 2002 found that the move toward voter-approved transportation nancing was the
product of two trends: (1) the political reluctance to increase user fee revenue given that the
state gas tax has failed to keep up with ination; and (2) the increase in demand for transit
projects which are normally not nanced by traditional user fees. The study conducted
case studies of Alameda County's Measure B approved in November 2000, Missouri State's
Proposition B rejected in August 2002, the Miami Dade Transit Sales Tax approved in
November 2002, Northern Virginia's regional sales tax referendum rejected in November
2002, and Washington State's Referendum 51 rejected in November 2002, using the following
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criteria: (1) Where will the revenue come from? (2) How will the revenue be spent? (3) What
provisions for oversight and accountability have been established? (4) How do proposed
projects relate to existing plans and processes? and (5) Is the proposed initiative at the
appropriate level of government [38]?
The report recommends the following:
1. Make user fees and the state gas tax more exible (eliminate restrictions on state gas
tax for public transit);
2. Index the gas tax to ination;
3. Develop new user fees to supplement gas taxes;
4. Specify projects and dedicate funding categories;
5. Broader public involvement during development of the measure (stakeholders and
members should be closely involved early in the process);
6. Apply social equity for non-user fees;
7. Emphasize land use planning and growth management as a part of larger transporta-
tion ballot measures [38].
In 2007, a study of Sonoma County, California was conducted using precinct-level voting data
and census demographic data for three local transportation sales tax elections in the county.
Using regression models, it was found that the proximity of voters to the transportation
projects on the project list increased their support of the measure. High incomes had a
positive relation to voters supporting a referendum. Political leaning impacted support
either positive or negative depending on the project list and expenditure plan. Another
nding of the study was that the most recent measure passed successfully and was positively
aected by the use of a multimodal expenditure plan [46].
In 2000, a report conducted four case studies including Santa Clara and Sonoma Counties
in California, and the Denver and Seattle metropolitan areas. The report also analyzed
statistics of community-level characteristics of the localities across the nation. Signicant
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ndings showed that initiatives were more successful in areas where the proportion of elderly
was greater than nine percent. The report concluded that in areas of less than nine percent
elderly, measures may require more determined marketing. Another signicant nding of
the report conrmed that initiatives are likely to be less successful in localities with higher
sales taxes. In addition, the report found that priorities should be based on direct collection
from public surveys and focus groups as well as citizen advisory groups and stakeholder
involvement throughout the process [45].
A follow up to the previous study used the same case study methodology as the 2000
study and expanded the study to 11 communities. The study found the following:
1. The combination of a credible opposition and a questionable reputation of the transit
agency or transit system decrease the chance of success;
2. A comprehensive rail-only package is unlikely to be approved in an area without current
transit infrastructure;
3. Limited funding under $1 million for mailing and television advertisements reduces
likelihood of success;
4. Generalization is dicult in the transportation package and developing a consensus
transportation project is dicult;
5. Under certain circumstances, voters do not appear to place signicant importance on
the expiration date of the tax [99].
In 2011, the previous study was replicated. The study closely followed the approach of the
2001 study with the research question are the same factors that seemed most important to
the outcome of transportation tax elections in 2001 still as important 10 years later? The
report found that most factors were replicated from the 2001 study. The following factors
were identied as present in successful campaigns or not present in unsuccessful campaigns:
• A consensus among stakeholders along with depth of nancial support;
• Use of multimedia campaign techniques;
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• Use of experienced campaign consultants;
• A transit agency with a positive public image [44].
The study also recognized rebound elections, where ballots were successful in communities
that had recently experienced defeats. The ndings of these rebound elections include the
following:
• Assured nancing may enhance voter condence in the deliverability of proposals;
• Specied routes may improve perceptions of individual benets;
• The reality of tangible service cuts may outweigh other factors [44].
2.2 A Brief History of Transportation in Georgia and the Atlanta Region
Atlanta would not be the bustling international city it is known for today if it were not
for its transportation history and infrastructure investment. Historically, the Atlanta region
has led transportation innovation with the streetcar network of the 1800s, the extensive
interstate system of the mid-1900s, and the heavy rail system of the late-1900s. Atlanta's
transportation history provides a robust timeline of transportation investments, bringing
with it social and political inuences which still aect transportation policy today. The
following sections give a brief history of the Atlanta region as it relates to transportation
issues later identied as contributing factors to the failure of the transportation referendum
in the Atlanta region.
2.2.1 Terminus to Highways
Given that the majority of cities in the United States were developed based on their prox-
imity to water, Atlanta was far from ordinary. Atlanta was developed mainly due to its
functionality as a transportation connection to the Southeastern United States [48]. In
1836, the Georgia General Assembly enabled the creation of the Western & Atlantic Rail-
road of Georgia. The zero-mile point was known as Terminus, marking the end of the
rail line originating in Chattanooga, Tennessee [58]. Several rail lines met at Terminus and
sparked economic growth and a prominent transportation hub [48].
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After being targeted based on its importance for wartime transportation and manufac-
turing, the majority of the city of Atlanta was burned during the Civil War. Afterward,
the city of Atlanta began to rebuild and restore. By 1870, population growth had produced
a need for public transportation. In 1871, Atlanta constructed its rst streetcar line. By
1881, the Atlanta Street Railway Company operated 11 miles of tracks [70]. The company
held a monopoly until the Metropolitan Street Railway Company emerged in 1883. The
rst streetcars were powered by mules followed by a relatively brief use of locomotives [70].
However, in 1889, the invention of the electric streetcar provided Atlanta with a cheaper
and more reliable service, that became increasingly popular into the next few decades. By
1894, Atlanta had developed the second largest streetcar transit system in the Southeast.
For the next few decades, the majority of the population in the Atlanta region relied on the
streetcar for their transportation needs [70].
But by the end of World War II, a major shift in transportation mode choice changed the
face of Atlanta's transportation infrastructure. The automobile was becoming an increas-
ingly more popular choice for the citizens of the Atlanta region. Following this trend in mode
choice, the city began designing the transportation infrastructure to better accommodate
the automobile [48]. In the 1960s and 1970s a radial network of interstates was constructed.
Figure 2 and Figure 3 show aerial views of the city of Atlanta before the construction of the
interstate system in 1950 and following construction of a majority of the system in 1967,
respectively. The interstates closely resembled the railroad lines Atlanta was initially known
for in design and function [48]. Ocials began planning increased interstate capacity almost
immediately; road widening and highway additions became the main solutions for increased
congestion in the following years [48].
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Figure 2: 1950 Aerial View of the City of Atlanta Pre-Construction of Interstate System [9]
Figure 3: 1967 Aerial View of the City of Atlanta Post-Construction of Interstate System
[10]
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With the ability to travel greater distances from their place of work, many decided to
move further out into the newly and rapidly expanding suburbs. This trend of decentral-
ization also included employers looking to relocate. Decentralization thus helped shape the
unique transportation needs of the Atlanta region [48]. At the same time, Atlanta was se-
cretly struggling with its racial and social issues while publicly boasting itself as the city
too busy to hate. The automobile served as a barrier to the newly segregated streets of
the city [54]. Furthermore, Interstate 75 cut through the core of the city and served as a
purposefully designed barrier of the races [54]. Interstate 20 functioned similarly by cutting
o black communities in the south from the city [58].
The well documented trend in property ownership known as white ight shaped the
transportation infrastructure of the Atlanta region beginning in the 1960s. After the segre-
gationist resistance of the Ku Klux Klan, the Columbians, and the West End Cooperative
Corporation ultimately failed, white property owners within the city sold their homes in fear
of lowered property values and unwanted impacts from recent school segregation. The city's
white population ed into the suburbs at increasing rates [54]. Figure 4 shows the radial
expansion of the overall population between 1960 and 1985. Given this trend compounded
with the heavy emergence of the automobile, the city of Atlanta underwent a massive de-
mographic shift from 38 percent proportion identifying as black in the 1960 census to 67
percent identifying as black in the 1980 census [80].
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Figure 4: 1970 - 1985 Directions of Growth Persons per Square Mile in Atlanta Region [11]
2.2.2 MARTA Referenda
With a large number within the population regularly commuting to Atlanta from the sub-
urbs, the highway systems experienced high levels of congestion. Projections for an explosion
of population growth in the city and suburbs spurred proposals for rapid transit in the region
[33]. In the early years of discussion, a referendum was put forth for a public vote which
would give counties taxing powers to fund the construction and operation of public trans-
portation systems. The proposal allowed counties to join cities and other counties at their
discretion [33]. Fulton and DeKalb Counties voted in favor of the referendum, following
the strong support of many civic groups and local ocials. Regardless, the referendum was
defeated on a statewide level in November 1962. Many believed the defeat was connected
to the statewide unfamiliarity with the issue, though the high level of opposition within the
inner metropolitan area suggested further reasons for rejection [33].
After the defeat, the Rapid Transit Committee of 100, a committee composed of 100
citizens, was formed with membership from the ve county metropolitan area: the City of
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Atlanta, Clayton, Cobb, DeKalb, Fulton, and Gwinnett Counties. In addition, the Georgia
General Assembly established the Georgia State Study Commission on Rapid Transit in
1963. These two groups worked to present another amendment in November 1964, which
provided for a public vote in the ve county metropolitan area. The referendum held that
the rapid transit authority would have a composition of eleven members with the following
distribution: 4 from the City of Atlanta, 2 in DeKalb and Fulton respectively, and 1 in
Cobb, Clayton, and Gwinnett respectively [33]. All areas passed the amendment, though
Cobb County passed by a slim majority of 51 percent [33].
The following year, the Georgia General Assembly passed the Metropolitan Atlanta
Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) Act of 1965, which allowed a special referendum for the
ve county metropolitan area and the city of Atlanta to decide county-specic participation
in the rapid transit authority. The referendum was held on June 16, 1965 where all but one
county voted in favor of participation. With only 43 percent voting in favor, Cobb County
decided to opt-out of participation with MARTA [33]. The decision marked the political
beginning of a long-standing historical opposition to public transportation by Cobb County
ocials and citizens.
Planning for the proposal of rapid transit met many dierent forms of opposition during
the next few years. In 1966, black leaders rallied together to oppose the then current plan for
rapid transit, concerned that it did not provide procient service to the black communities
of the region. The House shelved the proposal following the loud complaints of a number
of inuential Atlanta legislators and DeKalb County commissioners [33]. Many inuential
ocials were also concerned by the increase in cost estimates. Georgia's Governor Lester
Maddox summed up the overall discourse when he publicly stated that Atlanta should
improve the expressway system rather than sink hundreds of millions of dollars into an
unproven rapid transit system [33].
Despite heavy opposition, the MARTA board presented a proposal for rapid transit in
1968. The proposal included a 40-mile xed rail system, ve dierent lines, and thirty-two
stations and was voted on by 4 counties: Fulton, DeKalb, Clayton, and Gwinnett [74]. Half
of the $751 million dollar estimate would be covered by the state and federal government
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and half would be nanced through property taxes [74]. All four counties failed to pass the
referendum for the following reasons [48]:
• The rail network did not include a connection with the Atlanta-based private bus
service, Atlanta Transit System;
• The property tax method was relatively unpopular at the time;
• There was no public input in the proposal and the public was unable the review the
rail plan until two months before the election;
• The black leaders strongly and publicly opposed the proposal on grounds that it did
not provide adequate service to the black communities [33].
Given these issues, a number of unsuspecting allies rallied together to defeat the proposition.
Opponents included middle class residents, African-Americans, and white conservatives [48].
The MARTA Board took a new initiative after the defeat, specically targeting the black
community in discussions [74]. Taking into account the public input and recent studies on
alternative options, the board presented a revised referendum in November of 1971 [48]. The
proposal included a 57-mile xed rail system with 37 stations and two rapid busways with
three stations. The proposal stipulated that MARTA would purchase the Atlanta Transit
System and integrate its buses into the new system [48]. The cost of $1.4 billion would be
partially covered by the federal government and partially by a local one percent sales tax
in the participating counties. The sales tax was a relatively new concept for the state of
Georgia, requiring approval by the Georgia General Assembly. Of the four counties, only
Fulton and DeKalb Counties passed the referendum by a slim majority of 51 percent [74].
Since Clayton and Gwinnett did not vote in favor, the two counties were not included in the
construction and operation of MARTA.
The implications of this seemingly small moment in history were more than any could
imagine for the future of transportation nance and policy in Atlanta. Without the addi-
tion of rail in the outer counties, a regional network of rail was never implemented within
the Atlanta region. Because of this, the rail network did not play a large role in shaping
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transportation and development in the region. In addition, decentralization and long con-
struction times dulled the excitement of rail investment in Atlanta [48]. MARTA was unable
to inuence mode choice and transportation growth in the region. MARTA also was unable
to realize its initial promises of providing growth in downtown employment [48].
Much of the MARTA public referenda debate involved race relations at the time. The
racial divide between the city and the outer suburban counties has continually inuenced
Atlanta politics, and in particular Atlanta's transportation politics. This racial divide has
played a large role in the failures of many regional approaches to social and economic issues in
the region [58]. The MARTA referenda are perfect examples of the prominent geographically
oriented political barriers Atlanta ocials have faced throughout history. The referenda
provide a deeper understanding of the present diculties of attaining regionalism within the
Atlanta area.
2.2.3 OTP versus ITP
In 1969, Georgia completed a substantial transportation infrastructure project. Interstate
285 formed a ring around the city of Atlanta and provided a corridor for the freight industry
and others to bypass the heavy trac of downtown Atlanta. In addition, Interstate 285
serves as a prominent barrier for transportation politics in the region. Interstate 285 divides
the region into people who live inside the perimeter (ITP) versus people who live outside the
perimeter (OTP) [48]. Many consider this political barrier to be synonymous with urban
versus suburban interests in the Atlanta region.
Following the construction of Interstate 285, a surplus of employment centers developed
along the perimeter in order to bypass inner city trac and cut costs. In the 1970s, the
trend of decentralization was even more prominent. The suburbs functioned as stand-alone
employment centers and shifted new employment opportunities away from Atlanta. A few
years later, the suburbs reached comparable levels of employment with the city of Atlanta
[48]. At this point, the city was actually losing population to the suburbs.
By the 1990s, there was an unequal presence of employment and overall economic growth
in the suburbs, particularly in the northern portion of the Atlanta region. Because of this
20
unprecedented growth, new economic centers in the northern suburbs shaped commuter
patterns away from the standard downtown commute that both MARTA and the central
highway system were initially designed for [48]. In fact, by 1990, the number of commuters
traveling from suburb to suburb was the dominant commuter choice at 58 percent, with the
next closest commuter choice of suburb to city at 18 percent [48].
2.2.4 GRTA and Beyond
The region's success and years of heavy dependence on the automobile resulted in air pollu-
tion levels which violated national standards. The city of Atlanta was named in violation of
the Clean Air Act Amendment of 1990. By 1999, the city was required to meet the standards
or incur withholding of federal highway funding for the region [58]. The business community,
among others, took action and pushed for the development of an entity to solve this issue.
Governor Roy Barnes took oce proclaiming that his rst priority would be to address the
trac gridlock. The new governor pushed a bill to create a regional transportation agency
[58]. With no signicant opposition from a relatively popular new governor and a strong
presence from the business community, the bill passed into law early in the 1999 legislative
session [58].
In an unprecedented attempt at regionalism, the Georgia Regional Transportation Au-
thority (GRTA) was given power in the 13 counties of the metropolitan Atlanta area. In
addition, GRTA was given the power to plan, coordinate, or directly operate transit systems
in its jurisdiction [58]. GRTA signied a targeted attempt by the business community to
overcome regional barriers in transportation. GRTA currently oers Xpress commuter bus
service in 12 counties of the Atlanta region [12].
Today, GRTA arguably has never attained its intended goals for regionalism. According
to one member of the House of Representatives who served in the legislature for over 21
years, the GRTA bill may have been one of the most forward-looking pieces of transit
governance that the state of Georgia has ever passed [15]. The legislator argues that GRTA
would have been the regional transit authority that Georgia needed, only if Governor Roy
Barnes had been re-elected. Governor Roy Barnes lost his re-election campaign to Governor
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Sonny Perdue in 2002. The legislator maintains that even though the GRTA bill contained
every piece of statutory power that was required for regional governance, the agency has
been emasculated in many ways since passage of the bill [15].
A member of the Senate recalls another negative eect from the unexpected loss of
Governor Roy Barnes's re-election campaign. In anticipation of a second term, Governor
Roy Barnes had positioned a number of major transportation projects for future investment.
These projects ranged from a rail line to Cobb County to the controversial outer perimeter
project. A member of the Senate blames the state's inaction on transportation from 2003 to
2007 on the incoming Governor Sonny Perdue. The member maintains that the slashing of
the large number of transportation projects in the metropolitan Atlanta region by Governor
Perdue caused the legislature to sit around with nothing in transportation [18].
The Georgia legislature is currently searching for transit governance alternatives to solve
many transportation ineciencies and work toward improved regionalism. However, a tran-
sit governance bill failed to pass at the last hour during the 2012 legislative session due
to disagreements over using a weighted or equal representation for the power structure [1].
This attempt failed only a few months before the July 2012 transportation referendum,
when pressure to pass transit governance was at its highest. The 2013 legislative session did
not produce a transit governance bill due to this issue and the fact that pressure has been
reduced after the referendum had failed in the Atlanta region.
2.2.5 The Transportation Crisis
Atlanta transportation plans dating back to the twenties mention the presence of a trans-
portation crisis caused by population growth and the automobile. The Atlanta region has
historically experienced diculties keeping up with its growth and success. Recently, the
issue has compounded with a transportation funding crisis. Now not only is the region
not keeping up with its growth, it is also experiencing a decline in both federal and state
transportation funding.
Over the past 90 years, motor fuel taxes have funded the construction and operation
of the majority of transportation infrastructure in the United States. Both federal and
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state fuel taxes still serve as the largest source of revenue for transportation; however, the
revenue from these sources is steadily declining due to ination and increased vehicular fuel
eciency.
2.2.6 Business Community Pressures
The success of Georgia businesses relies in part on their ability to move goods and employees
to and from their places of business more eciently. For this reason, the business community
has historically pushed for investment in transportation through lobbying and other means.
According to a representative of the business community, the Metro Atlanta Chamber
began the process with the 1998 Metro Atlanta Transportation Initiative [25]. The initiative
produced a blueprint for improving transportation in Atlanta. The nal report, written
and prepared by McKinsey & Company, Inc., listed seven recommendations for the metro
Atlanta region:
1. Set and communicate short-term and long-term performance objectives for Atlanta's
regional transportation system;
2. Adopt aspirations-based strategic planning and land use compliance incentives;
3. Create a regional transit authority to plan and coordinate all transit in the region
(currently GRTA);
4. Secure adequate and exible funding for transportation needs;
5. Build public awareness about transportation issues and alternatives to single occu-
pancy vehicle travel;
6. Mobilize the business community to support recommendations and change commuter
behavior;
7. Empower one regionally focused agency with integrated responsibility for planning,
resource allocation/authority, and monitoring of implementation for all forms of trans-
portation in the Atlanta region [56].
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The fourth recommendation addressed the need for an adequate transportation funding
source. The report recognized the lack of exibility in the current transportation funding
structure given that the Georgia Constitution does not allow the use of state gas tax funds
for transit funding. Because of this, the local match funding for transit and non-road
alternatives in the Atlanta region is limited to local government funding sources such as
sales taxes [56]. This recommendation began a long discussion on transportation funding in
the Atlanta region. The six other recommendations were implemented by 2005, including
the creation of GRTA [25].
In 2005, many of Atlanta's competitive regions had already addressed or were in the
process of addressing their own funding crisis. Trac was a main factor for companies
looking to relocate or invest in a location. The overall perception was that Atlanta had
no plans to address its transportation funding crisis [25]. Because of this, the business
community was worried that other locations across the nation would be selected for company
relocation over the city of Atlanta based on trac concerns. The business community then
began to prepare its case for the Georgia General Assembly leading up to 2007 [25].
Governor Roy Barnes did not want to address the funding issue until his second term,
which never occurred. Governor Sonny Perdue was the rst Republican governor since
the mid-1800s and did not want to tackle the controversial issue until his second term. A
member of Governor Sonny Perdue's oce in 2007 recalls the governor pushing back on the
pressure by the business community and others to address transportation. People working
closely with the governor were not allowed to use the word funding in the governor's
presence [4]. During Governor Sonny Perdue's 2008 re-election campaign, he made promises
to the business community that he would deal with the transportation issue after his
re-election. Following these promises, the business community expected Governor Perdue
to move forward with a proposal for transportation in the legislature; however, Governor
Perdue did not do so. Fueled by this inaction, the business community formed a unied
push for legislative action on Georgia's transportation issues [18].
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2.2.7 The Joint Study Committee
According to a member of the Senate, the Georgia legislature initially identied two dier-
ent approaches to the transportation issue: regional or statewide. At the time, discussions
centered on either allowing an Atlanta regional referendum or allowing a statewide referen-
dum of in which Atlanta would participate [18]. Not being able to decide on an approach,
a bipartisan Joint Senate-House Transportation Funding Study Committee was formed.
During the 2007 legislative session, Senate Resolution 365 formed a committee of eight
legislators to determine alternative funding mechanisms for future transportation investment
[12]. The Joint Study Committee met six times across the state of Georgia during the sum-
mer of 2007 [12]. Two work sessions were also held in Atlanta to develop recommendations
for resolutions and proposed legislation to present during the 2008 legislative session of the
Georgia General Assembly[12]. During the meetings, the committee listened to presenta-
tions by transportation experts from the local, state, and national level. The committee's
nal report was divided into three phases: (1) Identify Transportation Funding Challenges
in Georgia; (2) Consider Potential Funding Solutions; (3) Provide Recommendations.
Phase 1 identied that the Georgia population will grow by three million people within
the next twenty years. In addition, the committee discussed increasing vehicle miles traveled,
truck trac, and an aging roadway infrastructure [12]. The committee discussed the motor
fuel tax in detail. The federal motor fuel tax generated 18.4 cents per gallon, or $1.3 billion
per year. The state motor fuel tax generated 7.5 cents per gallon, as well as 3 percent of the
4 percent from the sales tax on fuel. These two produced 17.3 cents per gallon, or around
$1 billion in state motor fuel tax revenue [12]. Given this current revenue, plus a few other
sources of revenue from the state general fund and general obligation bonds, the current and
future needs for transportation were determined to signicantly exceed current and future
funding. The committee concluded that Georgia had signicant transportation problems
[12].
In the second phase, the committee considered potential funding solutions. The com-
mittee discussed the following in detail: implementing a State Infrastructure Bank (SIB) to
provide low cost loans for transportation projects, to encourage Public-Private Initiatives
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(PPIs) which are public and private sector partnerships in transportation improvements, to
encourage design-build projects which use a single entity through design and construction
services, and mileage based enhancements in the form of a user charge system [12].
In the third phase, the committee considered possible recommendations. The committee
discussed the following in detail: asset management, revenue enhancement such as gas tax
indexing for ination, value engineering, marketing, and transit. After the nal meeting
and two working sessions, the committee developed a nal list of eighteen recommendations.
Table 2 shows the recommendations and descriptions by the committee [12].
Table 2: Final Recommendations by the Joint Study Committee on Transportation Funding
[12]
Recommendation Description
State Infrastructure Bank (SIB) Create SIB for providing low cost loans for transportation projects
Design-Build Increase frequency of design-build contracts
Aviation and Railroad State funds for statewide airport and rail system
Statewide Transportation Funding Remove excise tax on motor fuel and placing percentage sales tax on all but motor fuel
Regional Transportation Funding Allow counties to join as regions to hold referenda at max of one percent sales tax
Statewide Transportation Plan (STP) Develop of STP
Value Engineering Urge GDOT to use value engineering
Overall Concession Plan Urge report from GDOT on overall statewide concession plan
Public Private Initiatives (PPI) Urge GDOT to award contracts using PPIs
Transit Support transit in the STP
MagLev - Transrapid Support construction of MagLev transit line
HOV to HOT Lanes Urge GDOT to perform a HOT Lane Feasibility and Implementation Study
Eciency in State Governance Urge GDOT to privatize and reduce costs
Transportation Oversight Committee Create Transportation Oversight Committee
State Road and Tollway Authority (SRTA) Urge SRTA to Report to the House and Senate Transportation Committees
Council for Rural and Human Service Transportation Create the Georgia Council for Rural Human Services Transportation
The U.S. Department of Transportation Urge U.S. DOT to devolve federal highway and transit programs to the states
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Multiple committee members cited diculties in convincing the other members to sign
o on the nal report. One committee member believed that the issue of taxation bothered
many committee members [1]. Over the past decade, a huge shift in power occurred. A
number of the newly elected Republicans in the House and Senate had signed anti-tax
pledges. For this reason, many took issue with signing a document that recommended a
tax increase. To make matters worse, tax increases were unpopular recommendations given
a looming recession in 2007. After much discussion, each of the joint study committee's
members signed the nal report. The committee brought the recommendations back to the
Georgia legislature for the upcoming 2008 legislative session.
2.2.8 Carrying Out Recommendations
A number of resolutions and bills relating to the Joint Study Committee and recommenda-
tions were passed in the next few years:
2008 Session
• House Bill 1019 created a SIB [55];
• House Bill 1189 required the GDOT Commissioner to le a report on the Statewide
STP to be completed by June 30, 2009 [77];
• House Resolution 1631 urged GDOT to implement commuter rail services connecting
Macon, Atlanta, and Athens [49];
• Senate Bill 417 required the GDOT Commissioner to perform value engineering studies
and to produce benchmarks and reports to show progress on construction projects [61];
• Senate Bill 444 allowed GDOT to more easily dispose of surplus property [68];
• Senate Resolution 750 urged the USDOT to reconsider its mission and purpose and
devolve its federal gas tax funding back to the states [66];
• Senate Resolution 781 urged the GDOT to develop a Statewide Transportation Plan
(STP) [64];
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• Senate Resolution 1047 urged the GDOT to consolidate its county barns and privatize
road maintenance functions [67];
• Senate Resolution 1060 urged the GDOT to provide reports to the Georgia General
Assembly on maintenance and other progress [63].
2009 Session
• Senate Bill 85 created the Georgia Aviation Authority [50];
• Senate Bill 200 created a Director of Planning position within GDOT, provided for
development of transportation plans, and listed duties for the GDOT commissioner
and State Transportation Board [100].
2010 Session
• Senate Bill 305 increased the total awarded amount to design-build method projects
[59];
• Senate Bill 520 created an intermodal division within GDOT [60].
Though these bills and resolutions expanded and improved their respective areas of Georgia's
transportation system, there was still a great need for a substantial additional funding source
for transportation. Throughout the three sessions, the most favorable funding source for
both the House and Senate bodies involved some sort of transportation sales tax. The issue
and conicts between the two bodies arose within the specics of the bill. According to
a committee member, the discussion in the 2008 legislative session centered around two
separate recommendations: statewide transportation funding and regional transportation
funding [18].
Several weeks prior to the beginning of the 2008 legislative, the House and Senate Trans-
portation Committees met to discuss a compromise. The issue continued to center around
the logistics of the funding mechanism. The House was set on a statewide funding mech-
anism and the Senate was set on an Atlanta-specic funding mechanism [18]. Unable to
reach a compromise, the House and Senate proposed the two dierent approaches during
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the 2008 legislative session. The House of Representatives passed a statewide approach and
the Senate passed a regional approach, a position which occurred during all three years of
legislative attempts.
2.2.9 2008 Transportation Funding Initiative
House Bill 1139 of 2008, along with enabling legislation from House Resolution 1226 of
2008, originally allowed a one percent increase in the statewide sales and use tax to fund
transportation capital outlay and maintenance expenses. This proposed revenue was slated
for roadway, aviation, seaport, and public transportation purposes [79]. The one percent
increase would be decided by a statewide referendum. Though the referendum was statewide,
the project lists for 90 percent of the funding would be determined on a regional basis. Each
region would establish a list of transportation projects to be funded. The remaining 10
percent of the funding would be dedicated to statewide transportation purposes under the
direction of the Georgia General Assembly [79].
Senate Resolution 845 of 2008 originally proposed a one percent sales tax on multiple
counties and cities, given approval by a referendum in each area. The House Committee
on Transportation oered a substitute to the resolution which included naming specic
districts instead of allowing the counties and municipalities to join at their own will [65].
While in the Senate Conference Committee, the committee oered a substitute which would
provide for both a statewide and regional funding mechanism. One portion would utilize
a transportation fund from the state gas tax to be managed by GDOT and the Georgia
General Assembly. The second portion would allow for a one percent sales tax increase
approved by regional referenda. The same special transportation districts recommended by
the House Committee on Transportation remained in the substitute [65].
Negotiations were held in the conference committee for a week prior to the nal day
of the session. The committee ultimately decided on a regional approach. According to a
member of the committee, the regional approach would impose a one percent sales tax on
the Atlanta region in the form of a constitutional amendment with enabling legislation. The
rest of Georgia would receive the fourth penny collected from the state motor fuel tax. The
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other three pennies are currently guaranteed to GDOT with the fourth usually directed into
the general budget. The regional approach would have allotted that penny over a phased
period of time that would start diverting it toward a centric state aid program for local
governments to aid in local government transportation programs [18].
The Senate voted on the enabling legislation, needing only a simple majority of 29
members. The Senate passed the enabling legislation; however, the Senate failed to pass
the constitutional amendment when it received only 35 of the 38 required yes votes. On the
same day, the House voted overwhelmingly in favor. The vote of three senators pushed back
transportation funding for the state of Georgia for another two years. Many cite the limited
leadership of the lieutenant governor for the lack of unied support in the Senate, saying
that Senate leadership had voted against the bill [1]. Others argue that the overwhelming
support seen in the House was not expected given the regional nature of the legislation, a
specic that was more favorable in the Senate. Thus, the Senate, assuming it would not
pass in the House, did not form a unied push to pass the legislation. Regardless, the issue
was pushed o for the next legislative session. According to members of the Senate, the
business community was furious.
2.2.10 2009 Transportation Funding Initiative
Prior to the start of the 2009 legislative session, the House and Senate Transportation Com-
mittee members as well as the business community and state leadership met to discuss a new
compromise. The group agreed to move forward on a multiple-region funding mechanism.
The regions were not pre-dened. The counties were allowed to join and create their own
regions. Though an early deal had been struck, political issues changed the ultimate validity
of the deal. Lieutenant Governor Casey Cagle caused ripples with his hopes of running for
governor in the 2010 election [18]. While addressing transportation issues at a public meet-
ing, Casey Cagle promised the business community saying I will get this done. According
to a member of the Georgia General Assembly, Speaker Glenn Richardson took oense to
the statement [18]. During the next meeting for negotiations between the House and Sen-
ate, the majority leader arrived as a deal was about to be struck between the two bodies.
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The majority leader spoke about reconsidering the deal, informing the committee that the
House had decided to move back to a statewide approach. According to the member of the
committee, this was the end of negotiations for the 2009 session [18]. The House and the
Senate moved forward with competing proposals.
The Senate attempted to pass Senate Bill 39 along with enabling legislation in the form
of Senate Resolution 44 in the 2009 session. Senate Bill 39 of 2009 originally proposed a
one percent transportation sales tax to be allowed in transportation districts by referendum
where the districts would develop their respective project lists. The original bill allowed
counties to opt-out of the sales tax [62]. A oor amendment adjusted the specics of the
opt-out criteria. Another oor amendment provided for public studies by GDOT. The
Senate passed the bill and enabling legislation in February 2009.
The House oered a substitute in the form of an amendment to the MARTA Act of
1965, which would remove the restrictions placed on MARTA for its sales tax proceeds,
otherwise known as the 50/50 sales tax revenue split on capital and maintenance/operations
funding. The nal House substitute to Senate Bill 39 placed a June 30, 2011 end date on the
lifting of the 50/50 split, instead of lifting it altogether. The Senate oered an amendment,
essentially removing the entire substitute. The Senate never passed Senate Bill 39 into
law. According to a House member, the Senate and House could not agree on the opt-out
criterion. Many members of the House were not willing to allow an opt-out criteria because
it was not necessarily improving transportation for the region. With the opt-out criteria,
a seemingly regional bill could easily become a basic local transportation tax in regions
not willing to come together for their transportation needs [1]. Other members believe
the main issue stemmed from the lieutenant governor's comments prior to the legislative
session. Some believe that given this overarching political issue, the House had no intention
of passing legislation during the 2009 session [18]. Though Senate Bill 39 failed for these
and other reasons, the House also attempted a bill which would ultimately become the rst
successful alternative transportation funding bill passed in recent history.
House Bill 277 of 2009 originally proposed the creation of a Transportation Trust Fund
along with a Georgia 2020 Transportation Trust Fund Oversight Committee that provided
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the criteria and list of programs and projects to be funded through the trust fund. In ad-
dition, this bill allowed a 10-year, one percent special transportation sales and use tax to
supply the trust fund with the necessary funds [78]. The House Committee on Transporta-
tion oered a substitute to the bill which produced specics to the original bill. The Senate
Finance Committee oered a substitute which utilized special transportation districts to
develop project lists for their respective transportation funds. The substitute further stated
that counties would have the ability to opt-out of their involvement within these special
transportation districts.
While in conference committee, a member of the Senate remembers that he felt the
whole time, and knew for a fact, that the House had no intentions of making a deal that
session [18]. He reasons that since the House wanted a constitutional amendment, they
could pass it in 2010. Essentially, the legislature had another year to come up with the
specics.
Even so, there was an exciting moment that occurred during conference committee. With
the understanding that the committee was in agreement and the bill was to be signed, a
conference committee meeting was called. The members all sat down to make grand speeches
and sign the agreement. The members of the Senate had signed the agreement. But at the
last moment, a prominent member of the committee from the House of Representatives
said, I just can't accept this. The 2009 transportation funding initiative failed during
the last moments of the session [18]. Another member of the Senate attributes the failure
to bad politics. He reasons that it all stemmed from Speaker Richardson not wanting
the initiative to succeed, possibly due to the aforementioned complications with Lieutenant
Governor Cagle prior to the 2009 legislative session [17]. A member of the House recalled
that the substance of the bill was not in dispute, but only inter-chamber politics centered
on the ballot questions between the then ery speaker and lieutenant governor [3]. The
two leaders had made it evident to all of legislators interviewed that the entire process was
just a game [1]. The member of the House also mentioned that without this issue, the bill
would probably have been adopted [3]. With two years of inaction, many members of the
Georgia legislature remember the business community being noticeably angered and unied
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for a strong push for action on transportation funding.
2.2.11 The Transportation Investment Act of 2010
In 2010, a compromise was agreed upon and the Transportation Investment Act of 2010 was
passed into law. This section details the specics of the bill and its passage.
Governor Sonny Perdue
Many believed that the main reason the bill took three years to pass the Georgia General
Assembly was the lack of state leadership. Three weeks into the 2010 legislative session,
however, Governor Sonny Perdue came out in favor of a bill for transportation funding.
Once Governor Perdue became involved, other issues that had plagued the process began
to fade away [27]. Some members of the Senate and House were so frustrated with their
inability to agree in the previous years that they were happy to see the governor get involved.
One member of the Senate remembers that once the governor got involved he felt certain
that something was going to happen [17]. A member of the House recalls feeling that the
governor's plan was seriously awed, though it was very much the message that it was the
plan and there will be no other plan [3]. A marked improvement of relations between the
House and Senate also occurred in the 2010 session when the House elected a new speaker.
One legislator praised the new speaker saying that he had a dierent tactic and a dierent
way of handling things [1]. Also, there was an underlying political motivation for the
Republican Party to move on transportation for Governor Perdue's re-election campaign.
Former Governor Roy Barnes was looking to run again and could have used the years of
inaction in transportation against Governor Perdue as a campaign issue with the business
community. To avoid working with the Democrats in the Georgia General Assembly and
speed up the process, among other reasons, leaders in the House decided to go statutory [18].
This meant that the resulting proposal did not need to have enabling legislation. However,
given the lack of enabling legislation, questions were asked throughout the process on the
constitutionality of the legislation. This topic will be discussed further in chapter 4.
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The Georgia Senate
The Senate proposed Senate Bill 366 along with enabling legislation in the form of Senate
Resolution 972. The bill called for a phase-in on the fourth penny collected from the state
motor fuel tax for transportation purposes and a one percent sales tax in special transporta-
tion tax districts with the development of a project list in each district. The bill allowed for
the counties to opt-out of the districts by allowing the counties initially to decide if they
wanted to pass a resolution calling for the referendum. The bill also provided an exemption
for counties already utilizing a sales tax for public transportation. This proposal was read
and referred by the Senate in February of 2010 [81].
The Georgia House of Representatives
The Transportation Investment Act of 2010 began in the 2010 session as House Bill 1218
of 2009. According to a member of the House, this bill was a template from Governor
Perdue [16]. However, this template changed signicantly from the time it was introduced.
The original bill called for specic responsibilities of the director of planning and GDOT,
the development of a State Public Transportation Fund, the change in the provisions for
the balancing and allocation of state and federal funds, the suspension of the MARTA
50/50 restriction, and the creation of special tax districts and regional referenda held on the
date of the rst presidential preference primary for a one percent sales tax for a period of
eight years. The House Committee on Transportation oered a substitute to the bill, which
added responsibilities for the GDOT Commissioner, public meetings during discussion of the
investment list, the ability for governments to approve a regional tax through a resolution
or ordinance, the creation of a Transit Governance Study Commission to address future
legislation for transit governance, and the date of the referenda to be held with the general
primary in 2012 to last a period of 10 years [35].
House Bill 277
In March 2010, the conference committee favorably substituted a previous bill that had
already been introduced in the 2009 session, House Bill 277. Though the two bills actually
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did not dier substantially, House Bill 277 had progressed much further than House Bill
1218 in the legislative process. By the next month, House Bill 277 was passed by the House
and Senate. The House voted 141 Yea - 29 Nay and the Senate voted 43 Yea - 8 Nay. House
Bill 277 was signed by Governor Perdue on June 2nd, 2010.
House Bill 277 included the following signicant features:
• Creation of 12 special tax districts corresponding to the boundaries of existing regional
commissions for a 1 percent sales tax subject to the requirement of referendum approval
to be imposed for a period of 10 years;
• MARTA shall not be authorized to use proceeds of the sales tax for maintenance and
operations costs of existing infrastructure;
• 25 percent of the proceeds shall go to local governments within the district which the
tax is levied. 15 percent of the proceeds shall go to local governments wholly contained
within a single MPO (this only applied to Atlanta). The remaining proceeds would
fund a project list in each district;
• Regional transportation roundtable for each special district consisting of two represen-
tatives from each county (one chairperson, sole commissioner, mayor or CEO of the
county governing authority and one mayor elected by the mayors);
• Counties with more than 90 percent of the population residing in municipal corpora-
tions shall have the mayor serve as an additional representative (this only applied to
Atlanta);
• The regional transportation roundtable shall elect ve representatives to serve as an
executive committee;
• The GDOT director of planning, a position created in the legislation, shall write
the state recommended criteria for the investment list of transportation projects by
November 15, 2010;
• Any amendment or approval of criteria shall be enacted by a majority vote of present
members of the regional transportation roundtable;
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• After approval of criteria, a report shall be provided to local governments, MPOs,
local legislators, and the GDOT commissioner. Upon receipt of the report, the parties
shall submit projects to the GDOT director of planning;
• The GDOT director of planning shall assemble a list of example investments for
each district's investment criteria and submit the list to each executive committee for
consideration;
• A scally constrained draft list shall be developed and delivered by the executive
committee and GDOT director of planning by August 15, 2011;
• The draft investment list shall be considered by the regional transportation roundtable
and approved by a majority of present members;
• At least two public meetings must be held prior to the nal regional transportation
roundtable meeting;
• The nal investment list shall be delivered by October 15, 2011;
• The rst election shall be held on the general statewide primary in 2012 (exact wording
provided in the legislation);
• Change in matching requirements for GDOT local maintenance and improvement
grants based on passage of the referendum (see section 4.1.7);
• The approval of the tax shall not diminish alternative funds allocated to the district
and shall not be subject to congressional balancing;
• Collection of the tax shall begin on the rst day of the next quarter and shall cease
either on the nal day of the 10-year period or at the point the collections equals the
estimated amount to be raised [78].




The history of the Atlanta region has continually centered on transportation investment
and issues which have shaped current transportation policy. Changes in federal and state
gas tax revenue have recently caused a noticeable transportation crisis in the region. The
main solution from the Georgia legislature was either a regional or statewide transportation
sales tax, the specics to be argued over for three legislative sessions. A series of political
compromises led to the Transportation Investment Act of 2010. Once the bill passed into
law, the twelve regions entered into the rst phase of the process. The next chapter provides
a detailed case study of the Atlanta region as it moved through each of the phases outlined
in the Transportation Investment Act of 2010.
37
Chapter III
CASE STUDY OF THE ATLANTA REGION
The Atlanta region is the most diverse and complicated region of the 12 regions designated
by the Transportation Investment Act of 2010. The Atlanta region is a 10-County area of
over 4.18 million people, a population which is still larger than 24 states in the United States
[13]. The region, as shown in Figure 3, consists of the City of Atlanta, Cherokee, Clayton,
Cobb, DeKalb, Douglas, Fayette, Fulton, Gwinnett, Henry, and Rockdale Counties.
Figure 5: The 10-County Atlanta Region [13]
As shown in Figure 6, the region is home to a mix of urban, suburban, and exurban ju-
risdictions, each of which requires unique transportation solutions. As mentioned in chapter
2, the Atlanta region includes Interstate 285 and Interstate 20. Also, the city of Atlanta
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is the meeting point for Interstate 75 and Interstate 85. Portions of Interstate 85 include
HOT lanes, with future HOT lanes planned for portions of Interstate 75. The Atlanta re-
gion is also home to GA 400, a commuter toll road. Fulton and DeKalb Counties house
and fund the MARTA system through a one percent sales tax. Cobb and Gwinnett Coun-
ties operate their own transit systems, Cobb County Transit (CCT) and Gwinnett County
Transit (GCT) oering bus and paratransit services. GRTA operates an Xpress commuter
bus service in 12 counties of the 20-County Atlanta region.
Figure 6: Urban, Suburban, and Exurban Jurisdictions
According to the Texas Transportation Institute's 2012 Urban Mobility Report, Atlanta
currently ranks 7th worst in the nation for annual yearly auto delay per commuter. Atlanta
ranks near the top 10 worst for most every other congestion measure in the report [73]. Over
the last several years, Georgia has averaged 48th in transportation spending per capita.
The limited funding and increased congestion has made Atlanta home to seven of the worst
bottlenecks in the nation [6].
3.1 Demographic Snapshot
Using 2010 Census data, the Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC), the Atlanta region's
MPO, reported that 38.5 percent of the 10-County Atlanta region's total population lived
in cities, an increase of 20 percent when compared to 2000 Census data [31]. In addition,
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the trend of unequal population gain in the northern part of the suburbs, as discussed in
chapter 2, is continuing. The second development ring in the North contained the most
substantial population gains [31].
The Atlanta region is experiencing a large shift in its racial and ethnic prole. As shown
in Figure 7, the region's racial makeup has changed signicantly from just the White and
Non-White populations reported in the Census prior to the 1950s; the Atlanta region is
now home to an ever increasing number of individuals identifying as Black, as well as Asian
and Hispanic. In fact, the growth of non-White populations was far more substantial than
the growth of the White population in the 10-County Atlanta region. The Black population
has increased by more than any other race and ethnicity. Population changes over the past
decade show a trend of more Blacks moving to the suburbs. Seven of the 10 counties actually
lost White population. Six counties are now majority non-White [31]. The gure shows that
the distribution of race and ethnic groups follows distinct patterns. As shown, the White
population is mostly concentrated in the outer counties and north of Interstate 20. The
Black population is mostly concentrated south of Interstate 20. The Asian population is
concentrated in the Johns Creek/Gwinnett area, with pockets in Clayton and east Cobb.
Also, The Hispanic population is mostly concentrated in Gwinnett, Cobb, and Hall Counties.
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Figure 7: 2010 Census Distributions of Race and Ethnic Groups in 20-County Atlanta
Region [31]
The Atlanta region is also experiencing a shift in age. The number of individuals over
the age of 65 along with the number of children in the 20-County Atlanta region is expected
to increase substantially by the year 2040, as shown in Figure 8. According to the Atlanta
region's Regional Transportation Plan, this shift will increase the demand for alternative
transportation modes [83].
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Figure 8: Expected Growth by Age Group in the 20-County Atlanta Region [83]
In addition to projecting over 8 million residents by the year 2040, the Atlanta region's
Regional Transportation Plan anticipates a substantial increase in regional travel demand,
illustrated in Figure 9. By year 2040, projections indicate an increase in congested vehicle
hours traveled to approximately 110 percent in the 20-County Atlanta region [83].
Figure 9: 2010 and 2040 Regional Travel Demand [83]
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Eects of the recession can be seen in the data with a marked increase from 10 percent
to 18 percent of city-wide vacancies in the city of Atlanta [31]. Figure 10 shows the 2010
Census Percent Vacant, meaning the number of vacant housing units (as a percentage of all
housing units), in the 20-County Atlanta region.
Figure 10: 2010 Census Percent Vacant in 20-County Atlanta Region [31]
Though the business community and job market were negatively impacted by the re-
cession, many believe the recession had a positive impact on growth and congestion in
the region, arguing that the lack of investment in transportation would have caused a much
more serious congestion issue with a continuation of growth levels before the recession. Once
the recession hit, growth slowed and the lack of transportation investment went relatively
unnoticed by the general public.
3.2 The Atlanta Regional Transportation Roundtable
As designated by the Transportation Investment Act of 2010, the Regional Transportation
Roundtable (RTR) for each special district was to consist of two representatives from each
county (one chairperson, sole commissioner, mayor or CEO of the county governing authority
and one mayor elected by the mayors). The Atlanta region qualied for one portion of the
legislation with Fulton County having more than 90 percent of the population residing in
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municipal corporations [78]. Because of this qualication, Mayor Kasim Reed of Atlanta
served as an additional representative on the Atlanta RTR. Each county's representatives
of the 21 member RTR are geographically shown in Figure 11.
Figure 11: Atlanta Regional Transportation Roundtable Representatives [36]
3.3 Four Phases of Plan
The process laid out in the Transportation Investment Act of 2010 provided four separate
phases for completion. Figure 12 shows the four step process followed by each of the twelve
regions. The following sections provide a detailed documentation and discussion of the
Atlanta region as it progressed through the rst three phases. However, given that the
Atlanta region failed to pass the referendum, the project delivery stage was never completed.
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Figure 12: Four Phases of Plan [84]
3.4 Criteria Development
The GDOT director of planning was given responsibilities in the majority of the develop-
ment steps for the constrained draft investment list, including the development of draft
criteria. Given that the GDOT director of planning was appointed by the governor, the
heavy involvement of the GDOT director of planning served as a check for the governor's
oce during the project selection process.
3.4.1 Draft Criteria
As laid out by the legislation, the GDOT director of planning was given the responsibility
to draft criteria for the investment list of transportation projects. The GDOT director of
planning drafted the criteria and issued it to local governments and MPOs on August 3,
2010. All criteria excluded the 25 percent local share (15 percent for Atlanta) portion of the
sales tax revenue. All 11 districts outside Atlanta were given the same draft criteria (see
Appendix C) [86].
The draft criteria for the Atlanta 10-County region had three main requirements: (1)
the list should be a strategic use of funds for achieving the best value; (2) projects should be
delivered on-time and on-budget; and (3) the projects must have public support including
public trust that state and local governments will deliver on their promises [85]. Under the
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draft criteria, projects must originate from existing plans and/or studies while also being
consistent with the policies of the Statewide Strategic Transportation Plan and the Atlanta
region's PLAN 2040. In addition, projects must appeal to a broad range of citizens while
encouraging multimodal solutions. The draft criteria also allocated target ranges for the
program areas. Table 3 shows the target ranges for each respective program area.
Table 3: Program Areas and Allocation Ranges for Draft Criteria [85]
Program Areas Target Ranges
Roadway Capital 20 - 50 %
Transit Capital 10 - 40 %
Transit Operations and Maintenance 5 - 20 %
Safety 5 - 10 %
Trac Operations 2 - 5 %
Non-motorized (Bike/Pedestrian) 0 - 5 %
Freight and Logistics 0 - 2 %
Aviation 0 - 2 %
Roadway and Bridge Maintenance (Asset Management) 0 - 5 %
The draft criteria recommended that prioritization of the project selection should be
based on three levels for roadway capital projects: (1) Tier One projects have construction
phases beginning within six years of the start of the regional sales tax; (2) Tier Two projects
have an approved concept report; (3) Tier Three have been recommended but do not have
Tier One or Tier Two qualications [85]. For transit capital projects, projects which provide
the most economic benet, environmental benet, and were the most feasible during envi-
ronmental permitting according to the ARC, the GDOT director of planning, and GRTA
were recommended to be given the utmost consideration. Emphasis for the construction
phase was recommended to be placed on both transit and roadway projects. A number of
specics for transit projects were provided in the draft criteria:
• Should have contingency plan if future operating funds are based on renewal of sales
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tax;
• Should have independent utility;
• Should have transit service in more than one county;
• Should have connection to employment and activity centers in the Atlanta region;
• Should serve areas with land use ordinance that enable increased development densi-
ties around stops and stations;
• Capital expenditures are allowed to be new, systematic replacement, upgrades, refur-
bishment, and others [85].
The draft criteria focused on a three-level project selection categorization: (1) Tier One
projects should have an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) anticipated, an approved
draft environmental document, or an FTA-approved Locally Preferred Alternative (LPA)
and Alternatives Analysis (AA) to be completed by the end of FY 2012; (2) Tier Two
projects should have a feasibility study; and (3) Tier Three have been recommended but
do not have Tier One or Tier Two qualications [85]. Seven other program areas were also
dened and given recommendations for project selection (see Appendix C).
3.4.2 Approved Criteria
Comments on the draft criteria were to be submitted by local governments, MPOs, and leg-
islators by September 30, 2010. The ARC and GDOT provided responses to each comment
[88]. The regional criteria were then developed based on the rened version, which was
nally vetted by members of the Atlanta RTR via conference calls [87]. The RTR approved
the criteria by a majority vote of present members on December 17, 2010, the rst ocial
meeting of the Atlanta RTR. The nal criteria added a fourth goal, Investments should im-
prove regional mobility. In addition, four performance goals from the Statewide Strategic
Transportation Plan were given for project selection:
• Support Georgia's economic growth and competitiveness;
• Ensure safety and security;
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• Maximize the value of Georgia's assets, getting the most out of the existing network;
• Minimize the environmental impact [87].
The development of the project list was to be guided by the following additional principles:
• Regional equity was to be measured by outcomes not project cost;
• Package projects could be included to address connectivity issues [87].
Lastly, the projects would be evaluated on the following additional criteria (for a full list of
criteria, see Appendix C):
• Emphasis on construction phase or capital equipment acquisition (all other phases will
be given preference based on ability to be completed within 10-years);
• Each project phase included in the list must demonstrate full funding and construction
funds must be in PLAN 2040;
• Emphasis on delivery in the 10-year time frame, recommending that 40 percent should
be completed or underway within six years of the 10-year period;
• Roadway capital projects should serve origins or destinations for existing and proposed
employment and activity centers as well as serve to reduce congestion in regional
corridors;
• New xed-guideway facilities for transit should include a 20-year operating plan [87].
A report giving the approved criteria and revenue projections was provided to local govern-
ments, MPOs, local legislators, and the GDOT commissioner. Upon receipt of the report,
the parties began to submit projects to the GDOT director of planning; suggestions were
due to GDOT by March 30, 2011.
3.5 Project Selection
The project selection process was hard-coded into the Transportation Investment Act of
2010. The majority of deadlines were listed directly in the bill. A strict process was followed
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from late 2010 to the vote on July 31, 2012. Figure 13 diagrams the project list development
process.
Figure 13: Project Investment List Development Process [36]
3.5.1 Unconstrained Example Investment List
Four hundred and thirty seven complete forms were submitted to the GDOT director of
planning. [89] The unconstrained example investment list was developed by the GDOT
director of planning along with the collaboration of the ARC sta, using the submitted
projects and approved criteria. The initial list of projects was not scally constrained by
the projected budget. The unconstrained example investment list of projects was then given
to the executive committee for further development on June 1, 2011 [36].
3.5.2 The Executive Committee
The executive committee was elected during the rst meeting of the Atlanta RTR. Five
members were to serve as voting members. In addition, the executive committee included
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non-voting members of the General Assembly. The legislation required the appointment
of only three state ocials. However, four state ocials participated with three additional
alternates. The House had two representatives and the Senate had two representatives. The
three alternates were all from the Senate.
The full roundtable approved ve voting members:
• B.J. Mathis, Chair, Henry County Commission;
• Tom Worthan, Chair, Douglas County Commission;
• Bill Floyd, Mayor, Decatur;
• Bucky Johnson, Mayor, Norcross;
• Mark Mathews, Mayor, Kennesaw.
However, this was not the nal make-up of the executive committee. Many members of the
state leadership and the RTR were angered by this decision because the Mayor of Atlanta
was not elected to the executive committee. Also, an underlying tension between cities and
counties was causing ripples in the RTR. The cities did not want the bigger counties to
have undue inuence in the project selection process. Members had already selected and
garnered enough support for a list of members to serve on the executive committee, a list
that did not include people who hadn't been as active in ARC [20]. Many members of the
RTR suggested the main reason not including Mayor Reed was for his regular absence from
previous ARC meetings.
The resulting executive committee excluded representation from areas that were consid-
ered crucial for successful implementation such as the city of Atlanta, Fulton, DeKalb, and
Gwinnett Counties. According to those interviewed, Mayor Reed was instrumental in the
passage of the Transportation Investment Act of 2010 during his time in the state legislature.
Many believed it was a mistake to exclude such a strong supporter saying that without his
support, the referendum had no chance of passing. The process almost stopped in its tracks.
When no executive committee members responded to requests from the ARC Chairman for
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them to step down so as to include Mayor Reed, the Speaker of the House called a meet-
ing. The Speaker felt that if there was any chance of the referendum passing, the Mayor
of Atlanta must be included on the executive committee. Many recall him being very rm
and saying get it done. A decision was made by Mayor Bucky Johnson of Norcross to step
down as a voting member of the committee. Instead, he would serve as the non-voting chair
of the committee. Though the position was not listed in the legislation, the exibility was
allowed to create the position given that Mayor Johnson would not be a voting member.
Therefore, the nal approved executive committee included the following:
• Bucky Johnson, Mayor, Norcross (non-voting Chair);
• Kasim Reed, Mayor, Atlanta;
• B.J. Mathis, Chair, Henry County Commission;
• Tom Worthan, Chair, Douglas County Commission;
• Bill Floyd, Mayor, Decatur;
• Mark Mathews, Mayor, Kennesaw.
The 4 non-voting legislators were Representative Mike Jacobs (District 80), Representative
Sean Jerguson (District 22), Senator Chip Rogers (District 21), and Senator Jack Murphy
(District 27). The three alternates were Senator Valencia Seay, Senator Doug Stoner, and
Senator Renee Unterman [36]. In addition, the majority of the RTR members attended the
executive committee meetings and contributed to discussions.
Mayor Bucky Johnson, the non-voting Chair, received high praise for his work on the
executive committee. The majority of those interviewed mentioned the addition of a non-
voting Chair as a main reason for the impressive functionality of the executive committee.
Even though the non-voting Chair was not part of the legislation, the exibility to approve
a non-voting Chair was a favorable addition to the legislation and project selection process.
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3.5.3 Atlanta Regional Commission Sta
The ARC provided sta members who remained involved throughout the project selection
process. During the rst meeting of the Atlanta RTR, ARC sta was designated to serve in a
support role to help the group meet the requirements of the Transportation Investment Act
of 2010 [36]. The ARC had already been involved with the process through collaboration
with GDOT on the compilation of the unconstrained draft investment list. Upon receipt
of the unconstrained draft investment list, the executive committee designated the ARC
sta to perform analysis and reduce the list further. Working together with sta from
local governments and state agencies, the ARC reduced the unconstrained draft investment
list from a total of $22.9 billion down to a total of $12.2 billion. During the executive
committee meetings, the ARC sta was called upon to provide presentations and answer
questions per the request of the Chair, Mayor Bucky Johnson. The majority of executive
committee members praised the hard work by the ARC sta for the high level of thinking
and functionality provided during the entire project selection process.
3.5.4 The Constrained Draft Investment List
After the list was reduced, the executive committee met a total of nine times to determine
a constrained draft investment list. The RTR was convened an additional three times [36].
During the executive committee meetings, the majority of RTR members, local ocials,
and legislators attended and were active. Also, the meetings were open and attended by the
general public.
The executive committee removed county lines from the maps used during discussions. A
graphic dividing the Atlanta region into 10 sectors was used instead, as shown in Figure 14.
A categorization of subregion was used for each project on the project list. The subregion
for each project would be one of the 10 sectors or be categorized as regional [6]. In
addition, each project was categorized by Anticipated Schedule for Beginning Construction
or Implementation. Each project was categorized in Band 1 (2013 - 2015), Band 2 (2016 -
2019), or Band 3 (2020 - 2022) [6].
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Figure 14: 10 Sectors of the Atlanta Region [6]
Three scenarios were given by the ARC sta for the executive committee to use during
deliberations. Scenario A showed a constrained list with an emphasis on roadway projects.
Scenario B showed a constrained list with a more balanced investment list. Scenario C
showed a constrained list with an emphasis on transit projects. The ARC also provided
modeling capabilities to show congestion mitigation and other important factors for specic
projects. Scenario models were run to determine how the list aected underserved popula-
tions, a model which received high marks [2]. Many members remember relying heavily on
the ARC sta for determining the regional impact of dierent projects through modeling
and analysis. Though the majority of the members of the executive committee mentioned
holding regional signicance as the highest priority, other priorities also were considered such
as needs of particular constituency, overall congestion mitigation, and economic competi-
tiveness. Analysis and deal-making was typically done outside of the traditional meetings.
Regular attendees mentioned the silence and low key nature of the actual meetings. Votes
were usually quick and unanimous. Multiple deals were struck to make both sides happy.
All members recall being satised with the list from the standpoint of their constituency
as well as the regional priorities of the RTR. Even with the heavy involvement of the ARC
sta in the project selection process, some still criticize the political nature of the executive
committee meetings as well as the nal project list.
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3.5.5 The Final Investment List
Amendments
After the scally constrained draft list of $6.14 billion was developed and delivered unani-
mously by the executive committee on August 15, 2011, four additional RTR meetings were
held to discuss amendments [36]. Around the same time, 10 ocial public meetings were
held across the Atlanta region to provide for public input into the project list before nal
approval (the legislation required two public meetings). All amendments had to be cost neu-
tral, meaning no change could increase or decrease the nal project list cost of $6.14 billion
when implemented. Ultimately, six amendments passed. One amendment, the Cobb County
Northwest Corridor project, was the source of controversy at the time. The xed guideway
project from Midtown to Cumberland would have provided transit service to Cobb County,
an area which has had a long standing contention with transit service (previously discussed
in chapter 2). The amendment would reduce the funding for the transit line, instead putting
it toward a bus service from the Town Center area to connect with MARTA in Midtown
Atlanta. The rest of the money which was originally slated for the project would go toward
intersection improvements at three intersections in Cobb County. Each of the proposals was
drafted following discussions with the public. However, the amendment for the Northwest
Corridor project received a great deal of media attention and controversy. Regardless, all
six amendments passed and the nal project list was moved forward for a nal approval.
Unanimous
The last meeting was held on October 13, 2011 where the nal package of amendments and
documentation was approved along with the nal investment list [36]. The full roundtable
voted unanimously in favor of the nal investment list. After a seemingly rocky start, the
project selection process ended on a political high note. Many members of the RTR recall the
day being magical. All members, representatives from a diverse group of counties, were able
to come together and agree on one project list. At the time, spirits were high for the sta
and representatives who worked on the project list. Many considered this to be a historic
moment for the region, a huge step forward in regional thinking. Others joked that it was
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the nature of the body and did not truly represent the agreement of the entire body. One
legislator noted that it was never going to be anything other than near unanimous because
of the nature of the body [3]. A unanimous vote just means the RTR all got together and
made a pinky promise that they are going to support the project list and referendum. The
RTR must speak with one voice [3].
Specics of the Final Investment List
The nal investment list totaled to $6.14 billion in current year dollars ($7.2 billion adjusted
to year of expenditure). The project list included 157 projects. Table 4 gives a percentage
breakdown of the projects included in the project list. Notably, the project list devoted over
52 percent of the funding to transit.
Table 4: Category Percentages of Atlanta Region Final Investment List [36]
Category Allocation Percentage
Transit $3,159,892,477 51.5 %
Roadway $2,903,019,900 47.3 %
Roadway/Transit $50,000,000 0.8 %
Bike/Pedestrian $24,070,000 0.4 %
Aviation $3,190,000 0.1 %
Total $6,140,172,377 100 %
Figure 15 shows the projects geographically across the 10-County Atlanta region.
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Figure 15: Geographic Atlanta Region Final Investment List [6]
A list of all projects on the nal investment list is included in Appendix D.
3.5.6 Public Involvement
According to the Transportation Investment Act of 2010 Final Report and the ARC, the
entire process involved more than 200,000 residents. The ARC reported activities and
approximate connections are shown in Table 5.
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Table 5: Activities between August 2010 and October 2011 [36]
Activity Approximate Connections
Comments on draft criteria (August/September 2010) 170
Public comments on PLAN 2040 outreach process related to TIA (January - June 2011) 300
Regional Transportation Roundtable website visits (May - October 2011) 26,605
Email Alert sign-ups (May - October 2011) 2,463
Participants in twelve University of Georgia focus groups (March/April 2011) 126
Respondents to Kennesaw State University Quality of Life Survey (April 2011) 1,100
Attendees at ve monthly community briengs (April - October 2011) 150
Respondents to Roundtable online survey (May - July 2011) 9,812
Participants in an AARP telephone town hall (May 2011) 11,000
Participants in Roundtable telephone town halls (June 2011) 134,405
Respondents to Roundtable online survey (July 2011) 496
Attendees at local elected ocials briengs (July 2011) 280
Respondents to Roundtable online survey (August 2011) 199
Attendees to 12 Regional Transportation Forums (September 2011) 1,698
Public comments received (August - October 2011) 684
Respondents to Draft Investment List online survey (September - October 2011) 1,392
Various community meetings (2011) 800 +
During roundtable meetings, public comment was allowed. However, many criticized the
structure of the public comment. Any interested in public comment had to sign up before
the meeting. As well, the public comment was restricted to a short two minute time frame
during the public comment period, usually held at the beginning of the meetings. Meetings
were announced publicly at least a week prior to the meeting. Opponents complained
that they were shut out of the process by not being selected. While their comments were
submitted in writing during the meetings, some opponents recall not having their questions
answered. ARC sta disagrees with the complaints, arguing that the meetings were designed
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to allow for public comment on both sides. Members of the RTR mentioned a number of
inuential public groups and demographics during the public comment process. Groups such
as seniors, bike and pedestrian advocates, transit advocates, and concerned individuals were
listed as strong voices during the project selection process. Not one member of the RTR
mentioned opposition as an inuential group during the project selection process. However,
some members of the business community were not shocked by the type of opposition who
came out against the referendum later in the process given that some public comment
foreshadowed the future opposition.
3.5.7 Transparency
Those interviewed noted the transparency of the project selection process. Multiple websites
documented and discussed the Transportation Investment Act of 2010, project selection
process, and referendum. The process was paperless meaning all documents were posted
to the internet and were open for public access. In addition, many fact sheets and one-
page summaries were disseminated to make the process more understandable to the general
public. The ARC provided interactive mapping of the nal project list as well as videos
touring the dierent subregions of the Atlanta region. All RTR meetings were recorded
and posted on the website. Acronyms were removed and explained in all documents on the
primary website.
3.6 The Campaign
The Atlanta region slowly entered into the public awareness and advocacy phase of the
process. The proponents and the opponents began to emerge as active community members
decided if they were pro-TSPLOST or anti-TSPLOST. The term TSPLOST was used by
the media and became a common phrase during the campaign. A lot of organizations in
the region stayed neutral because they either did not want to support some of the projects
or they did not want to lose their tax status by going on record through advocacy. The
strongest members of the proponents and opponents are detailed in the following subsections.
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3.6.1 Proponents
On paper, the big name support for the proponents seemed to be all they would require to
secure 50 plus one of the votes in the Atlanta region. Not only did the proponents have the
wallets and hearts of the business community, they had the support of inuential legislators,
local ocials, the Mayor of Atlanta, and the Governor of Georgia.
The Atlanta Business Community
The business community had no stance on the project list. Instead, the business community
focused on the idea that it was up to each community to decide through proper education.
The members of the Chamber of Commerce were educated so that they could speak accu-
rately to their respective communities [5]. The business community began to raise money
for an ocial campaign while conducting focus groups to emphasize the importance of the
referendum [5]. According to a representative, the business community felt it was impor-
tant to raise money from an outreach perspective, so that voters would understand the
importance of the referendum to the future of the region [5].
The Campaign
The business community had been planning the campaign since mid-2010, pulling in busi-
nesses and community organizations in a July 2010 big tent kicko [27]. The group also
met every rst Friday to inform members and receive input. Around 100 organizations were
involved in these rst Friday meetings.
According to a member, the campaign consulted with CRL Associates, the company who
ran the campaign in Denver for their FasTracks transit referendum. CRL Associates was used
by the business community, and later the ocial campaign, to gain ideas and suggestions
about how to set up the campaign [27]. Given that campaign rules were dierent in Georgia
when compared to Denver, an attorney was hired to analyze the proper structuring of
the campaign [27]. It was determined that the campaign had to be divided up into two
dierent organizations. The campaign was structured into a C3, that can only educate,
and a C4, that can advocate. The education campaign was ocially named the Metro
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Atlanta Voter Education Network (MAVEN) and set up as a non-prot corporation with the
Secretary of State. The advocacy campaign was named Citizens for Transportation Mobility
(CTM) and set up as a registered fund-raising committee with the Georgia Government
Transparency and Campaign Finance Commission [27]. The two campaigns had the same
working group with a separate board of community leaders for each of the two campaigns.
The campaign hired three strategists, two Republicans and one Democrat. The campaign
also hired communications and other important sta to help implement strategies. By
September 2011, the two campaigns were ocially structured and the necessary campaign
sta had been hired [27]. Figure 16 shows the structure of the ocial campaign for the
transportation referendum.
Figure 16: Structure of Ocial Campaign [69]
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MAVEN and CTM
The campaign strategy for MAVEN was to educate voters through April of 2012. The
advocacy side, CTM, would then start a persuasion campaign to convince voters to get to
the polls in support of the referendum [69]. MAVEN approached the education side by calling
the TSPLOST one solution to Atlanta's trac woes [47]. MAVEN sent educated speakers
out across the region to give presentations which covered topics such as the transportation
history and background of the region, the legislation, and the project list. MAVEN funded
education eorts as well as some get-out-the-vote eorts. MAVEN was not legally required
to disclose its contributors and raised close to $2.1 million, of which $1.5 million originated
from community improvement districts (CIDs). [47].
The campaign strategy for CTM was to advocate for passage of the one percent sales tax,
campaigning on behalf of the question that was posed on the ballot [69]. It was more dicult
to raise money for the advocacy side given that many organizations could not or did not
want to donate to advocacy. By law, the campaign must disclose donors and expenses to the
ethics board 14 days prior to the referendum. Because of this, fund-raising was noted as one
major obstacle for the CTM campaign [27]. Regardless, the advocacy side of the campaign
was able to raise $6.5 million, an amount which received a great deal of criticism before the
referendum. Major corporations and businesses helped fund the majority of the campaign.
Contributions came from companies such as Home Depot, Cox Enterprises, Georgia Power
Company, Coca-Cola Company, Clear Channel, Delta, UPS, Turner Broadcasting System,
as well as a large number of construction companies [34]. Many argued that the construction
companies had a lot to gain if the referendum passed in the Atlanta region.
The advocacy campaign ran the Untie Atlanta commercial advertisements, billboards
(see Figure 17), and social media discussions. The advocacy campaign was the most visible
campaign due to its large nancial investments in billboard and commercial advertisements
around the region. According to the ethics report, the CTM campaign spent $4.8 million
on paying sta, advertising, print advertising, online advertising, media advertising, ad pro-
duction, video production, television production, sponsorship, social media management,
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website management, polling, surveys, automated phone calls, consulting, events, and cam-
paign buttons, signs, T-shirts, bumper stickers, push cards, and yers [34]. Independent
polling conducted two months before the election noted the far reach of the campaign when
39.6 percent of respondents reported they had seen television advertisements regarding the
referendum and 31.9 percent had reportedly received mailings regarding the referendum.
Also, a total of 75.5 percent of respondents reported being either somewhat familiar or
familiar with the transportation sales tax voter referendum that will be on all ballots [72].
Figure 17: CTM Campaign Billboard [47]
According to a member of the campaign, the focus changed after polling data showed
that the campaign should be targeting the Democrats more heavily. The campaign had good
inroads with the suburban Republican vote but in order to gain a stronger turnout, they
began to focus more heavily on Democrats. With the movement toward conservative and
no new taxes, it took away some Republicans who may have voted for the referendum. To
make up this decit, the campaign began to heavily target the Democrats around a month
before the referendum [27].
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Mayor Reed
From his time in the Georgia legislature, Mayor Kasim Reed had been a strong advocate for
the Transportation Investment Act of 2010 and public referendum. Not surprisingly, Mayor
Reed became one of the biggest advocates for the referendum during the campaign. Mayor
Reed held a number of press conferences and spoke on behalf of the referendum. Many
criticize him for not being active enough at the beginning of the campaign. However, he
was the loudest advocate during the months leading up to the referendum. Mayor Reed
pushed the BeltLine and the regional nature of the project list. According to many, he
was no longer the Mayor of Atlanta; Mayor Reed became the Mayor of the Atlanta region.
However, this persona made many suburban voters angry. Many did not think the Mayor
of Atlanta should tell them what to do, saying, he is not my Mayor. The Mayor made
television and radio appearances, spoke at events for the campaign, and maintained a high
level of visibility. The most interesting, and seemingly powerful connection occurred during
the same time: the Democrat Mayor Reed partnered with the Republican Governor Nathan
Deal.
Governor Deal
To the surprise and anger of many of his supporters, Governor Nathan Deal came out in fa-
vor of the transportation referendum, speaking at a number of fund-raising events across the
state. Even more interesting is that Governor Deal did not sign the Transportation Invest-
ment Act of 2010 into law. Nonetheless, the governor came out in favor of the referendum
given that the referendum had the potential to attract companies and provide a number of
positive impacts to the state of Georgia. The bipartisan support of the top leaders in the
Atlanta region should have made a large impact on the results of the referendum. However,
though many praised the support of the two leaders, many also believe the partnership
seemed political and temporary, possibly aecting the power of the partnership.
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Legislators, Local Ocials, and Others
In addition to the power of the most inuential members of the community, some local o-
cials involved in the project selection process and legislators involved in the legislation were
supportive of the referendum. However, a great deal of the legislators and local ocials were
silent supporters. Many were up for re-election and weary of supporting such a controversial
issue during their re-election eorts.
In addition, members of the community, transit advocates, seniors, and concerned in-
dividuals were supportive of the referendum. Many spread the word through grass roots
eorts and aiding the campaign through volunteer work. Though the proponents had a
large amount of support nancially and otherwise, the opponents countered with a powerful
mix of unusual allies.
3.6.2 Opponents
The size and make-up of the opponents surprised many legislators and local ocials involved
in the process. Groups with seemingly nothing in common formed a unied bond to defeat
the referendum through education and grass-roots eorts. The Atlanta Tea Party, the Sierra
Club, and the DeKalb NAACP along with legislators and local ocials drove the opposition
for the transportation referendum.
The Tea Party
The Atlanta Tea Party was against the referendum from the basic understanding that the
group is fundamentally against tax increases. The Tea Party also argued that the project list
was far too heavy on transit investment and was not the best use of the taxpayers' dollars.
The Atlanta Tea Party did not reach the $500 dollar contribution threshold to le state
paperwork. They relied on small donations to pay for grass-root eorts such as yard signs
and volunteer work [47]. The leader of the Atlanta Tea Party movement was present as a
representative at the majority of the meetings and debates across the Atlanta region. One
criticism that many interviewees echoed was that the Tea Party leaders were not elected
and therefore it was dicult to know what constituency they actually represented. It was
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dicult to quantify how large the Atlanta Tea Party constituency was in the Atlanta region.
The Atlanta Tea Party received equal footing in the media as if it were as powerful and
substantial as the business community constituency. However, polling numbers suggested
a substantial amount of support for the Tea Party philosophy. Of the respondents to an
independent poll conducted on June 12, 2012, 52.7 percent of respondents among those who
identify as Republican or Independent also identied with all of it or most of it when
asked if they identify with the general philosophy of the Tea Party. When expanded to
identifying with some of it, that total increased to 77.4 percent of those respondents who
identify as republican or independent [52].
The Sierra Club
The Sierra Club was against the referendum mostly on the grounds that the project list
was seriously awed. The Sierra Club disagreed with the roadway projects which were
sprawl inducing as well as the limited amount of transit projects. Given that the gas tax
structure did not allow transit funding, the Sierra Club believed the project list should have
ideally been 100 percent transit projects. They argued that transit had no other source of
funding and thus should be given priority over roadway projects, which could be funded
by other means. The Sierra Club argued that a sales tax was not the ideal method for
nancing and the process put forth by the legislation put the region in the perpetual cycle
of a dysfunctional, undemocratic decision-making process [90]. The Sierra Club advocated
restructuring and increase of the gas tax among other nancial strategies. Even though the
Tea Party disagreed with the referendum partly for having too much transit, the Sierra Club
became their close partners against the referendum. The partnership shocked and angered
many members of the campaign and project selection process. The Sierra Club's opposition
was a close vote internally. The Sierra Club was one board member away from having no
public opinion on the matter. Many members of the Sierra Club were vocally upset about
the Sierra Club's public opposition of the referendum, feeling that the initiative was better
than doing nothing in the region. A member of the Sierra Club said that the strategy of the
Sierra Club's opposition was based on the high probability of the referendum failing. Once
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the referendum failed, the Sierra Club would be able to have a strong political stance on a
successful plan B [21].
The DeKalb NAACP
The DeKalb NAACP was against the referendum due to equity issues in South Fulton as
well as the unequal payment of two pennies by the Fulton and DeKalb residents. The
campaign's initial strategy had been relying heavily on the large level of support out of
Fulton and DeKalb Counties. Instead, racial and equity issues caused unexpectedly low
levels of support from leaders and constituency in the area. Inuential leaders in the Black
community came out in strong dissent against the referendum. These leaders went up
against the Mayor of Atlanta, usually a powerful representative for the Black community
in Atlanta. The public discourse which ensued created misinformation and emotion in the
surrounding Black community. Having lost their support, initially identied as the base
support for the passage of the referendum, many believed the referendum did not have a
chance to pass. Others still believe there were other larger factors that played into the failure
of the referendum, saying that the opposition of the DeKalb NAACP itself did not play a
substantial role in the failure of the referendum. Still, the dissent provides an interesting
comparison to the failed MARTA referendum of 1968, discussed in chapter 2.
The Transportation Leadership Coalition, LLC
Though there were many small groups and concerned individuals involved, only one received
the majority of publicity. The Transportation Leadership Coalition, LLC was formed along
with a grass-roots campaign against the TSPLOST by May 1, 2012. The group maintained
tractruth.net, the most inuential and organized online resource used by the opposition.
The group worked to defeat the referendum by educating the public. They pushed the
idea that the passage of the referendum would be the largest tax increase in the history of
the state of Georgia [92]. This phrase was used on yard signs and campaign signs. Many
interviewees believe the phrase resonated well with suburban and exurban Republicans. The
group also pushed the distrust in government by pointing out the close to $8 million dollars
of campaign funding used by the proponents, while the Transportation Leadership Coalition
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only spent a reported $14,418 in total [47]. The group questioned deliverability by GDOT
and the validity of ARC facts, overall questioning the public trust in government agencies.
Through the website, the group provided their own fact sheets and documentation to argue
that the referendum was not the best use of taxpayer dollars. Outside of the website, the
group pushed their agenda through social media and emailing. The group primarily used
yard signs, bumper stickers, yers, and push cards to get the word out. Figure 18 shows
one yer which documents the group's views and eorts in the opposition campaign. The
group also held events such as the Lights for Liberty Drive which received criticism from
the proponents. During the Lights for Liberty Drive, the group gathered to drive the I-285
loop counter clockwise for two loops. The group drove the speed limit in the center lane
with their ashers on to protest the referendum [92].
Figure 18: Transportation Leadership Coalition Anti - TSPLOST Campaign Material [92]
Legislators
A group of inuential legislators, many who had initially voted for the legislation in 2010,
came out in strong opposition for the referendum. They argued that the lack of an opt-out
criterion raised many questions. They had voted for the Transportation Investment Act of
2010 with caution and the promise that the projects will be laser focused on trac conges-
tion [3]. In their opinion, 52 percent transit on the project list had broken the promise and
was not a good use of taxpayer dollars. Moreover, the legislators argued that the project list
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should not have addressed economic development and therefore was a poor use of taxpayers'
dollars. Also, they argued that the legislation was unconstitutional because it lacked en-
abling legislation. Members of the project selection process and campaign were angered by
the legislators who came out publicly against the referendum, calling it hypocritical. They
argued that if legislators overwhelmingly voted for the legislation and provided this process,
they should not then be against the results of the process. One member of the community
argued that the only reason we are here is because the legislators did not do their job
in the rst place [26]. The legislators were given three years to come up with a solution,
and instead the legislators pushed it back to the local ocials with an awkward tool and
during the process shot bullets at the referendum [26].
Others
Concerned individuals not necessary identifying with the groups above were also involved
as volunteers and attendees at debates and meetings. These individuals used primarily
grass-roots and word of mouth to push for the rejection of the referendum.
3.6.3 Political Plays and Strategies
No Plan B
The proponents often mentioned that there was no Plan B, meaning the alternative to
passing the referendum was to do nothing. At many debates, one of the main reasons
proponents oered for the public to support the referendum was that there was nothing
else. They argued that the legislature would not pass another bill and, if the referendum
were held again, it would be at least two years away. This would put the region in a
transportation crisis. In addition, the proponents would argue that the referendum was
Atlanta's nal chance to invest in transit. This discussion angered many in the opposition.
They argued that the law allowed for a new list to be voted on in two years. The opponents
also argued that there were many plans that could be initiated if the referendum failed,
calling it a high pressure sales tactic [3]. The Sierra Club responded to the comments by
providing a report that discussed the various alternatives to the transportation referendum.
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GA 400 Toll
Governor Deal, in an eort to garner favorable support for the referendum by improving trust
in the government, promised to end the tolls on the GA 400 toll road, a campaign promise
which had gone unanswered from a previous administration. The unanswered promise had
caused years of distrust in government to build around the issue of transportation in the
region. His promise to remove the tolls occurred just a week before the vote. Many took the
timing to be very political and contemplated. According to the majority of those interviewed,
this completely backred and may have had an overall negative impact on the results of the
referendum.
Don't Tell Me How to Vote
Some members of the business community sent emails and letters requesting or recommend-
ing that their employees vote in favor of the referendum. Some only sent emails and letters
to their employees that informed and educated. Many believe this actually backred on
members of the business community.
3.6.4 The Last Stretch
According to the ARC, more than 24,000 Metro Atlanta residents were connected to local
ocials during June to discuss the referendum. Twelve Wireside Chats occurred over six
dierent evenings in June. The chats were divided by jurisdiction [6]. The campaign ran
advertisements during the Olympics. The grass-roots eorts of the opponents picked up.
The political atmosphere was charged and the media was producing multiple articles daily.
3.6.5 Final Polling Numbers
Polling done by Rosetta Stone Communications on May 20, 2012 with a margin of error of
3.5 percent noted voter patterns leading up to the vote. Polling from the same source was
done once in June and twice more in July. Similar trends were seen in each poll conducted
by Rosetta Stone Communications. When asked how likely the respondents were to vote
in the primary, 48.9 percent and 41.0 percent of respondents said they would vote in the
Republican and Democrat primary, respectively, with 10.1 percent undecided. The same
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results were broken down into DeKalb and Fulton Counties or the suburbs as well as Black,
White, or other (see Table 6). The results suggest that, of the respondents, there was a
clear partisan divide between the races in the Atlanta 10-County region. In addition, the
results suggest that, of the respondents, there was a clear partisan divide between the two
geographic areas dened as those identifying as residents of DeKalb and Fulton Counties and
those identifying as residents of the suburbs. When asked if they would support or oppose
the referendum if the referendum were held today, the results showed marked dierences
between age, region, race and party aliation (see Table 6). The results suggest that, of
the respondents, the support for the referendum was higher for residents of DeKalb and
Fulton Counties as well as for respondents identifying as Black. The same was true for those
respondents identifying as Democrat. Overall, the results indicated that the referendum was
more likely to fail in two months' time. However, the results made many hold out hope for
swaying the 13.5 percent plus or minus 3.5 percent of voters who were undecided on the
referendum. Mayor Reed publicly said, We are not here to read polls, we are here to change
polls meaning it was the opponent's job to get the public to understand this was a problem
and the transportation referendum was the right solution [25].
Table 6: Polling Results from Rosetta Stone Communications for May 20, 2012 [72]
Question Total
Region Race Party
DeKalb/Fulton Suburbs Black White Others Republican Democrat Undecided
Likely to vote Republican? 48.9% 27.4% 65.4% 7.6% 77.4% 30.4% 100% 0% 0%
Likely to vote Democrat? 41.0% 60.4% 26.1% 81.3% 15.0% 41.3% 0% 100% 0%
Likely to vote undecided? 10.1% 12.2% 8.5% 11.1% 7.6% 28.3% 0% 0% 100%
Support referendum? 41.5% 52.0% 33.4% 55.1% 33.4% 33.3% 27.8% 58.6% 38.5%
Oppose the referendum? 45.0% 33.3% 53.9% 27.2% 56.5% 46.7% 62.7% 26.7% 33.9%
Undecided? 13.5% 14.7% 12.7% 17.7% 10.1% 20.0% 9.5% 14.7% 27.6%
Another independent study was conducted a month before the vote. The research asked
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the respondents if the vote were held today, how would you vote on the following refer-
endum. The respondent was given the exact wording to be presented on the ballot. The
respondent was then asked, Would you vote for this, against this, or are you undecided?
The results in Table 7 show the responses to this question only from the respondents who
were likely to vote in the July 31st Georgia election divided into age, race, and party alia-
tion [52]. The results suggest that, of the respondents, there was an even more pronounced
discrepancy between those supporting and those opposing the referendum. Also, the number
of voters who responded under don't know is much higher than the comparable undecided
in the previous poll. The results suggest that, of the respondents, those 18 - 29 were over-
whelmingly supportive of the referendum. In the age range of 30 - 44, the majority was
against the referendum or did not know. The same trend occurred for both higher age
ranges. In the terms of race, the results suggest that, of the respondents, those identifying
as Black were more in favor than any other race or ethnicity. The results also suggest that,
of those respondents, there is still a clear partisan divide between those against the refer-
endum and those for it. Similarly, the proponents looked favorably on the results noting
the 21 percent who answered don't know, while also citing their own polling which was
more favorable. Many proponents mentioned their polling numbers being 50 percent for
the referendum and 50 percent against the referendum in interviews leading up to the vote,
some of which was never released to the public.
Table 7: Polling Results from Insider Advantage for June 12, 2012 [52]
Question Total
Age Race Party
18 - 29 30 - 44 45 - 64 65 + Black White Others Republican Democrat Independent
Vote for it 31.7% 98.1% 23.4% 28.2% 29.7% 38.1% 29.9% 14.6% 28.7% 48.0% 20.1%
Vote against it 47.3% 1.9% 47.9% 47.0% 55.9% 29.3% 53.8% 69.0% 60.6% 26.7% 52.2%
Don't know 21.0% 0.0% 28.7% 24.8% 14.4% 32.6% 16.3% 16.4% 10.7% 25.3% 27.8%
The polling for the Mayor of Atlanta was conducted by Hill Research Consultants. A
survey was conducted on likely primary election voters. Table 8 shows the results of the
independent survey. The results indicate that the inner counties of DeKalb and Fulton
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when compared to rest of the 10-County region were much more likely to approve the
transportation referendum. The results were similar to the results conducted by Rosetta
Stone Communications. The results were some of the most favorable survey results released
to the public.




ATL Counties DeKalb Fulton Northwest Cobb Southeast Gwinnett
Yes to approve
Strongly 30 26 33 21 25 24 20 26
Not strongly 14 18 10 12 11 11 11 12
Total 44 44 43 33 36 36 31 38
No to reject
Not strongly 11 9 14 14 8 12 17 12
Strongly 21 26 16 39 40 31 31 29
Total 32 35 30 53 49 44 48 41
Unsure 22 19 24 12 13 17 18 18
Refused 3 2 3 2 2 3 3 3
Yes - no 12 10 13 -20 -12 -8 -18 -3
Number of cases 339 153 185 219 146 244 112 803
The proponents still held out hope during interviews leading up to the vote, noting the
amount of unsure respondents in each of the reported polls. Several other independent
polls and surveys were conducted leading up to the referendum, showing similar trends
highlighted in this section. The most notable takeaway from the polling completed is that
each source was slightly dierent and received slightly dierent results; however, the majority
of polling foreshadowed the ultimate results of the referendum. Interestingly, the majority
of polling resulted in generally more favorable results than the actual referendum results.
3.7 Voter Referendum
The referendum occurred on July 31, 2012. Each side of the campaign, along with other
smaller groups, held campaign watch parties across the region. All were expecting a very
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close race. Throughout the timeline of interviews, when asked the percentage yes votes, the
majority of those interviewed expected an extremely close race. Even though polling results
approaching the vote began to show a smaller chance of approval, the majority of those
interviewed in the last month were still hopeful.
When the voters cast their ballot, they were not shown a project list or given any
background. After party-specic questions, the transportation referendum ballot question
was asked along with other referenda, regardless of party aliation. Figure 19 shows the
ballot questions each voter was given before they cast their ballot.
Figure 19: Wording for Transportation Referendum on July 31, 2012 Ballot [78]
Advance voting began July 9, 2012 and reported numbers were much higher than usual.
According to the Secretary of State website, 18.8 percent of the votes in the referendum
were early voting, meaning categorized as being either advanced in person or an absentee
ballot. In terms of results, 16.5 percent of yes votes were early voting and 20.2 percent of
no votes were early voting [7].
3.7.1 Results
The results were decided within a few hours of the polls closing. The Atlanta region had
failed to pass the referendum 38 to 62 percent. Table 9 shows the results of the trans-
portation referendum by county. Though the results were based on the majority vote of the
entire 10-County region, inferences can be made about the results of each county separately.
Each specic county failed to approve the transportation referendum. DeKalb, Fulton, and
Clayton Counties had the highest approval, each being under 4 percent away from passage.
Cherokee and Fayette Counties had the lowest approval with fewer than 24 percent ap-
proval. Also, Henry, Rockdale, Gwinnett, Douglas, and Cobb were grouped together around
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30 percent approval. Overall, the transportation referendum resulted in a resounding failure
in the Atlanta region. However, notably, the City of Atlanta supported the transportation
referendum 58 to 42 percent.
Table 9: County Results for Transportation Referendum on July 31, 2012 Ballot [7]












Figure 20 shows a precinct level geographic representation of the results of the refer-
endum. A clear radial trend can be seen in the results. The results suggest a divide in
interests between the urban areas and the suburban/exurban areas of the region. As the
distance increases radially from the center of the city, the percentage yes vote substantially
decreases. Also, the results suggest a higher percentage voting yes in the southern portion
of the region, below Interstate 20. Given that Black populations south of Interstate 20 are
signicantly larger, the results suggest a higher percentage of yes votes from the Black com-
munity. In addition, a lower percentage of yes votes trended in the highly populated and
auent Northern suburbs. Further research must be conducted on demographics to better
understand the demographic and socioeconomic results of the transportation referendum.
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Figure 20: Geographic Precinct Voter Results of Atlanta Region [6]
Another surprising nding from the results originated from the unusually high level of
turnout for the election. Many interviewees were shocked by the turnout, saying that no
other issue on the ballot could draw that amount of votes. Table 10 shows the number of
ballots cast, number of registered voters, and voter turnout percentage by county.
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Table 10: 2012 General Primary Voter Turnout Percentage in the 10-County Atlanta Region
[7]
County Ballots Cast Registered Voters Voter Turnout
Cherokee 44,419 124,372 35.71%
Clayton 36,075 150,788 23.92%
Cobb 124,304 398,052 31.23%
DeKalb 126,221 405,103 31.16%
Douglas 19,923 70,478 28.27%
Fayette 28,400 72,585 39.13%
Fulton 145,387 542,683 26.79%
Gwinnett 100,058 391,232 25.58%
Henry 32,786 117,845 27.82%
Rockdale 17,962 48,523 37.02%
Total 675,535 2,321,661 29.10%
Table 11 shows the number of ballots cast in the previous two primary elections, the
2008 and 2010 primary elections when compared to the number of ballots cast in the 2012
primary election. The number of ballots cast increased by close to 1.5 times the number of
ballots cast in the 2010 and over 2 times the number of ballots cast in the 2008 primary
election. The marked dierence along with interview statements suggest that the increase of
thousands of ballots cast in the Atlanta region was due to the controversial transportation
referendum issue at the ballot. A member of the business community remembers seeing the
numbers coming in as strong as they did during the night of the election and realizing at
that moment that the polling had not been reliable, primarily because they had not been
polling the right people [26].
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Table 11: Comparison of Voter Turnout in 2008, 2010, and 2012 Primary Election in the
10-County Atlanta Region [7]
Year of General Primary Ballots Cast Registered Voters Voter Turnout
2008 320,936 2,308,787 13.9%
2010 456,115 2,290,984 19.91%
2012 675,535 2,321,661 29.10%
Further study on the demographics of the registered voters in comparison to the voter
results of the 2012 primary election is currently in the discussion phase with ARC and a
third-party consultant. When completed, this research could possibly give further insight
into the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the results for the transportation
referendum. The next section discusses the issues following the transportation referendum.
3.8 Political Aftermath
After the referendum, many in the transportation community were silent. The rst signs
of placing blame were all directed at the campaign. Governor Nathan Deal made a public
statement that did not resonate well with transit advocates and inner city voters. Some local
ocials involved in the project selection process and legislators involved in the legislation
lost their seats. The Plan B that many believed might occur, the production of a new project
list and referendum has not occurred. According to interviewees, the possibilities are slim
to none. As of early 2013, there has been little in the way of discussions on new eorts at
transportation funding in the Atlanta region.
3.8.1 Governor Nathan Deal
After the election, Governor Nathan Deal made public comments regarding the failed ref-
erendum. Governor Nathan Deal informed the public that he had no intent to revisit the
regional transportation tax after the resounding rejection, saying the public had expressed
their opinion on that [32]. He went on to silence the requests for restructuring the gas
tax or re-purposing the hotel tax, requests made consistently by the Sierra Club during the
campaign. Governor Deal presented a strategy for the state of Georgia where he would make
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certain projects a priority. One such project would be the new interchange at` Georgia 400
and Interstate 285. The Governor mentioned needing sharp cuts to ensure the funding
of these high priority projects. Governor Deal also noted that he was not going to give
funding for MARTA a high priority, arguing that MARTA needed serious restructuring and
improved functionality before the topic would even be considered [32]. Many took these
MARTA criticisms as a blatant attack on transit in the region. To many, the governor was
blaming the failure of the referendum on MARTA. Many believe the discussion, as well as
the results of the referendum, did not help the already deteriorating case for transit invest-
ment in the Atlanta region. Some went as far as to say it slammed the door for transit
investment in the Atlanta region in the near future.
3.8.2 Campaign Criticisms
Of those interviewed, the common blame for the resounding failure of the referendum was
placed on the campaign. Many blamed the communications side of the campaign for not
reaching the right voters. Others blamed the campaign for not being with the times, saying
that early voting had changed the strategy for a successful campaign. Because of this, many
believe the campaign did not start their advocacy portion in time to sway many voters;
by the time they had reached the voters, the voters had already decided and were about
to cast their ballots. Many blamed the leadership of the campaign for being inexperienced
in campaign management. Others criticized the messaging and how it was implemented
in advertisements. Many blamed the campaign for focusing far too much on congestion
mitigation when the numbers did not warrant the campaign slogans. Some compared the
campaign strategy to the grass-roots strategy of the opposition, saying the campaign should
have placed their $8 million dollar funds toward more grass-roots options instead of big
glossy advertisements. Some interviewees reversed the criticism saying the campaign was
too successful in reaching the public, and attracted a signicant number of no voters to
the polls along with the yes voters they were targeting. Regardless, the campaign received
a number of criticisms on factors which may or may not have changed the outcome of the
referendum. Many of those interviewed believe that other factors were much more signicant
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in the failure of the referendum.
3.8.3 Local Ocials Lose Seats
On the night of the referendum, many incumbents either lost their race outright or entered
into runo races. Though many factors likely contributed to the loss of many incumbents
in their re-election campaigns, many believed the transportation referendum and the roles
many of the ocials and legislators played in the process might have been a main factor.
Since the election, a few other legislators and local ocials have also been unseated. Many
attribute this to the overarching national issues of distrust in government, the economy, and
the looming presidential election. Many believe the voters came out in unexpectedly large
numbers to voice their opinion on these issues by addressing the local issues, especially a
local attempt to increase taxes as well as any elected ocial allowing it to occur.
3.8.4 Plan B
Many in the public felt there would be a better alternative to the transportation referen-
dum. The legislation allowed another project list and referendum 24 months after the failure
of the referendum. The public was hoping for an improved plan and project list in a few
years' time. However, this plan B will never make it to fruition. Instead, the majority of
those interviewed after the election believe it will politically be close to a decade before any
transportation nance initiative would be seriously discussed in the legislature. Many also
believe this estimate to be a best case scenario alternative. Because of the lack of trans-
portation funding, the Atlanta region will continue forward with increased trac congestion
and reduced quality of life, highlighted in the Atlanta region's Plan 2040. No additional
transit investments or funding initiatives have moved forward in the 2013 legislative session.
Some are hopeful saying that other regions in the nation who have attempted similar
initiatives have failed their rst time around. This group believes the Atlanta region has
now elevated the issue of transportation in the region and calls the failure a pre-requisite
to a passing initiative. These members of the community are hopeful for future transporta-
tion initiatives, regardless of the design, in the next decade. Also, many in the Atlanta
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region forget that three regions passed their transportation referenda in the state of Geor-
gia, meaning there probably will not be any restructuring of the current legislation. Many
believe nothing will happen in transportation investment until the races are held for the
Governor of Georgia and City of Atlanta, so another three or four years. Until re-election
season is over, it is not politically likely that anything in transportation funding will be
attempted. More reasonable, the timeline for attempting transportation investment ranges
from a favorable estimate of four years to as much as over a decade. Until then, the region
will look on as other regions across the nation as well as the three regions that successfully
passed their referenda move forward and implement their transportation funding initiatives.
Until then, the Atlanta region is left with alternatives such as tolls, increased property taxes,
or continuing in its transportation crisis. The next chapter highlights issues discussed and
lessons learned for the Atlanta region as well as other regions comparable to the Atlanta
region.
3.9 Summary
The Atlanta region unanimously passed a nal investment list through the hard work of
the executive committee, ARC sta, local government sta, and the RTR. The business
community largely supported the ocial campaign through donations and endorsements.
A strong partnership between the Democrat Mayor Reed of Atlanta and the Republican
Governor Deal became the face of the proponents a month prior to the referendum. The
opposition countered the well-nanced campaign with an unexpected partnership between
the Sierra Club, the Tea Party, and the DeKalb NAACP. The polling results leading up to
the vote on July 31, 2012 were found to be unreliable when the actual results were far from
the close race expected from projections. The nal results of the referendum were 38 to 62
percent. The geographic results showed a radial trend of increased no votes as the distance
from the center of the city increased. Not one county of the 10-County region voted in favor
of the referendum. Notably, the city of Atlanta passed the referendum 58 to 42 percent.
The resounding failure of the referendum in the Atlanta region provides a number of lessons
for future initiatives in the state of Georgia, as well as in other regions across the nation.
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The next chapter details the factors identied by interviewees as contributing factors to the




Political strategies and negotiated results shaped the outcome of the referendum. Those
interviewed felt the failure of the referendum resulted from a perfect storm of factors.
The majority of those interviewed believed that though many factors played a role, the
overarching national issues, discussed in the nal section of this chapter, were the main
contributing factors to the failure of the referendum. In the following sections, each factor
is examined and lessons learned are given for future referenda in the Atlanta region as well
as in other regions in the nation.
4.1 The Transportation Investment Act of 2010
The Transportation Investment Act of 2010 presented a series of political compromises [25].
The governor had a number of specics that he wanted addressed in the legislation and the
majority of his musts were included in the nal bill. A number of legislators wanted specic
items as well. Many blamed these additions for the ultimate failure of the referendum in
the Atlanta region. Some even went as far as to say the bill was designed to fail.
4.1.1 10-Year Period
Local ocials criticized the 10-year period required by the legislation. Given that Georgia's
county-specic TSPLOSTs could only be imposed for a six-year period, the 10-year require-
ment did not leave room for seemingly regional projects that might require an extended
funding period. For instance, many of those interviewed disagreed with the 10-year re-
quirements, arguing that transit projects normally require a much larger window for project
completion. Transit projects under a 10-year requirement for completion could possibly run
into issues that might push back the completion date; under the legislation, this would leave
the project incomplete without additional funding. This type of complication could possibly
meet dissatisfaction with the public and increase the already heightened public distrust in
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government.
The legislation outlined a provision for a sales tax renewal by a public referendum af-
ter the 10-year period expired, a method which has been highly successful with Georgia's
county-specic TSPLOSTs. An incomplete transit project could potentially reduce public
willingness to renew the regional sales tax after the 10-year period had passed. Even so,
many members of the legislature had designed bills with six or eight year periods in the two
years prior, arguing that a 10-year period was too lengthy. Many believe the reduced time
periods in legislation were meant to disincentive transit investment on the project list.
Lessons Learned
Designing the project selection process such that criteria were to be developed externally
from the legislation formed a conict between the legislature and the local ocials in the
fundamental understanding of the intended purpose of the legislation. By setting up a
process which allowed the local ocials to draft criteria, the legislation created an unknown
factor. Given the relatively strict process codied in the legislation, the oversight allowed
for too much exibility when compared to the rest of the legislation. Local ocials in the
Atlanta region were allowed to produce a list with more transit than many in the legislature
felt was acceptable. The disjointed nature of the design left a gap which made transit funding
possible through the initiative but dicult given time constraints. The legislature could have
eliminated the issue by either increasing the time period, making transit investment more
feasible, or creating criteria restricting transit. Even stricter, the legislature could have
placed a percentage cap on transit investment in the Atlanta region.
Some in the legislature disagreed with the level of transit and publicly complained that
the 10-year time period would not be sucient for the transit projects on the list. Their
criticisms were highly publicized and might have been a factor in the failure of the refer-
endum. To counteract this issue, the legislature could have been stricter on the criteria or
the time period so that the intended purpose of the legislation would be carried through
the process. If transit is less favorable in a region, creating a time frame of six years would
reduce the level of transit on the list automatically. If transit is more favorable in a region,
83
the time frame should be increased to a more feasible period for transit investment. In this
case, additional time should be built in for transit investment to ensure public trust and the
viability of future referenda.
4.1.2 Date of the Election
The public referendum was required by legislation to take place on the Republican Primary
of July 31, 2012. Some legislators suggested that this date was chosen as a campaign
strategy: by placing the vote on a date that would lessen voter turnout, you could minimize
the opportunity for failure and slide in under the radar. Another argument is that a
vote on this date would be less likely to pass with the high turnout of conservative voters,
minimizing the opportunity for success [22]. To many, this date typically represented an
election date where voters who were more likely to vote against it were going to the polls to
vote on other matters [23]. Many argued that the date should have been on the presidential
election ballot, when there is typically a more representative sample of the general public
going to the polls and when voters more likely to support a sales tax would be present.
Though some legislators were against it, the date of the election was one of the musts
the governor wanted in the legislation and was not up for debate. In addition, many
legislators were hoping the economy would improve. Instead, the economic issues facing
the Atlanta region had created an environment and culture that were more anti-government
and anti-tax than when the bill was passed into law in 2010. Without the exibility to
change the date of the vote, the referendum was required to be held on a date where many
believe the sentiments were at its highest. Flexibility in the legislation might have allowed
ocials to analyze the political atmosphere, social atmosphere, and current polling numbers
and make the informed decision to postpone the election. For instance, in Denver, even
though a proposed 0.4 percent sales tax increase was slated for the November 2012 ballot,
the Regional Transportation District Board decided not to place the measure on the ballot.
Instead, the Board pushed back the dates for the proposed vote [24].
When retrospectively asked what they would go back and change in the legislation, one
member of the House said they would have liked to have made the date open-ended [1].
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The representative explained that it was dicult to foresee the political atmosphere two
years later. The General Assembly could not have predicted the struggling economy, the
controversial decisions surrounding the opening of the High Occupancy Toll (HOT) lanes on
Interstate 85, and the broken campaign promise to end tolling on Georgia 400 [1]. According
to the representative, each of these played a role in the failure of the referendum. A more
open-ended date for the referendum could have provided an opportunity to bypass some of
these issues, which were encountered prior to the referendum.
One member of the full regional transportation roundtable criticized the date of the ref-
erendum for being set too close to the re-election of many who served on the full roundtable.
He argued that the referendum was held when the members of the roundtable, who you
needed to go out there and help, were all up for re-election, for a tax in a conservative state
[20]. A number of incumbents lost their seats, many believe because of their support of the
referendum.
Lessons Learned
The date of the election was initially designed for a number of reasons. Retrospectively, the
date should have been moved to the presidential election to increase the turnout of voters
generally more willing to vote for tax increases. Also, the date of the election should be
analyzed and the most benecial date should be selected not only in terms of characteristics
of voter turnout but also in terms of political feasibility of leadership support for the initia-
tive. It is important to push for strong public support from members of the RTR as well as
local and state leadership. The timing of the election conicted heavily with the re-election
campaigns of a number of the local ocials whose support is normally crucial for a sales tax
referendum. Regardless, other factors played a more substantial role in the failure of the
referendum; many argue that the referendum would have failed regardless of the date.
If the Atlanta region, and possibly other regions, had been given the ability to move
the date based upon analysis of the political and social atmosphere along with the polling
numbers, some have argued that the vote should have been postponed to a more favorable
time. Flexibility must be allowed in the legislation to provide for external political factors
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that may occur during the project selection and campaign process. The legislation was
passed two years prior to the referendum date. Many local transportation issues and national
politics arose and angered the public. The Tea Party became more prominent. With a more
exible bill, the date could have been changed based on the political atmosphere. Allowing
for an open-ended date could possibly bypass many of the issues faced by the campaign in
the Atlanta region.
4.1.3 Rigid Structure
Some of those interviewed thought the bill was overly complicated, onerous, and cumber-
some. For the general public, the bill was dicult to understand, being many pages long
and riddled with acronyms and technical jargon. For local ocials, it was far too specic
and strict. Each date was codied in the legislation and could not be altered. One member
heavily involved in the project selection process criticized the legislation saying, the legis-
lature just made these arbitrary dates, these arbitrary processes, this arbitrary legislation,
because they were being twisted, because they hadn't done anything for six years and now
they were on the wire [20]. Others however, suggested that this rigid structure worked
well by positively aecting the local ocials in terms of process and execution. With set
deadlines, local ocials worked diligently to complete tasks on-time.
One of the biggest aws mentioned in the structure of the legislation centered on the
close to nine-month period after the approval of the project list. The time period between
the approval of the project list and the vote allowed for months of criticism and controversy
without the ability to amend or alter the project list. Complaints surrounding controversial
projects went unanswered. Overall public trust decreased when many in the public realized
that the project list was set in stone. Before the campaign, only active members of the
community were aware of the project selection process. Others in the general public were




Overall, the bill was dicult to understand for the general public and local ocials. Creating
a piece of legislation which is easy to understand and transparent may increase public trust
in government and the basic understanding of the project selection process and ultimate goal
of the legislation. Also, the rigid structure codied into the bill must be relaxed to allow
for more exibility in the process. Creating a piece of legislation at the last moment in the
session, though it is part of the political process in the legislature, produced a bill with aws
and groupings of political additions which did not necessarily work well together. In future
legislation, the legislature must work against political maneuvers and attempt to produce a
more cohesive plan and process. The basic process for project selection was a fundamentally
successful process, though exibility should have been placed into the bill so that situational
alterations could be made. Also, the rigid two year time period should be reduced so that
the public is given less time to criticize a project list which cannot be altered. Ideally, the
project selection process must be highly publicized so that members of the community not
normally involved can give public input. After the project list is approved, the vote should
occur as soon as politically possible.
4.1.4 Pass it to the Locals
Many stakeholders criticized the Georgia General Assembly for its inability to solve the
transportation funding issue. The legislators could have developed a list of projects, or even
gone as far as approving a tax without a public referendum. Instead, the majority of deci-
sions, and in turn risks, were pushed to the local ocials. Members of the General Assembly
responded to the criticism by explaining that the local elected ocials, who should know
what their communities need, should be tasked with creating a transportation project list.
Another member of the legislature remembered the Association of County Commissioners
and the Georgia Municipal Association wanting to be a part of the process and be the peo-
ple making the decisions. The legislator retrospectively believes it was a mistake to allow
the locals to pick projects because the criteria were far from what some legislators were
expecting from the RTR [3]. According to the legislator, it was so profoundly against the
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expectations that the members of the majority had of what the Transportation Investment
Act of 2010 was going to be about [3].
Some members of the General Assembly did not expect the local elected ocials to work
as well together as they ultimately did. Many were shocked that all 12 of the regional
transportation roundtables were able to devise and vote for a project list. In fact, some
stakeholders believed that many legislators voted for the bill hoping that the local elected
ocials would not be able to work together and inaction would then be blamed on the
local representatives. Many members of the General Assembly did not want their name
connected to legislation that created a 10-year tax. With local elected ocials failing to
agree or stumbling through a project list, the chances of a favorable referendum would have
been reduced.
Criteria for project selection were not established but only recommended in the legisla-
tion. The responsibility to establish criteria was passed to the GDOT director of planning,
a position directly connected to the governor by appointment. The criteria were then to be
voted on by a majority of members of the regional transportation roundtable of each district.
A number of legislators, a majority who had voted in favor of the legislation, and many, who
were up for re-election, came out in strong opposition to the referendum in their areas. One
of their main complaints centered on the criteria for project selection. In response, several
stakeholders criticized the complaints of members of the General Assembly who came out
in opposition of the referendum, because they argued that if these members were so against
the established criteria, they should have created strict criteria in the bill. In response, the
legislators argued that they left the criteria up to each district because of the diverse nature
of the state.
Lessons Learned
As mentioned earlier, the gap in the understanding of the fundamental purpose of the
legislation between members of the legislature and the RTR played a factor in the failure of
the referendum. The legislature could have counteracted their issue with the project list by
providing for strict criteria or creating their own project list in the legislation. The unique
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political motives behind the Republican support and passage of the legislation played a factor
in the failure. Under normal circumstances, legislators who overwhelmingly pass a piece of
legislation do not publicly oppose the legislation later. When passing a substantial piece of
legislation, it is important to ensure long-term support from the legislature. The criticisms
and vocal opposition by legislators who initially passed the legislation negatively aected
public opinion. Though it has received criticism, many believe passing it to the locals is
fundamentally a good idea when tasked with creating a project list. Ideally, the project
list should be created by planners and engineers along with local ocials who represent and
understand the needs of their constituency. However, when passing it to the local ocials,
the legislature must maintain support. If needed, the legislature should implement criteria
and restrictions which ensure their support in the long-term.
4.1.5 Regional versus Statewide
Some believed that the cards were stacked against the referendum given that the legis-
lation was created by a rural and conservative-oriented legislative body [23]. As discussed
in chapter 2, the transportation crisis was largely perceived as an Atlanta problem [25].
However, the rural legislature has historically pushed against allowing metropolitan areas,
especially the Atlanta region, to have decision-making abilities [23]. This was one of the
main underlying issues surrounding the three-year plus debate on whether to go regional
or statewide with the legislation. As discussed earlier, one of the prior legislative eorts
addressed Atlanta's transportation crisis as a separate funding source while addressing the
rest of the state with another. Another legislative eort addressed the entire state with
one funding source. The argument surrounded how to specically address the funding issue
of Atlanta without giving any additional power to the Atlanta region. The Transportation
Investment Act of 2010 created twelve regions, but singled out Atlanta in multiple ways:
• 15 percent instead of the 25 percent in local discretionary funds;
• Mayor of Atlanta allowed on the executive committee in the Atlanta region;
• MARTA fund restrictions on operations and maintenance where operation is entirely
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in the Atlanta region;
• Specication of GRTA for contracts on mass transit and bus projects where majority
of transit would be in Atlanta region;
• 10-year period for project completion, discriminating against transit capital projects
which would most likely be located in the Atlanta region.
The legislation was designed in part to solve Atlanta's transportation crisis while providing
the rest of the state with the ability to acquire additional transportation funding. Many
argue that the remaining 11 regions were slapped together and did not have a dened
transportation vision. Some counties next to each other might have had a better relationship
together than with their respective regions. One legislator argues that Paulding County
should have been included in the Atlanta region instead of Fayette County given that more
commuters come from the former rather than the latter [3].
Without a clear transportation vision, many believe these regions were doomed to fail.
Only three regions passed the referendum, and all by slim majorities, as shown in Table
12. Many believe these three regions passed the referendum because they could agree on
a transportation vision for local road funding. Many of the major projects in these rural
regions, known as some of the most rural areas of the state of Georgia, addressed paving
dirt roads and improving local roads, issues many voters could agree on.
Table 12: Three Regions Passing July 31, 2012 Referenda [7]
Region Yes No Outcome
Central Savannah River Area District 54% 46% Passed
River Valley District 54% 46% Passed
Heart of Georgia Altamaha District 52% 48% Passed
Lessons Learned
The legislature must attempt to limit the aect politics has on the transportation nance
initiative. Many mentioned that a statewide funding initiative was far too dicult to attempt
given that the state could never agree on a cohesive transportation vision through one project
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list, especially since the majority of regions in the regional initiative failed to agree upon a
cohesive transportation vision and project list. If this regional initiative did not work, the
statewide would be far less feasible. The possibility of passage of a single project list would
be reduced as the size of the regions increased. Following the same logic, smaller regions
could possibly share a more cohesive transportation vision and agree upon one single project
list. Smaller regions are closer together and thus have a higher possibility of holding similar
transportation needs.
Through future initiatives, the Atlanta region should be reduced to a ve-county region.
The region would include the initial areas listed in the MARTA referenda: the City of
Atlanta, Clayton, Cobb, DeKalb, Fulton, and Gwinnett Counties. All other counties in
the state would be allowed to opt-in by partnering with other counties and holding a
referendum for their own regional transportation funding. Incentives could also be allowed
through legislation by allowing for higher sales tax percentages or larger time periods in
areas where more than two counties partnered together. Allowing for this type of exibility
would move the state toward producing a regional transportation network through targeting
similarities between existing local transportation visions across the state. The alternative
would accomplish the goals of addressing regionalism, the transportation crisis in the Atlanta
area, and the funding needs of the rest of the state.
4.1.6 No Opt-Out
The discussion of allowing a county to opt-out of the referendum in each district was heavily
debated throughout the three years of legislative discussion. As discussed in chapter 2, the
ability for counties to opt-out of the MARTA referendum of 1971 created a disjointed
and inecient public transit system. A transit system originally designed as a regional
transportation network never truly realized its regional nature. Many in the legislature did
not want to allow another regional attempt to be thwarted by an opt-out mechanism.
This side met resistance from members of the legislature who were against taxing counties
that did not vote favorably with their respective regions. Some in the legislature pushed
for the inclusion of an opt-out criterion while others pushed for a hybrid of the two,
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allowing an opt-out in the rst stage in the form of allowing local ocials to provide a
resolution for a referendum. Even so, Governor Perdue did not want an opt-out criterion
in the legislation [18]. The governor's request was honored and counties were not given the
opportunity to opt-out of the sales tax if the referendum passed in their district but not
in their particular county. Following this mechanism, every county, even counties that did
not vote majority in favor of the referendum, was required to pay the sales tax when 50
plus one in the district voted in favor of the referendum. This angered many members of
the legislature, even members who voted in favor of the bill. They believed that there were
profound concerns with tying counties together with an unknown project list, calling it
reckless and a near fatal aw [3]. One member of the House went on to say that it poses
profound issues when counties that pride themselves as being the best managed counties
scally and otherwise in America are bound with organizations like MARTA that over the
years have had major issues with both scandals and management issues [3]. Several stated
that the majority of the members against the referendum for these reasons still ultimately
voted for the legislation to ensure that the transportation issue would be removed from
the governor's election campaign, and in turn help the re-election eorts of the Republican
incumbent, Governor Sonny Perdue. Many of the same legislators who voted with great
reservation in favor of the legislation later publicly turned on the referendum during the
campaign phase [3].
Lessons Learned
Providing for some type of opt-out is fundamental to ensure public trust. Many in the
public were angered that their respective county might be forced into paying a sales tax when
their county did not vote majority in favor of the referendum. The exemption of an opt-
out criterion was one of the musts from Governor Perdue and many in the legislature
fundamentally disagreed with the addition. The majority of legislators interviewed were
shocked by the exclusion of an opt-out criterion. The issue was bipartisan in many ways.
For example, the House adopted an amendment in 2009 for which would have provided for
a county opt-out for any county in any region. Out of 180 in attendance, 172 members,
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across party lines, voted in favor of the bill. In fact, there were no objections to the adoption
of the amendment. Every single member recognized a county opt-out is something they
wanted to give their local ocials [3]. The only discussion centered on the level of opt-out
to include in the legislation.
In the state of Georgia, an opt-out criterion must be included. However, to ensure
that the mistakes of the past are not repeated, the opt-out must occur at the beginning
of the process. Essentially the opt-out would be an opt-in. The process would be more
favorable in the terms of public trust. Flexibility must also be allowed such that if an
important county does not opt-in, the process does not move forward. An ideal process
would be exible and transparent with smaller regions of two or more counties who are given
the ability to opt-in to a partnership and referendum together. After a certain date, the
county could not opt-out. In other regions across the nation, the inclusion of the opt-
out criteria should be based on the specic characteristics and beliefs of the public and
legislature. If excluding an opt-out criterion is politically feasible in the region, it is highly
recommended because it essentially ensures a regional process and outcome.
4.1.7 The Carrot and the Stick
One of the most controversial discussions surrounding the legislation was the change in
matching requirements for GDOT local maintenance and improvement grants. For regions
that failed to pass the referendum, the legislation required a 30 percent match for GDOT
local maintenance and improvement grants lasting until the tax is approved. The legislation
basically increased the matching requirements to a base level of 50 percent, a level which
was similar to matching requirements before the legislation. If the region approved a project
list, the matching requirements were then reduced to 30 percent. If the region then voted
in favor of the referendum, the matching requirements were further reduced to 10 percent.
Some members of the legislature suggested that the matching requirements were created as
incentives to the members of the full regional transportation roundtable into promoting the
project list and referendum.
The matching requirements were meant initially to be incentives, but were viewed as
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disincentives for regions that did not pass the referendum. Many local ocials from the nine
regions that failed to pass the referendum were unhappy to hear that funding transportation
in their local areas might become more dicult given an increase in transportation match
funding on the local level. However, these matches became less detrimental given that a new
provision in the matching requirements allowed the usage of right-of-way [1]. Many believe
they were overblown politically and in the media given that the penalties were not as severe
as they originally were portrayed. Still, some legislators worked to change the legislation so
that the regions that did not pass the referendum would not incur the matching penalty.
However, following the views of the majority of legislators interviewed, their attempt fell on
deaf ears and was not moved forward in the 2013 legislative session.
Lessons Learned
Though the matching requirements were initially designed as incentives, the line between
incentive and disincentive became blurred though the two-year process. During the cam-
paign, the opposition attacked the political nature of the bill by criticizing the matching
requirements. The matching requirements furthered the public distrust in government. If
incentives are codied in the legislation, the line between incentive and disincentive must
be distant. The incentive must remain an incentive throughout the process. A disincentive
is usually skewed as a negative for a public referendum, and thus must be avoided in the
legislation.
4.1.8 Fractions of a Penny
In addition to being very complicated, the state currently does not allow sales taxes below
1 percent. In other regions across the nation, sales taxes have been successful at fractions
of a penny. For example, Denver passed a regional sales tax for 0.6 percent in 2004. The
public could be more willing to vote in favor of a referendum which funds transportation
with fractions of a penny. The amount is easier to market to the public.
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Lessons Learned
Passing a constitutional amendment which allows for the implementation of 0.5 percent
sales tax rates may be a more favorable alternative for voters. In addition, the fraction
sales tax could be utilized by local and statewide funding initiatives. The result would
better divide the sales tax revenue in the state. The idea of presenting a fraction of a
penny for transportation improvements provides for a campaign marketing strategy which
may be more benecial than the 1 percent status-quo. Providing for a 0.5 percent sales
tax for a longer period of time would increase feasibility of on-time transit investment in a
transit-friendly region. In regions less supportive of transit, the 0.5 percent sales tax can be
implemented for a shorter period of time to fund road programs and projects.
4.1.9 MARTA Restrictions
The legislation called MARTA out specically by regulating the way MARTA could spend
the proposed sales tax revenue. In turn, MARTA projects on the proposed list could only be
capital investments. No other agency or entity was identied in the bill with specic spend-
ing restrictions. The specics are part of a long history of contention between MARTA
and the state legislature. A supporter of the legislative restriction argued that without the
restrictions, the revenue from the referendum would go toward inating MARTA salaries.
The supporter argues that MARTA has been very poorly managed in the past, having is-
sues with overly heightened salaries, unacceptable use of taxpayers' dollars, and a record
of mismanagement that some counties in the region do not want to fund [3]. The sup-
porter connected the fact that North Fulton County has been paying the MARTA penny for
decades and the trac conditions are unsatisfactory, arguing that the other counties in the
region did not want those same conditions applied to their respective counties through the
legislation. Because of this, the MARTA legislative restrictions were important to include
in the Transportation Investment Act of 2010 [3].
In addition, the 50/50 restriction has been a source of contention for as long as MARTA
has been around [15]. Under the MARTA Act, a restriction was included to require MARTA
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to spend 50 percent of its revenue on capital expenditures and the other 50 percent on op-
erations and maintenance. The Transportation Investment Act of 2010 lifted the 50/50
restriction for three additional years. The Georgia legislature has not lifted the 50/50 re-
striction other than for small periods of time, causing funding issues every few years. Many
believe the legislature's hard grasp on the 50/50 restriction is part of a historical power
struggle between MARTA, the city of Atlanta, and the rural and home-rule based legisla-
ture. One representative believed it was caught in the evolution of the legislature from
a Democratic body to a Republican body [15]. Many stakeholders believe that there was
initially a sound reason for the restriction, when MARTA was just starting and federal
grants were owing, it was not unreasonable to say that you should be preserving a part
of your money to use as a match for the big grants [22]. According to a member of the
House, the MARTA 50/50 restriction has become a crisis as funding has become more and
more precious. The representative went on to say that as capital infrastructure is in place
and particularly as MARTA has aged and there is need for maintenance, it is in fact a big
deal [15] Supporters of the 50/50 restriction believe that given the history of MARTA, it is
not appropriate to remove the restriction until the agency can prove itself to be nancially
independent. This discussion was a hot topic in the 2013 legislative session given that an
audit was released in late 2012 that gave many specics to how the agency could improve
its nancial situation. The discussion is predicted to be a hot topic over the next few years
as MARTA attempts to address the line items in the audit.
After the failure of the referendum, Governor Deal called out MARTA as a main factor
in the failure of the referendum in the Atlanta region. Many blamed MARTA's dwindling
image for the negative image on transit and thus the ultimate failure of the referendum. The
MARTA discussion played a role in the failure of the referendum. However, many believe
Governor Deal overinated the MARTA issue, arguing that other issues played a larger role.
Lessons Learned
The MARTA restrictions in the legislation were construed as an attack on the system by
many in the public. The system was not highly favored by suburban and exurban interests;
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however, portions of the inner city and choice rider population came out in opposition of the
referendum solely on the aect the referendum had on MARTA. The group raised equity
concerns on the lack of funding toward MARTA and the ongoing issues between MARTA and
the legislature. The MARTA funding issues should have been addressed before the passage
of the legislation. Also, MARTA should not have been singled out in the legislation. Instead,
criteria should have been listed in the legislation which listed restrictions on operations and
maintenance for all systems, if any. MARTA's image did play a factor in the negative public
view of transit; however, the legislature should have addressed the issue prior to the funding
initiative.
4.1.10 Lack of Transit Governance
Many noted the lack of legislative eorts on transit governance as a factor in the failure of
the referendum. Others disagreed with the premise, arguing that the majority of voters did
not understand or comprehend the issue of transit governance, meaning it would not be an
issue to the voters. One member of the Atlanta RTR cited the lack of transit governance
as more of an issue of organization. When asked what the member would change about
the process retrospectively, he said he wished transit governance would have been addressed
prior to the project selection process. Without transit governance, many regional transit
projects were dicult to organize and sell to the public. It was dicult to determine who
would operate and maintain the system as well as where additional funding would come
from once the 10-year period expired.
Lessons Learned
In future legislative eorts, it is important to address transit governance before attempting
a transportation funding initiative. The lack of understanding and transparency in transit
projects on the project list were caused by the lack of transit governance in the region. With
transit governance addressed, many issue with public trust in government and anti-transit
sentiments could have been avoided. Without transit governance, the RTR was missing a
fundamental piece required for project selection.
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4.1.11 Constitutionality
The constitutionality of the legislation was called into question by the opposition. As men-
tioned in chapter 2, the decision was made to go statutory, meaning that the resulting
proposal did not need to have enabling legislation. Without enabling legislation, the con-
stitution remained unchanged. Currently the Georgia Constitution allows sales taxes to be
implemented on either a statewide or a local level. The regional boundaries had never been
attempted in the state prior to the Transportation Investment Act of 2010. Many in the
opposition believed the exclusion of an opt-out while forcing counties into sales taxes
in pre-dened regions was unconstitutional. In fact, in other gray areas, prior pieces of
legislation have ensured the issue was bypassed. For example, prior tax allocation districts
(TADs) were created so that the TADs did not cross county lines. As long as the TADs did
not cross county lines, the issue would not be called into question and would not require a
constitutional amendment. Constitutional amendments were more dicult to acquire give
that it required 2/3rds approval by members in the House and Senate and a statewide public
vote to approve on a general election, usually held during even-numbered years. Essentially,
all prior attempts at regional discussions had been purposely avoided. Lawyers on both sides
gave diering views of the issue. Lawyers on the campaign side told the campaign that the
legislation was constitutional. Lawyers on the opposition side reported that the constitution-
ality of the legislation was questionable and could be challenged. The discussion negatively
inuenced public trust in government and called the entire process into question. If the
Atlanta region had passed the referendum, it was highly likely that the constitutionality of
the referendum would have been quickly challenged.
Lessons Learned
To bypass this issue, the House could have decided to attempt a constitutional amendment.
Given the numbers in support of the bill in both the House and Senate, the constitutional
amendment would have passed. The acquisition of a constitutional amendment would ensure
that the legislation was constitutional and would bypass the complaints by the opposition.
In turn, it would increase public trust in government.
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4.2 The Project List
The project list and several specic projects were highly criticized. However, given that
the ballot itself did not include the project list, many believe no single project played a
signicant factor in the failure of the referendum.
4.2.1 The Project List Itself
The project list contained 157 separate projects. Given this many projects, a voter could
criticize any project for it not being where they traveled, lived, or worked. Voters could
identify many projects that they didn't want to pay for and thus believe them to be a
waste of taxpayers' dollars. Some suggested that the project list could have been more
inuential and therefore successful if there were only a few large projects that voters could
identify with. The list of regional projects would make a noticeable change in transportation
system performance to the areas they were located in. Depending on the political support for
transit, the list could possibly be made up of more transit projects and economic development
projects when compared to roadway projects given that basic roadway projects would have
more diculty reaching the regional and cost requirements necessary to make the list. In
areas politically requiring less transit investment, a project could be a program, like road
pavement or intersection improvements assigned a program cost. Placing programs such as
this instead of displaying a large amount of local projects on the project list would create a
more cohesive understanding of the project list and its eect on the regional transportation
infrastructure.
Areas in the inner city were exposed to the BeltLine project, Clifton Corridor project,
and other city-related transit and roadway improvements. In the suburbs, roadway and
intersection improvements were highlighted. Still, designing a single marketing phrase to
sum up the project list was dicult. On the other hand, the opposition had one phrase
that resonated, the largest tax increase in Georgia's history. The campaign was left with a
jumble of projects to sell to dierent areas of the region. Instead of pushing regionalism, the
project list forced the campaign to divide the region into subareas. The division suggests the
level of regionalism on the project list was not as high as members of the RTR had hoped.
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Some suggested that placing 157 projects on a list where many projects seemed to have
no connection to one another was setting the initiative up for failure. A member of the
campaign noted that this number of projects was a real challenge to selling the initiative.
The campaign was tasked with placing a 157 project list on a billboard or in a commercial
advertisement which needed to relate to the public. In response, the campaign targeted
commercial advertisements and billboards with projects by location. However, a member
of the campaign retrospectively concluded that a 157 project list was a lot to digest [27].
The sentiment in the region was what is in it for me? A member of the campaign believed
that the region was not ready for regional thinking and a big picture transportation
improvement [27].
Given that the TSPLOST was designed, and historically functioned, as a repeatable
referendum, the outcome of the rst vote would reect on the viability of future referenda.
The next referenda could include a project list with projects that built upon the initially
supported set of projects. Some suggested that a more politically favorable list, even though
it would not initially please all of the outlying groups, would have been more successful at
the ballot. Then, the next referenda could have included the more controversial projects
and then would be more likely to pass given that the rst list was scally responsible and
politically favorable.
Lessons Learned
The large size of the project list played a role in the public understanding of the referendum.
The 157 seemingly separate projects did not appear to be as regional in nature to the
public as it was initially designed for by the RTR. The project list could possibly have been
divided up and presented as programs, similar to the project lists of the three regions which
ultimately passed their respective referenda in Georgia. The project list must be designed
so that it can be marketed by the campaign as a cohesive, regional plan. The campaign
was given a project list with no clear marketing phrase to place on a billboard and in
commercial advertisements. In addition, a more politically favorable list of projects, with
less transit projects and more congestion mitigation and intersection improvement projects
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could possibly have received less criticism and a more favorable public vote for the rst
round of a typically repeatable referenda process.
4.2.2 Transit versus Roadways
In the legislative phase, discussions occurred on putting caps of 15 to 20 percent as the
maximum level of transit investment on the project list because there were major concerns
that transit would be o the charts in Atlanta and it would turn into a funding mechanism
for what many believed to be a transit remaking of Atlanta [3]. However, these caps were
never implemented in the legislation. Instead, 52 percent of funding on the project list was
devoted to transit.
Many opponents criticized the level of transit projects on the list arguing that the transit
projects did not provide for congestion relief and were far too expensive. The anti-transit
side argued that many transit projects on the list were not scally responsible, calling to
question the public distrust in government and raising concerns that the transit projects
would not be completed on-time and on-budget. Opponents argued that transit projects
were not comparable to roadway project in terms of the taxpayer's return on investment.
The argument created a noticeable divide in the regional discussion seen earlier in the project
selection process.
In addition, the opposition argued that transit was not feasible in the region because the
region did not have sucient density to warrant transit. The opposition often mentioned
the statistic that only 4 percent of the region used transit. One legislator argued that the
opposition struggled with the concept of subsidization with their continued complaints that
transit investment was heavily subsidized by taxpayers' dollars. The legislator argues that
the opposition did not understand that both roadway and transit infrastructure were heavily
subsidized [1].
Some opponents pushed for transit to be devoted solely to Bus Rapid Transit (BRT)
given that the costs would be much lower and more feasible [39]. BRT projects received
an unexpectedly higher level of public support when compared to heavy rail and light rail
alternatives. The opposition favored the lower costs and similarity to the Xpress service
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that many outer county areas favored and utilized for their commute.
Overall, many against transit were also against the inclusion of MARTA. 17 percent of
the transit projects included capital improvements to the MARTA system. The MARTA
improvements included train control systems upgrades, elevator and escalator rehabilitation,
unied transit communications infrastructure, passenger information system, tunnel and
platform lighting, tunnel ventilation rehabilitation, electrical power rehabilitation, track
rehabilitation, aerial structure rehabilitation, and improvements to the MARTA Airport
Station [36]. Given that MARTA held a negative image for many in the outer counties,
many were angered by the inclusion of these projects. The outer counties did not want to
begin funding a repeatable tax, a never-ending tax, which helped to bail out the MARTA
system. One legislator argues that the MARTA projects should not have been in the project
list, especially considering the nancial challenges that MARTA has right now including
some of the general maintenance of escalators. The legislator argued that it was dicult
to justify expanding using additional capital [1].
In addition, the opposition focused on the vague descriptions of the transit projects on
the project list. Project descriptions were vague given that transit governance had not been
determined. Also, the transit projects were at varying levels of completion. Many projects on
the list were not actually slated to be constructed upon passage of the referendum; instead,
the projects would be given funding for corridor planning, engineering, and environmental
review and assessment. Because of this, these projects did not know what type of transit
technology would be ultimately chosen.
The GRTA Xpress service and the Regional Senior Mobility Call Center were essentially
the only transit projects included on the project list in the outer counties. The inner
counties received the BeltLine project, the Clifton Corridor project, the streetcars, MARTA
improvements, and MARTA extensions. Clayton County received the Clayton County Local
Bus Service, a transit system that was discontinued due to inadequate funding a year prior.
Overall, the impact of transit investment in the inner counties was substantially higher
than in the outer counties. Provided that 52 percent of the project list included transit
investment, the public in the outer counties believed that their revenue would go toward
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transit projects that they would never utilize.
In addition, transit projects were not given long-term operations and maintenance fund-
ing sources. The assumption was made by many that the projects would forever be funded
by the repeatable referendum. The projects with preliminary engineering completed would
likely be placed on the second project list for construction, along with a similar lack of
long-term operations and maintenance funds. Many felt the process would be cyclical and
the 10-County region would be forced to continually fund transit projects.
The Sierra Club opposed the project list, saying that it would put commuter rail o
for at least another decade. Only one commuter rail project was included on the nal
investment list. The project funded the preliminary engineering of a possible commuter
rail line from Atlanta to Grin. The Sierra Club believed that more funding should be
put toward commuter rail, arguing that commuter rail was the most feasible transportation
solution for the development patterns of the Atlanta region. Following the process, this
project would most likely be the only commuter rail project pushed forward in the 10-
year funding period. Then, the commuter rail would be built, only if a funding source for
construction was acquired. This would be at least 10-years after the passage of the July
31, 2012 referendum. Given that the transportation crisis would be solved, more than
likely, no other funding sources for transit would appear. Thus, any other commuter rail
projects in the region would most likely not be constructed in the next few decades. The
repercussions of this decision, the Sierra Club argues, would be dire.
The discussion against transit investment fueled the opposition. Still, many argue that
the transit issue did not play a signicant role in the failure of the referendum. They argue
that the national issues such as the economy, anti-tax sentiments, and public distrust in




Though many groups disagreed, the transit percentage was abnormally high when compared
to the constituency represented in the 10-County Atlanta region. To ensure a more favor-
able outcome, the project list should reect the overall constituency of the entire region.
The transit percentage would have been more acceptable with a carefully selected set of
new transit capital projects. The MARTA capital investments should have been addressed
through the MARTA funding issues prior to the project list selection process. Including such
controversial projects along with the negative MARTA image did not produce a favorable
outcome from the outer county constituency.
Given that the referendum was designed to be repeatable, the rst project list would
have been more favorable with a roadway heavy list. The next referendum would then
be more feasible for transit investment following a positive on-time and on-budget delivery
and increased condence of voters during the decade prior. Overall, only 23 of the 157
projects on the list were categorized as transit projects; still, these projects included 52
percent of the total revenue from the proposed sales tax. Of these 23 projects, only eight of
the projects produced new transit construction. The other projects on the list were either
improvements to an existing system, continued funding of an existing system, or funding of
the preliminary engineering phase of the transit project. Projects of this nature should not
have been included on the project list. The repeatable referendum must receive a favorable
public image, especially during the rst referendum. Projects must be selected based on
the measured impact on the public. Projects which fund construction and will impact the
current transportation infrastructure in a way the public will acknowledge must be given
a higher priority than maintenance or preliminary engineering funding of transit projects.
Projects which can be funded in the rst six years of the sales tax should also be given
higher priority. In this way, the noticeable success of the process and the improvement of
the current transportation system would allow for future viability of repeatable referenda.
Overall, the public in the Atlanta region holds a negative view on transit investment.
The process created by the Transportation Investment Act of 2010 has the potential to
slowly change the view of the public through successful implementation of transit projects.
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The lesson learned from the failure of the referendum is to begin small and work up to
the percentage of transit included in the project list. In partnership, the legislature must
address transit governance and in turn funding and connectivity issues between the multiple
agencies currently servicing the region.
4.2.3 Congestion Mitigation versus Economic Development
The opposition especially criticized the projects that were designed for economic develop-
ment goals. The opposition argued that the mandate of the bill was for congestion mit-
igation, saying economic development should not have been considered as a criterion for
the project list. A report written by the Georgia Public Policy Foundation, a conservative
transportation think-tank in the region, argued that encouraging economic development
and creating a cleaner environment are admirable and desirable goals, but not related to
transportation and should not be supported by a transportation tax [39]. One member
of the campaign retrospectively argued that as the project list was designed it should have
focused solely on trac mitigation. If the project list had consisted of a smaller number of
high dollar projects and programs, economic development could have played a larger role.
However, given that the project list was a collection of 157 separate projects, the criteria
for project selection should have centered on congestion mitigation [27]. On the other hand,
another member argued that the criteria were initially not just congestion mitigation, saying
the bigger overarching goal was economic development. He believed that the message of
economic development got lost, arguing that the entire initiative was about quality of life,
economic sustainability, and prosperity, not just about relieving trac [26].
Essentially there was a divide between the criteria set by the GDOT director of planning
and RTR members and the understanding of opponents from the legislature who only wanted
congestion mitigation. The issue resonated well with opponents; economic development was
a dicult sell for the campaign. The issue became a key discussion for projects such as the
BeltLine and other transit projects. One local ocial cited the congestion mitigation and
economic development discussion as the most problematic issue about the Transportation
Investment Act of 2010 [19]. A member of the business community argued that the truth
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in numbers was that if the region could do everything it wanted to do, congestion in the
region would still not go down; at best it would stay the same. He reasoned that the best
the region could hope to do was not to lose ground; the commute was not going to get
better. The truth was that the referendum list would allow a 20 minute commute to remain
20 minutes [26]. Targeting solely congestion mitigation is not cost benecial to the public;
managing congestion and reducing congestion are two very separate things [19]. It was
dicult to sell the public on the hard truth of the continuing levels of congestion in the
region.
When the campaign focused on congestion mitigation with a number of their popular
billboards and commercial advertisements, it came under criticism because of the narrowed
focus. A member of the campaign argued that economic development was hard to sell on
a billboard because it was an intellectual argument that many did not understand and
ultimately did not want to hear [27]. One member of the business community admitted that
the campaign needed to better link job creation and economic prosperity to the project list.
The member argued that it was tough to do this the rst time around [26]. One member
argued that economic development and job creation was a good criterion for a rural district
because they did not have a trac congestion issue. However, Atlanta has a huge trac
congestion issue and thus the criteria for the region should have been strictly congestion
mitigation [3]. As mentioned earlier, there was a fundamental divide between the ultimate
goal of the legislation and the criteria developed by the RTR.
Lessons Learned
To counteract this issue, the legislature could have imposed strict criteria which ensured that
congestion mitigation would be the ultimate goal of the legislation. Overall, the goal from
legislation to the campaign must remain constant. The project list should have included
both congestion mitigation and economic development projects on the list. However, the
majority of projects and percentage of funding should have been devoted to projects which
address congestion mitigation because the constituency favored the criterion. If economic
development is included on the list, a marketable campaign must embrace and properly sell
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the idea of economic development to the public. In addition, the campaign must eectively
explain the issue of growth and congestion mitigation in the Atlanta region. The percentage
of economic development and congestion mitigation on the project list must be determined
based on the level of public support for economic development, especially the support of
leaders for the criterion.
4.2.4 Controversial Projects
The BeltLine
The Mayor of Atlanta was a strong advocate for the Atlanta BeltLine project, pushing
for close to $600 million in funding for the project as part of the referendum. The $600
million would go toward two transit lines, approximately ve miles of transit on the East
and West of Atlanta. The project also included ve miles of transit connecting the city of
Atlanta from East to West, a missing connection many believe has reduced walkability and
accessibility in the city. Given that Mayor Kasim Reed's support for the referendum was
crucial, members of the executive committee included this large amount of funding for the
BeltLine on the project list. Later in the process, the BeltLine met a great deal of public
resistance. Many criticized the BeltLine, arguing that the BeltLine was not a regional
project. They went further saying that the project was clearly for economic development
and not congestion mitigation. One legislator argued that it was a major violation of the
original intent of the legislation saying that the legislature did not pass a stimulus bill in
2010, the legislature passed a trac relief bill in 2010 and called the BeltLine project's
inclusion a bait and switch [3]. In addition, the BeltLine raised equity concerns based
on its eect on the surrounding communities, many being historically Black neighborhoods.
Some long-time residents might be pushed out of the areas surrounding the BeltLine due to
increased property values. Many choice riders could lose their proximity and transit access
to their place of employment. This particular issue is further discussed in Section 4.7. Many
of those interviewed believed the BeltLine was a great project and should be funded, but
felt the project should not have been included on the nal investment list.
107
The McCollum Airport
Similarly, the public criticized the airport project for not addressing congestion mitiga-
tion. The McCollum Airport held a strong case for job creation and economic development,
boasting the economic impact of $1.2 million per year and 800 jobs in Cobb County [19].
However, economic impact did not sell to the public. Many across the region did not see the
regional benet of investing in the McCollum Airport, believing the project list should only
include congestion mitigation projects. A member of the campaign retrospectively wishes
the project had not been included on the nal investment list [27].
The Northwest Corridor Project
The original Northwest Corridor Project, as seen in the draft investment list, proposed a
xed guideway project from Midtown to Cumberland. Cobb County has a long history
of anti-transit sentiments, only oering CCT bus services and GRTA Xpress commuter
services. The project would have provided Cobb County with a xed guideway project
connecting Cumberland to the MARTA Arts Center Station in Midtown Atlanta. After
the agreement on the draft investment list, legislators representing Cobb County came out
in opposition of the project. The group of legislators held public meetings and the public
opinion of the project decreased in the county. Members of the RTR acknowledged the
opposition and proposed an amendment to the project list. During the amendment process,
the funding was reduced for the transit line, instead putting it toward an enhanced transit
service from the Town Center area to connect with MARTA in Midtown Atlanta. The rest
of the funds were diverted toward intersection improvements at three intersections in Cobb
County. Many transit advocates were angered by the reallocation of funds toward roadway
projects. However, many in the county were pleased by the amendment. Throughout the
process, anti-transit sentiments in Cobb County were directed at the Northwest Corridor
Project. Others in the county were happy to see transit. According to those interviewed,
there are still racist and classist emotions in Cobb County surrounding the issue of transit
that did play a role in the failure of the referendum (history discussed in chapter 2).
However, the county has become more diverse in race and culture, bringing with it a
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decrease in citizens with anti-transit sentiments. The Northwest Corridor Project provides
an in depth case study of the progress of the historical issues of race and culture in the
Atlanta region [19]. Recent studies show promising changes in the public support for transit
in Cobb County. According to a recent survey, nearly 75 percent of respondents reported
never using public transit for their commute. The numbers suggest that access to public
transit needs improvement in Cobb County. Furthermore, in the same study, 62.5 percent of
respondents favored improvements to rail transit and 21.1 percent favored improvement to
bus transit [93]. Even more promising, another survey showed that 50 percent of respondents
chose improving the public transit system over building more roadways. The survey showed
that 57 percent would favor adding rail transit service within the county and connecting
with MARTA [91]. The recent results show positive trends for transit support in the county.
The Northwest Corridor project is currently moving forward with preliminary engineering.
The Clifton Corridor Project
The Clifton Corridor Project called to question equity concerns in the inner counties. After
being promised a rail line out to South Fulton, the project was not put on the nal project
list. Instead, one of the more auent neighborhoods near Emory University and the Center
for Disease Control was slated to receive a new MARTA rail line and connection. Though
many believed the project was warranted, the main complaint was its inclusion on equity
principles. The project fueled the discussion of race and class in the region. Many believe
the discussion drastically reduced the level of support from inner city voters.
Lessons Learned
The BeltLine is generally supported in the city of Atlanta and the surrounding communi-
ties; however it is generally not supported outside of the city. The BeltLine was a regional
project for the city of Atlanta but was not a regional project for the entire Atlanta re-
gion. Because of this, alternative funding sources should have been acquired for the project.
The BeltLine project already currently receives its own smaller funding source, though the
referendum would have speed up the process and placed transit on the BeltLine within a
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decade. As of now, the process will possibly take over a decade, depending on future fund-
ing opportunities. TheMcCollum Airport also was not generally supported by a regional
constituency. Because of this, the project also should have been funded by an alternative
source. The Northwest Corridor brought about lessons surrounding politics and transit in
Cobb County. The criticisms on the Northwest Corridor Project could have been avoided
given greater transparency between legislators and members of the RTR. As soon as the
members of the RTR were informed of the negative public opinion of the Northwest Corri-
dor Project, they drafted an amendment to adjust funding to a more favorable level. The
actions of the members of the RTR were one of the main success stories of the amendment
process during the project selection process. The members addressed public comments
received during the time period and adjusted the funding in the project list accordingly.
Though many were upset about the reallocation of funds, the decision to change the project
list likely had a positive overall eect on the results of the referendum. The Clifton Corridor
Project also was highly supported by surrounding communities, but received criticism from
the rest of the region. Projects of this type should be studied before they are included in
the project list. As mentioned before, only a few projects of this type should be included
given their controversial nature. If the McCollum Airport and the BeltLine were excluded
from the list, the Northwest Corridor and Clifton Corridor project, two possible connections
to the MARTA system, would have received less overall criticism. These two projects were
arguably more regional in nature when compared to the BeltLine and McCollum Airport
projects. Overall, during the project selection process, it is important to analyze projects
based on their potential support by the general public. Projects that might receive criticism
should be avoided, especially during the rst regional referendum.
4.2.5 The Atlanta Regional Transportation Roundtable
The marked dierences between the needs and wants of the constituency when compared
to the decisions of the representatives on the RTR show another fundamental divide. The
RTR approved a list they believed their constituency wanted and would approve. The RTR
also was subjected to public comment which many believe was skewed toward a more transit
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friendly, urban interest. The location of the RTR meetings, held in downtown Atlanta, might
have played a factor. Also, the transit advocates who some believed to have the strongest
voices were located in the center of the city, and could easily attend the RTR meetings to
make public comments. The members of the RTR might have overestimated the level of
support for transit. Some may not have realized the eect transit projects with high costs
in a recession would have on their constituency.
Some of those interviewed believed the overall structure of the RTR allowed for an equal
representation of the entire region. Each city and county had equal representation on the full
regional transportation roundtable. Others completely disagree, arguing that the mayors on
the RTR had undue inuence on the project selection and should not have been given as
much power. One member of the legislature argued that the cities were given far too much
inuence in the project selection process because currently the majority of the region lives in
unincorporated areas [1]. The discussion has become more prominent as the political battle
over power between cities and counties has been silently waged for years.
Some believed that the make-up of the executive committee was not as representative
as the RTR. Many believe the original make-up of the executive committee was designed to
ensure lower transit approval and the control of outer counties. Instead, some members on
the executive committee changed their personal views on transit investment and its potential
for the Atlanta region. Ocials close to the project selection process believe it was one
member of the executive committee who became a swing vote in favor of transit [14]. The
executive committee member's unexpected support of transit inated the nal percentage of
transit in the project list. Generally, the membership of the executive committee and RTR
diered in their level of support for transit investment when compared to the legislature and
the overall views of their constituency. The dierence played a factor in the ultimate level
of transit on the project list as well as the failure of the referendum.
Lessons Learned
The RTR and the executive committee are generally more supportive of transit investment.
The legislature is less supportive because it is controlled by a home-rule, rural system.
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The RTR and executive committee did not realize the aect the nation issues such as
the economy, distrust in government, and other national pressures had on local initiatives.
Following these growing sentiments, the Atlanta region constituency reected the views of
the rural legislature more so than the views of the RTR. The resulting list contained an
inated percentage of transit investment. It is important to ensure that project selection
is based on the current views of the constituency. This can be provided by constant and
real public input throughout the project selection process. Also, to ensure the views of the
constituency does not change between project selection and the referendum, the distance
between the dates should be minimized.
4.3 Public Input
The RTR boasted that 200,000 residents were involved in the entire process. However,
many complained that the level of involvement was overstated. Some mentioned being
discriminated against at the public meetings if they had negative comments. After October
13, 2011, the project list was set and could not be altered. From that date until the vote
on July 31, 2012 the public scrutinized the project list but the proponents were unable to
change the project list. Some in the public had not heard of the project list and process until
a month prior to the referendum, when the campaign began playing advertisements during
the Olympics and placing advertisements on billboards. Overall public trust in government
decreased given that many felt they were unable to given their input in the process and
project list.
Lessons Learned
Though the majority of RTR members and ARC sta mentioned that a large amount of
public input occurred, the RTR arguably did not receive a representative sample of public
input. Some in the public were unaware of the project selection process and could not give
input unless they happened to discover the process before the October 13, 2011 date. To
ensure project selection is based on the current views of the constituency, the process must
be speed up by allowing for a vote immediately after the project list is solidied. Two
years between passage of the legislation and the public referendum allowed for too long of
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a period for public comment without the ability to amend the project list. The project
selection process should occur as close as possible to the date of the referendum so that
criticism can only occur during a time period when the project list can be amended. Also,
the public input process must ensure that the public feels their voice is heard. Public input
should be real, meaning the public, not necessarily the RTR, must believe they were given
the proper amount of time to voice their opinion on the project list. If a large amount of
criticism is heard in a particular area, the RTR should attempt to amend the project list
accordingly, as was seen successful completed on the Northwest Corridor project. An eort
should be made to ensure that a representative sample of the public is able to oer public
input in the project list. Implementing surveys and studies throughout the process should
be used to ensure an accurate public opinion.
4.4 Unusual Opposition
The opposition shocked many in the public; it was dicult to envision the partnership of
three groups who normally would never work together, and would certainly never share a
table. The close partnership between the Sierra Club and the Tea Party was unexpected
given that the Sierra Club's support of transit was in conict with the Tea Party's opposition
to transit investment in the region. Still, the group became close by strategizing and even
celebrating the failure of the referendum together on the night of the election. When deciding
between if they should vote yes or no on the referendum, one negative comment can easily
sway a voter. Generally, it is much easier for a voter to reject a tax increase. The opposition
was highly visible and argued many dierent reasons to reject the referendum, reasons which
sometimes bypassed party lines. The opposition was highly successful in putting doubt in the
minds of all types of voters, ranging from inner city transit advocates to rural housewives.
Lessons Learned
Many in the process were not surprised by the opposition of the Tea Party. However, the
other two main groups could have been addressed at an earlier time. As mentioned in
chapter 3, the Sierra Club's decision to oppose the referendum was a split decision. If the
RTR had addressed a few more of the Sierra Club's issues, they might not have come out
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in opposition. If the RTR had addressed the equity issue in the South Fulton and placed
the long promised transit line on the project list, the DeKalb NAACP might have not come
out in opposition. Addressing the powerful stakeholders in the project selection process is
important when ensuring limited controversy and opposition to a referendum. Both groups
were in attendance and gave public comments at RTR meetings. Through improving the
public input process by implementing the lessons learned discussed earlier, these stakeholders
might have been better heard by the RTR and addressed accordingly.
4.5 The Campaign
The campaign played a large role in the failure of the referendum. Many believe the project
list and process was far too dicult to sell for the campaign and that the referendum was
going to fail, regardless. However, many blamed the campaign for the failure and provided
criticisms, discussed in the following subsections.
4.5.1 Congestion Mitigation versus Economic Development
The campaign pushed congestion mitigation over economic development. The campaign did
mention job creation in its advertisements. However, the main strategy and focus of the
campaign focused on how the project list would untie Atlanta's transportation knot. One
local ocial believed that the campaign focused on congestion mitigation because they knew
that it would pass a campaign [19]. However, the numbers behind congestion mitigation
did not show a proper balance between costs and benets. In truth, the cost point that
is technically required to actually reduce congestion is not cost benecial. The opposition
called the campaign out on the numbers and the public opinion of the campaign and the
project list suered. In the long-term, the referendum would have had little impact on the
reduction of congestion in the region and the support of future referenda would be reduced.
Lessons Learned
The campaign should devise a strategy to have an honest discussion with the public on
economic development and congestion mitigation. The public must understand the truth
behind the numbers and make an informed decision for the future of the region. The
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dierence between congestion relief and congestion management must be well understood to
ensure public trust in government and long-term viability of the funding source. By simply
ignoring the issue, the strategy backred on the campaign and decreased overall trust in
government.
4.5.2 Marketing the Referendum
The campaign struggled with selling 157 separate projects on a billboard or in a 30 second
television advertisement. In contrast, the opposition resonated well with their phrase The
largest tax increase in Georgia history, vote NO to the 1 percent regional sales tax. Also,
the campaign message of Untie Atlanta received negative responses from voters in the
Atlanta region that did not necessarily identify with Atlanta. The message focused on
downtown Atlanta while targeting suburban commuters. The suburban commuters did not
want their money going toward the city and the Downtown audience also was essentially
ignored, assuming that they would vote in favor of a 52 percent transit project list. Some
believe the regions surrounding the Atlanta region were similarly aected by the campaign
advertisements on billboards. The voters were misinformed and believed the referendum in
their region was connected to the city of Atlanta. Not wanting to fund downtown investment,
citizens in regions surrounding the Atlanta region voted against their respective referenda.
In addition, the members of the RTR and other local ocials whose support for the
referendum would inuence their constituency remained silent due to many upcoming re-
election campaigns. The timing of the vote reduced the campaign's ability to market the
referendum by inuencing the level of support from the local level.
Lessons Learned
The campaign must determine a strategy which can market the project list in a short time
period and will resonate with the public. To obtain a successful marketing strategy, the
RTR must produce a list that provides a cohesive transportation vision. More so, this vision
must match the transportation needs of the constituency. Also, the RTR, the legislature, and
the campaign must agree and maintain the strategy throughout the process. Local ocials
must play a key role in discussing the campaign on a grass-roots level in their community.
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Without their strong support, the local areas did not have an advocate they could identify
with.
4.5.3 Responding to the Opposition
In the beginning, the proponents attempted to address all comments by opposition. As the
comments increased, the proponents were unable to continue responding, leaving criticisms
and complaints during debates, on social media, and on media outlets unanswered. The
result presented misinformation and confusion to the public. Many retrospectively wished
they had addressed the concerns of the opposition.
Lessons Learned
Any negative criticism or comments on social media, media, and debates should be addressed
in writing and in person with facts and reason and as soon as possible. The campaign could
further target the issue of distrust in government by providing statistics of on-time and
on-budget delivery of previous transportation projects. Leaving criticism unanswered prop-
agates misinformation and confusion surrounding the issue. The campaign could divert some
funding away from advertisements and more toward manpower addressing the criticisms of
the opposition.
4.5.4 Attract the Right Crowd
Given that projections of voter turnout for the election were set to be around 375,000 to
400,000 people, the campaign's initial goal was to win 200,001 votes. They concentrated on
achieving that number and on getting nontraditional people who do not normally vote, to
vote yes. The campaign exceeded its goal by getting 254,663 yes votes; however, 675,535
ballots were cast [7]. Members of the campaign did not expect the high level of turnout and
believed this was primarily caused by the overarching national issues. One member believed
that the inuence of national issues was at its peak and thought the campaign inadvertently
heightened interest in overarching national issues [27]. Another member agreed saying, the
election was essentially the rst moment when people could protest national issues [26].
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Lessons Learned
Numbers show that the campaign reached its goal of 200,000 votes. However, the controver-
sial issue garnered a large number of votes against the referendum. The campaign targeted
individuals likely to vote for the referendum. They also specically targeted areas and sold
dierent projects based on the area. These strategies might have been fruitful. However,
the billboard advertisements did not resonate as well with the opposition. The billboards
aected members in the outer counties as well as members of other regions surrounding the
Atlanta region as they traveled through the region. The campaign's presence was arguably
too prevalent. More targeted voting when compared to billboard advertisements would al-
low for a more structured attempt at reaching the correct voters. Minimizing the campaigns
presence through less extravagant and glossy advertisements would resonate better with
voters who are still undecided or leaning toward voting against the referendum. Also, the
campaign must minimize its overall presence with the voters who are identied as being
more likely to vote against the referendum.
4.5.5 Timing
The campaign strategy was to essentially target the public with increased amounts of com-
mercial advertisements and billboards during the last month before the election. Some
believe the campaign remained silent while the opposition attended debates and presented
their case to the public, arguing that many voters had already decided against the refer-
endum before the campaign began. Others disagree, arguing that the campaign was too
loud, too early and began the Tea Party's opposition. Also, some criticize the campaign,
arguing that the campaign placed too many advertisements at one time. The overabundance
of advertisements made many believe it was too good to be true and that the campaign
had far too much nancial support. Many believe the campaign oversold the referendum.
Some argue that the consultants and ocials who the campaign relied on for their strategy
and preparation were not well informed on the Georgia campaign world and thus should not
have been utilized as the campaign prototype.
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Lessons Learned
The campaign must be started earlier so that it can address the issues before the voters
have made their decisions, especially when opposition is strong in the beginning. In the age
of early voting, the original campaign strategy of working in the last 72 hours is no longer
valid. The campaign must start earlier to address concerns before negative comments are
heard from the opposition. In addition, the campaign must be careful not to oversell the
advertisements, designing the strategy so that they do not seem over-funded or as if they
are overselling their message. Also, the campaign must strategize on a situational basis.
Georgia and Colorado contain dierent politics, rules, and constituencies. Strategy should
be primarily based on previous campaigns held in Georgia such as previous local sales tax
campaigns.
4.5.6 Spending Millions
The biggest criticism from the opposition toward the campaign was the large amount of
donations the campaign received from the business community. The campaign spent more
than $8 million, running a campaign which was highly visible with expensive advertisements
during the Olympics as well as a large number of billboards across the Atlanta region. The
public questioned where the money came from and why the donors funded the campaign.
Many businesses stood to gain if the referendum passed. The entire campaign seemed
political to the general public. The public trust in government was aected by the visibly
large amount of campaign spending. In many ways, the excessive amount of campaign
nancing and the method in which it was spent backred on the campaign.
Lessons Learned
During an economic recession where the constituency is dissatised with government, cam-
paign spending should be at a minimum. The majority of campaign spending would have
resonated better through grass-roots campaigning. By utilizing grass-roots methods, more
sta members could be hired and the money could be spent in a more discrete fashion so
that the public does not notice the amount the campaign is paid over than the importance
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of the message on the advertisements.
4.6 Suburban versus Urban Interests
4.6.1 ITP vs. OTP
The political barrier separated by Interstate 285 played a role in the failure of the referendum.
Similarly, the two portions of the region have dierent transportation needs and struggle to
agree upon a single transportation vision. Voters who identify as OTP typically support less
transit investment and more roadway and intersection improvements. Voters who identify at
ITP are more likely to support more transit investment along with roadway and intersection
improvements. Voters identifying as OTP commute into the city with their automobile or
utilize the GRTA Xpress service. Others commute to their place of work either in another
county or their own county with their automobile. A likely transportation vision for OTP
voters is to improve intersections and roadways so that their commute time is lowered. A
project list would likely fund the GRTA Xpress service as well as the Senior Call Mobility
Center. Voters identifying as ITP commute out of the city with their automobile or using
transit or commute within the city with their automobile, using transit, or walking. A
likely transportation vision for ITP voters is to improve transit connectivity, walkability,
and bikeability while improving intersections and roadways around the city. The two groups
dier in many ways, making it dicult to agree on a transportation vision and project list.
Lessons Learned
The size of the region created a divide between two separate transportation visions vot-
ing on one single project list. In truth, the project list reected a transportation vision
similar to the ITP voters, as shown by the results that the City of Atlanta supported the
transportation referendum 58 to 42 percent. As mentioned earlier, the region should be, at
a minimum, divided in two subregions. In this scenario, the two regions, likely the inner
MARTA counties and the remaining outer counties would have two separate project lists.
Also, tying three (Fulton, DeKalb, and Clayton Counties) to ve (Fulton, DeKalb, Clayton,
Cobb and Gwinnett Counties) of the inner MARTA counties into a region would ensure
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regionalism by also allowing for a cohesive transportation vision. In this scenario, the re-
maining counties would be allowed to create regions of two or more counties to provide for
a referendum in the region. The aforementioned ability to opt-in should be included and
must be restricted to a specic time period.
4.6.2 Understanding Regionalism
Many criticized the list because certain projects were not near their workplace or home.
The idea of regionalism, an idea used to formulate the project list, was dicult to sell to
the general public. A member of the campaign recalls feeling that the Atlanta region was
not ready to think regionally [27]. More so, the region was not ready to be a region.
Lessons Learned
The region was unable to think regionally because the region was far too diverse and
did not have a cohesive transportation vision. In future initiatives, smaller regions would
possibly produce more favorable results given that they are more likely to share a common
transportation vision. The core understanding of regionalism begins with a common interest
to work toward. It is dicult to bypass home-rule politics under these circumstances.
4.7 Equity
The campaign expected the inner city vote to go relatively in their favor. There was an
internal struggle in the inner city with the project list and the exclusion of a MARTA
extension which had been promised for years. In addition, the legislation did not provide
an exemption for DeKalb and Fulton Counties, requiring that the counties pay two pennies
after successful passage of the referendum, placing additional taxes on lower income family
in the inner city that had already been funding the MARTA system for decades. The
Black community criticized a number of projects, including the BeltLine, as an economic
development project which displaced the Black community, many being lower income, away
from their jobs and homes. In addition, many of these displaced communities could be
categorized as choice riders, the primary customers for the MARTA system. In the terms
of the MARTA restrictions in the legislation, equity issues were raised. Some believed the
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MARTA restrictions were racially motivated and hurt the lower income, Black population.
Instead, some pushed for the failure of the referendum so that a new initiative would address
MARTA's funding crisis, and restore MARTA. Many believe discussion on race and class
brought about by the referendum prompted the unexpectedly low percentage yes votes in
the inner city.
Lessons Learned
The equity issues closely parallel the failure of the MARTA referendum of 1968, discussed in
chapter 2, where one primary reason reported for the failure of the referendum was the lack of
support by the Black community. The MARTA referendum of 1971 passed, one main reason
reportedly being the involvement of the Black community in planning and discussions. Even
given the heavy involvement of the project selection process, many in the Black community
felt their issues had not been addressed. The project selection process did not function in
a way which made constituency comfortable about the process and outcome. As mentioned
earlier, the public comment portion was limited in time and functionality. The majority
of the public was not aware of the project selection process, and thus did not attend the
meetings.
Misinformation and distrust in government coupled with anger and claims of racism
could have been avoided given more involvement and public awareness prior to the selection
of the project list. Black leaders could have been consulted and projects important to
their constituency would have then been included. The lack of projects addressing the lower
income, Black communities angered too many of the members the campaign projected to vote
overwhelmingly in favor of the referendum. It is important to understand the constituency
needed to pass the referendum when determining the project list.
4.8 The Role of the Media
Many felt that one of the biggest obstacles to the campaign was the media [27]. One member
of the business community believed the media was not a friend of the campaign. Every
opportunity the media had to be a whistle blower or showcase the opposition they did,
certainly more often than they provided the opportunity for the campaign to showcase its
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side. Many believed the level of attention given to the leaders of the Tea Party, Sierra Club,
and DeKalb NAACP was skewed when compared to the proponents. Many believed there
was an unequal public representation of the proponents and opponents and the constituency
their represented. Polling conducted two months before the referendum showed that a total
of 75.5 percent of respondents reported being either somewhat familiar or familiar with
the transportation sales tax voter referendum that will be on all ballots [72]. It can be
assumed that many of the respondents familiar with the referendum read at least one media
article that discussed negative views toward the transportation referendum. It is possible
that these interactions alone may have inuenced their decision.
Lessons Learned
As mentioned earlier, the campaign must respond to all negative attacks, especially attacks
featured on major local news sources. The media played a role in the failure of the referen-
dum. However, the majority of the players in the process could not inuence how the media
portrayed the opposition and the overall process. The most inuential player in the process
is the campaign and how eciently they approach the media and the public statements of
the opposition.
4.9 Overarching National Issues
Though the above issues were mentioned as contributing factors to the failure of the refer-
endum, the majority of those interviewed argued that overarching nation issues played the
most signicant role. National issues such as the economy, the looming presidential election,
the anti-tax movement, and overall distrust in all forms of government aected the local
political climate in the Atlanta region. Even in in Los Angeles, a location which is normally
highly supportive of sales tax referenda and transit investment did not pass their referendum
around the same time. This suggests that the national issues impacted more than just the
referendum in the Atlanta region [26].
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4.9.1 The Economy
In December of 2007, the rapid decline of the nation's housing and commercial real estate
markets ocially pushed the national economy into a recession. The event, today known
as the Great Recession, is considered by many as the worst economic crisis since the Great
Depression in the 1930s. In 2008 and 2009, the situation worsened when the nancial sector
crashed. At its worst, Georgia reportedly lost close to 26,000 jobs per month [82]. In 2010,
the legislature was hopeful that the economy would improve before the referendum and the
voters would be more receptive to a tax increase [1]. By 2012, many lost hope, calling
the economic situation the new normal. The public was greatly aected by the Great
Recession. Some members of the legislature argue that the referendum might have had a
better chance of passing if it had been held in 2010 in comparison.
The state of Georgia was hit especially hard. Household incomes were at historically
low levels. Median household income fell by nearly $2,000 from 2010 to 2011, a median
household income level comparable to values in the early 1990s. Also, annual wages for the
median Georgia worker fell by more than $2,500 which was the most substantial decline
in the nation [82]. According to the most recent report by the Georgia Budget & Policy
Institute, Georgia now ranks 5th in the nation for the total percentage of residents living in
poverty and 10th highest for total percentage of children living in poverty [82].
The Great Recession has reduced annual pay for low- and middle-income Georgians by
thousands of dollars since the recession began [82]. Georgia's low- and middle-income fam-
ilies have characteristically high unemployment rates, depressed wages, shrunken incomes,
and high poverty rates [82]. Given that the sales tax is regressive, passage of the referendum
could have produced a more pronounced eect on the low- and middle-income levels. Since
many in the outer counties were greatly aected by the recession, many were not supportive
of another regressive tax.
In general, many were against placing undue pressure on other struggling families during
the Great Recession. Many were against taxing the public during a recession, arguing that
families needed all of the money they were earning. Generally, discussing a new tax is
unpopular during a recession. Following this view, the economy caused many ocials and
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leaders to remain silent or come out against the referendum. Much of the opposition was
fueled by the economic emotions and pressures from the Great Recession. Many interviewees
mentioned the economy as one of the main driving factors to the defeat of the referendum.
Lessons Learned
The local ocials and legislators could not have anticipated the economic situation in 2012.
However, legislation must allow exibility for future unknown circumstances such as the
economy and public sentiments. Given proper exibility, the date of the referendum could
be postponed to a more favorable date. In addition, the recommendation of implementing
a sales tax for a fraction of a penny may be more favorable to the public. Strategies to
improve the general view of how the revenue will be spent must be implemented including
increasing transparency and providing for real public involvement. Removing any contro-
versial projects and only placing projects with specic descriptions might also be helpful.
The strategy could be furthered by removing any transit projects with vague descriptions.
However, many of the voters identifying with the economy would not vote in favor of the ref-
erendum regardless of strategies implemented given that this group is fundamentally against
tax increases during a recession.
On a national level, the eects of the great recession can be seen in the overall percentage
of approval for transportation measures. In 2004, the percentage of approval for transporta-
tion funding measures was 76 percent. In 2008, the number was 78 percent. However, by
year 2010, the number decreased to 61 percent. In 2012, the percentage increased to 68
percent. Even areas that are typically supportive of sales tax initiatives ran into diculties.
For example, Los Angeles, California met a close defeat with Measure J, which would have
extended a 30-year 0.5 percent sales tax initially passed in 2008 for another 30 years [30].
In California, the measure needs a supermajority of 66 percent to pass and only resulted in
65 percent. The results suggest that the overarching national issues played a large role in
other measures around the same time as the Atlanta referendum.
124
4.9.2 The Anti-Tax Movement
Many voters developed anti-tax sentiments in reaction to the economic situation. As the
economy continued to struggle, the Tea Party's message became increasingly popular in the
state of Georgia. One main goal of the Tea Party movement was to solve the national debt
crisis by adhering to the ideals of scal conservatism and reduced government interference;
the movement resonated with the general public, though many did not identify specically
with the Tea Party. As the anti-tax sentiments increased, many Republican legislators and
leaders signed no tax pledges upon taking oce.
In 2010, many legislators remember the Tea Party not being as visible when compared
to present day. The Tea Party became very prominent over the two year period between the
passage of the bill and the voter referendum. One member of the legislature complained of
the diculties determining how many members of the public identied with the Tea Party.
The legislator argued that leaders of the Tea Party are not elected, meaning there is no
specic process which determines the reach of the movement in the Atlanta region and what
constituency the leaders represent when they speak in public or are quoted by the media
[1]. Even so, the media portrayed the loss of the referendum as a victory for the Tea Party.
Most of those interviewed felt the media played a large role in their success, arguing that
they Tea Party was given as much power as the campaign on media channels, a medium that
many in the public received the majority of their information from during the campaign.
Also, those interviewed argued that it was easy to run a campaign against a tax during a
recession with the public sentiment and distrust in government was at such volatile levels.
Still, grass-roots campaigning by the Tea Party and other opponents pushed a message
many in the public could agree with. As mentioned earlier, the public was struggling through
the Great Recession and the slogan seen on all yard signs and yers, the largest tax increase
in Georgia's history, caught the attention of many, sometimes likely being the rst mention
of the referendum. The anti-tax movement grew with the referendum and is likely to be
a driving force in Georgia politics in the near future. Many believe the victory for the
movement will provide more power for the movement in future state politics.
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Lessons Learned
Following the beliefs of anti-tax sentiments, many would not vote for a tax increase, regard-
less of the purpose or proposed benet. In a post-election survey, the second most popular
response of respondents who voted against the referendum voted against the referendum
because they did not want more taxes [91]. In the terms of combating the message, the
issue is not necessarily the type of campaigning conducted by each campaign but more so
the message of the two campaigns. Though the campaign should have devoted more of its
funding toward grass-roots eorts, the argument is more directed toward marketing. The
message presented by the Tea Party and other members of the opposition provided for a
cohesive and marketable message to voters and the message presented by the proponents
did not. For example, a recent campaign against a local option sales tax for the purpose of
education funding recently passed in Cobb County. The passage is attributed to the strong
message of educational funding which many in the county could agree upon. The message
of educational funding prevailed over the anti-tax message, a message which was extremely
prevalent in Cobb County during the July 31, 2012 referendum.
The opposition's message could have been countered by a strategic move to publicly
address all criticisms directed toward the campaign, project list, and legislation in an ef-
fort to reduce misinformation and public distrust in government and the process. Also, the
recommendations mentioned earlier in this chapter such as providing for a cohesive, mar-
ketable transportation vision by oering a smaller project list in smaller regions could also
be benecial. Regardless, the strength and marketability of the anti-tax message played a
large role in the failure of the referendum.
4.9.3 Distrust in Government Amid a Looming Presidential Election
The nation was struggling with the Great Recession and was growing tired of the status-quo.
Many were angered by the government and its overall inability to x the economy. The
generally conservative state of Georgia was gearing up to voice its opinion in the presidential
election in two months' time. The public political awareness was at one of its highest points
given the perceived importance of the presidential election on the national debt, the economy,
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and healthcare, among other issues. Many believe this emotion caused many in the region
to cast a vote in deance of taxation and government interference, a characteristic normally
contributed to President Barack Obama. Many argue that this emotion was directed at the
national level but was felt at the local level in this referendum. The enormous amount of
voters who turned out at the polls on a normally quiet primary suggested the underlying
motivations of the voters.
A survey of Cobb and Atlanta voters after the referendum showed that 32 percent of the
respondents who voted against the referendum voted against the referendum because the
did not trust the government to do a good job, the most popular selection [91]. Overall, the
public distrust in the national government to address the national debt and the economy was
inated in the state of Georgia. This distrust in government spanned all levels of government;
there was disconnect between the federal and local levels. A legislator recalled sensing the
mood of the voters as mix of frustration, distrust, and fear [1]. A member of the campaign
mentioned that the public did not believe that the safeguards coded into the bill were going
to happen. The public did not believe the safety nets imbedded into the legislation such
as the 10-year period or the inclusion of only the projects on the list [26]. Large amounts
of misinformation went unanswered and caused many not to trust the process. The public
believed the tax would never end and the 10-year period was only a recommendation. The
public believed the revenue would be misused. The vague descriptions in the project list
called many transit projects into question and left many weary. Historical distrust in state
agencies such as MARTA and GDOT in terms of their on-time and on-budget delivery as
well as misuse of tax dollars fueled the sentiments. Controversial decisions surrounding the
opening of the High Occupancy Toll (HOT) lanes on Interstate 85, and the broken campaign
promise to end tolling on Georgia 400 also played a role in public distrust in local government
to use taxpayers' dollars wisely.
Lessons Learned
The proponents must give facts about on-time and on-budget delivery of GDOT and inform
the public about the trustworthiness and transparency of the process. In addition, the
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state of Georgia and leaders must continually work toward improving the public image of
agencies by providing and educating about on-time and on-budget project delivery. Also,
the legislature must address MARTA's funding crisis and public image.
4.10 Summary
Many factors were identied as contributors to the failure of the referendum. The legislation
contained what many considered to be fatal aws. The project list contained pet projects
and did not provide a cohesive transportation vision for the region. The campaign struggled
to sell the project list and met a large and unique mix of opposition. The public perception of
the legislation, project list, and campaign declined throughout the process for a multitude of
reasons. The following were identied as contributing factors to the failure of the referendum:
• The lack of exibility in the legislation and project selection process;
• The timing of the process and referendum date;
• The lack of long-term support from leadership;
• The lack of an opt-out criterion;
• The size and diversity of the Atlanta region;
• The size and composition of the project list;
• The lack of a cohesive transportation vision;
• The lack of agreement on the transportation vision between the legislation, criteria,
project list, and campaign;
• Anti-transit sentiments and the negative public opinion of MARTA;
• The lack of real public involvement and input in the project list and process;
• The unusual level and mixture of opposition;
• The successful marketing strategy and grass-roots campaign by the opposition;
• The negative spending visibility of the ocial campaign;
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• The timing and level of grass-roots eorts by the ocial campaign;
• The strong role of the media in promoting proponents and opponents.
However, the consensus among those interviewed was that not one of these issues caused
the failure of the referendum. Instead, the referendum was signicantly inuenced by the
following overarching national issues:
• The economy;
• The anti-tax movement;
• The looming presidential election;
• Distrust with all levels of government.
These were the driving force in a perfect storm of factors which led to the ultimate failure
of the referendum on July 31, 2012. Lessons learned include the following:
• Allow more exibility in the legislation and project selection process;
• Ensure that all members of the process understand the fundamental reasoning for the
legislation through criteria or restrictions in the legislation;
• Depending on the politics of the region, determine if it is necessary to codify the
criteria and project list into the legislation;
• Design process so that long-term support from legislators, local ocials, and public is
maximized;
• Address critical stakeholders early in the process;
• Establish a time period that matches the percentage of transit and roadway required;
• Build in additional time into the process so that on-time and on-budget delivery for
transit projects is obtained;
• Minimize time between approval of the project list and the referendum;
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• Place the date of the referendum on a date where a representative sample of voters is
at the polls;
• Allow for an open-ended date for the referendum;
• Refrain from long-winded language with technical jargon and acronyms in the legisla-
tion;
• Create regions such that the areas share a similar transportation vision;
• Smaller regions are more likely to share a transportation vision and goal for regional-
ism;
• An opt-out criterion is necessary in a home-rule state similar to Georgia. If politically
possible, do not allow an opt-out criterion. When necessary, an opt-in criterion is
more favorable where the oer expires after a certain time period;
• Never use disincentives. When using incentives, the line between a disincentive and
an incentive must be far enough apart to not be blurred;
• Allow for fractions of a penny sales tax implementation;
• Do not call out political issues in the legislation. Do not call out certain agencies in
the legislation. Address the issue in another format;
• Address transit governance before allowing the exibility to include transit projects
on the project list;
• Ensure constitutionality of the legislation;
• Construct a project list with a small amount of projects with a cohesive transportation
vision that is designed to later be marketable by the campaign;
• In an anti-transit region, create the rst project list with only a few transit capital
projects with construction ideally in the rst six years of the sales tax. During the
rst referendum, attempt to minimize transit funding while choosing transit projects
which will fund construction;
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• Ensure that transit projects will be completed on-time and on-budget;
• Avoid placing controversial projects on the project list;
• Avoid placing pet projects and projects which are not regional in nature on the
project list;
• Analyze the constituency to determine proper percentages of transit and roadway
projects;
• Analyze the constituency to determine criterion percentages such as economic devel-
opment and congestion mitigation;
• Allow for real public involvement and ensure strong levels of public involvement;
• Address concerns by the public quickly;
• Address concerns by the opposition prior to the approval of the project list;
• Address equity concerns and the concerns of inuential communities in the region;
• Address public concerns about overall trust and the on-time and on-budget delivery
of projects;
• Attempt an honest conversation with the public about congestion relief versus conges-
tion management;
• Ensure long-term viability of the transportation funding initiative;
• Create a marketing strategy for the campaign which resonates with the public through
a cohesive transportation vision;
• Respond to all complaints and criticisms by opposition;
• Avoid overselling the message;
• Minimize campaign presence to voters less likely to vote in favor of the referendum;
• Balance campaign spending toward more grass-roots eorts;
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• Begin the campaign in time to address the public and counter opposition;
• Form strategies from sales tax campaigns on a local level in the state with support
from other regional sales taxes across the nation. The success of other regions depends
on the politics, rules, and constituencies unique to that region;
• Minimize noticeable campaign spending during an economic recession;
Other regions in the nation looking to attempt similar referenda can utilize the following
recommendations:
1. Flexibility should be allowed in the legislation and process;
2. Ensure the project list criteria and composition matches public opinion and critical
stakeholder opinions throughout the process;
3. The size of regions should be minimized to ensure a similar transportation vision for
each region and resulting project list;
4. The size of the project list should be minimized. Project lists and criteria should
match the transportation vision initially agreed upon and be maintained throughout
the process;
5. The process timeline must be minimized to reduce opportunity for public criticism;
6. Public involvement should be conducted throughout the process and must match the
results in the process and project list;
7. Key issues such as transit governance and public distrust in government must be
addressed prior to passing a transportation funding initiative;
8. Regionalism begins with a common interest to work toward, such as a common trans-
portation vision. Ideally, regions should be divided along similar transportation vi-
sions.
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Chapter 5 addresses Atlanta moving forward by discussing alternative options for future
funding initiatives as well as true possibilities taking into account the current political en-





Currently, the Atlanta region remains in a transportation crisis. According to the ARC,
approximately $13.2 billion in transportation investments will be made during the 2013 -
2022 period from traditional sources, assuming budgets are not cut. However, the ARC
estimates that 70 percent of the funds will be spent maintaining the existing transportation
system in the Atlanta region [6]. The region lacks resources for transportation investment
and will experience increased congestion as the population continues to grow. Increased
congestion will impact quality of life and business eciency. Members of the business com-
munity fear the repercussions on future business relocation decisions in the region. Others
worry that the young, talented professionals, a demographic that normally supports tran-
sit and walkable development, will relocate to more competitive regions that provide the
lifestyle the youth typically prefer.
Given that many other metro areas around the nation have addressed their transporta-
tion crises, the competitiveness of the region has been called into question. Dallas, Denver,
Phoenix, Charlotte, Minneapolis, Salt Lake City, and Seattle have all passed transportation
referenda in the past few years and are currently investing in their respective transportation
systems. Until a new transportation funding source is acquired, the Atlanta region will con-
tinue down a path of limited funding and increased congestion, losing businesses and talent
to regions that are addressing their transportation issues.
5.2 Alternative Options
A positive aspect of the referendum many interviewees noted was that the process started
a discussion on regionalism in transportation. The discussion might help spark new initia-
tives in coming years that will attempt to solve the transportation crisis. Local ocials
and legislators have learned from the process, as shown in chapter 4. If the discussion on
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transportation investment is continued in a positive light, it is possible that the local ocials
and legislators can work together to design an initiative taking into account the aws in the
original process and legislation. Many in the region were not shocked or disheartened by the
failure of the referendum. Failing the rst time is common for similar referenda across the
nation; trying again is normal. For example, Seattle, a region that normally favors transit
and transportation funding, failed during the rst initiative in 2007. According to a member
of the business community, Seattle failed, learned, elevated the issue, and came back and
made some changes [26]. The Seattle area passed their referendum 58 percent to 42 percent
the following year [24]. Many believe that Atlanta is on the same path and will pass the
next attempt.
Some members of the general public and opposition believed there would be another
project list and referendum after the 24-month allotted time codied in the legislation;
however, the political possibility of another vote similar to the process discussed in chapter
3 is slim to none. The majority of legislators believe the best possible scenario is to start
with new legislation. However, politically, new legislation is at least four of ve years from
reality. One legislator even said we should know better than trying this again [3]. To
some legislators, the issue is far down the list of important topics they will address over
the next few years. When it is deemed politically feasible, a new initiative will likely be
attempted. The following subsections discuss possible alternatives and additions that take
into account lessons learned and that would likely produce a more favorable outcome in the
Atlanta region. All alternatives require varying levels of compromise and leadership support.
5.2.1 Limited Geography
Regardless of the specics of the legislation and process, one lesson from the referendum is
that the size of the regions plays a large role in ensuring that each region shares a trans-
portation vision; similar transportation visions can be transformed into a cohesive list of
projects preferably with a few large projects that have the most impact. Following this line
of thinking, limiting the geography of the region can increase the possibility of a favorable
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outcome during a regional referendum. Over the past decade, the majority of regional at-
tempts similar to the Atlanta region's initiative have included fewer than 10 counties. The
largest attempt occurred in 2004 in Denver, Colorado where eight counties were included
in the referendum for a 0.6 percent sales tax increase to fund transit improvements in the
district. The district was 2,340 square miles and is currently home to 2.7 million people
[71]. As mentioned earlier, the district has not been as successful with recent attempts to
increase the sales tax to 1 percent due to negative public opinion. The district's successful
2004 initiative was one of the models the campaign and business community used to design
and implement the Atlanta initiative. In comparison, the Atlanta region is 2,981 square
miles and is currently home to 4.18 million people [6]. The Atlanta region, along with the
majority of the regions in the state, was the largest attempt thus far in the recent history of
regional sales tax initiatives in terms of both square mileage and population. The Atlanta
region should design a future referendum with smaller regions having similar transportation
visions.
5.2.2 A Cohesive Transportation Vision in the Atlanta Region
In a post-election survey, the third most popular response by respondents who voted against
the referendum was that the proposed initiative was not comprehensive/good enough [91].
To increase the likelihood of approval, the region must have a cohesive transportation vi-
sion. The Atlanta region should be divided into two subregions. The inner counties (Clayton,
Cobb, DeKalb, Fulton and Gwinnett Counties) would form one subregion and the remaining
outer counties (Cherokee, Douglas, Fayette, Henry, and Rockdale Counties) would form an-
other. The two subregions would devise separate project lists and vote in separate referenda.
The two subregions would share similar transportation visions. The inner counties would
likely agree on transit investment similar to the list presented for the entire 10-county region.
The outer counties would likely agree on continued GRTA funding, possibly a mobility call
center, and intersection improvements throughout the subregion. The shared transportation
vision would make a positive outcome more likely in the respective subregions.
The type of desired impact, that is, economic development or congestion mitigation,
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must be determined based on the level of support for certain criteria in the subregions. The
criteria must be maintained throughout the process to ensure a cohesive understanding of
the project list and initiative. The legislation and process must be designed to ensure that
the vision is maintained throughout the process as well as reects public opinion in the
region.
5.2.3 The Opt-In Criteria and Intergovernmental Agreements
The remaining 149 counties in the state of Georgia can be addressed in a separate manner.
Given that many do not have a cohesive vision or similar needs, the counties can be given
more exibility. In counties outside of the Atlanta region, counties should be open to con-
tract with any bordering county to form a region through an intergovernmental agreement,
following an opt-in structure. The counties which comprise the respective region should
be allowed a time period to opt-in to an agreement. If all counties of the region opt-in,
the process would move forward. If not, the ability to opt-in again would be allowed after
a specied time period had passed. A recommended time period would be annual or bien-
nial. Using this alternative, a shorter time period of 10-years or less is preferred based on
the possible change in transportation needs over a decade. The shorter time period could
allow for greater political feasibility in choosing a list of projects that immediately meets the
needs of the region. The alternative would also garner support from those in the legislature
who required the initiative to focus on the entire state. The alternative both addresses the
Atlanta transportation crisis while also allowing the remaining counties the ability to fund
their transportation needs.
With this alternative, the ability of regions to implement a fraction of a penny could
likely produce a more favorable outcome. The fraction of a penny could function as the base
level of involvement. As an incentive for intergovernmental agreements and regionalism, the
counties forming regions of more than two counties could increase their fraction of a penny
to a whole penny sales tax.
Still, one member of the House says that they will probably not be heading in that
direction because it defeats the purpose. The member argues that the legislature should
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not only address the Atlanta region but the entire state as a whole [1]. Because of this view in
the House, it will be dicult to reach a consensus on legislation relating to intergovernmental
agreements. The legislation would need to addresses the entire state. Regardless, any of
the recommendations in the alternative could be utilized to improve the outcome of future
referenda in the Atlanta region.
5.2.4 The Fourth Penny
To counter the home-rule concern, the phase-in of the fourth penny of the general fund
could be used, similar to proposals in prior legislative attempts. The fourth penny could be
phased in to fund specic projects in the state of Georgia, which are identied as being of high
priority. Currently, the other three pennies are guarantee to GDOT and the fourth penny
goes to the general budget. The proposal would allow the fourth penny to be directed from
the general budget to transportation. The funding would not be large but would add up over
time for certain important transportation projects. The projects could be selected by the
GDOT director of planning, meaning the governor would likely be behind whatever project
is selected. However, the fourth penny would free up additional funding for critical projects
for the region and state. Given current political views toward transit investment and the
MARTA public image, the projects would likely be roadway and intersection improvements.
The addition could serve as a check for the state to ensure that the initiative did not just
deal with Atlanta region, but the entire state. The fourth penny alternative could be an
addition to the use of intergovernmental agreements to address the concerns of the home-rule
legislature.
5.2.5 Addressing Transit Funding
Transit does not receive funding from the state. Currently, the state gas tax revenue is re-
stricted from transit projects. Many interviewees are hopeful that state funding for MARTA
is possible in the next decade. Others are not as hopeful, noting the history of contention
between MARTA and the state legislature. Some argue that the fourth penny could instead
be used to fund transit projects. The General Assembly by statute can pass a law that allows
the fourth penny of the motor fuel tax to be an authority fee that would be collected by an
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authority. Authority fees can be redirected by the general assembly to lter into the fund of
the authority. The fees would not be subject to annual spending requirements, meaning it
could roll-over from year-to-year [3]. One member of the House argues that $180 million a
year from the state for transit is a fair amount. After 10 years Georgia could build close to
$2 billion for transit. The funding could advance MARTA, fund portions of the expansion of
MARTA lines, and allow some operations funding for commuter rail projects [3]. Still, the
long-standing anti-transit sentiments of the state legislature make the alternative politically
infeasible in the short-term.
Transit supporters in the region are hoping to revisit the MARTA Act of 1965. As
mentioned in chapter 2, the General Assembly passed the MARTA Act of 1965 to allow a
special referendum for the ve county metropolitan area and the city of Atlanta to decide
county-specic participation in the rapid transit authority. The MARTA Act allows the three
counties (Clayton, Cobb, and Gwinnett Counties) that voted to opt-out of participation to
join by approving a county-wide referendum. In 2010, there was a positive result from a non-
binding referendum asking "Should Clayton County become a full participant in MARTA...
and levy a sales tax in support of MARTA and Clayton County's public transportation
needs? The Clayton County voters approved the non-binding referendum 67 to 33 percent
[7]. This positive result makes many transit advocates hopeful for future expansion and
improvement of MARTA in the next few decades.
One background incentive for the voters to approve such a measure stems from the
elimination of the Clayton County bus service, C-TRAN. The service was discontinued in
March of 2010, leaving many citizens stranded and raising questions on equity in the county.
The project list for the transportation referendum included funding for Clayton County's
bus service. Regardless, the county voted 54 to 46 percent against the referendum. The
failure of the referendum in the area suggests the lack of a cohesive transportation vision
in the region. Clayton County had agreed overwhelmingly for increasing the sales tax by
1 percent two years prior to fund their bus system and future MARTA expansion in the
county. Two years later, the county voted against a list that included the same transit
service along with other helpful projects for the county such as GRTA, the regional mobility
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center, and roadway improvements. The lack of agreement on the rest of the list was likely
an important factor for the county.
After the failure of the referendum, many transit advocates were actively pushing for the
inclusion of a binding referendum on the November ballot for Clayton County to ocially
join MARTA. They were on a deadline given that the expiration of the legislatively approved
relaxation of the current cap on sales tax dollars was occurring in November 2012. The push
met resistance from the Clayton County Commission and was never placed on the November
ballot. Currently, the political feasibility of Clayton County joining MARTA is reduced given
that the relaxation of the cap has expired and any addition in sales tax must replace one
tax with another given that Clayton County is currently at its sales tax limit. Also, many
believe the feasibility of the other two MARTA counties joining MARTA is far less than
Clayton. As MARTA works to improve its image in the next decade, the political possibility
of revisiting the MARTA Act may become more likely. However, this alternative is currently
very unlikely.
Many initially believed that anti-transit sentiments and MARTA issues reduced the
chance for transit investment in the region; however, current events show that the Atlanta
region is slowly moving forward on transit investment. The Atlanta region is currently con-
structing the Atlanta Streetcar, opening in 2014. The Atlanta region Eastside and Westside
tax allocation districts (TADs) recently approved the funding of environmental studies for
streetcar lines similar to the lines proposed in the project list. The BeltLine project and
additional transit investment is popular with citizens inside the city limits.
One legislator mentioned that the region needs a little time right now to build the con-
dence in the public in GDOT's ability...and to address the public's opinion of MARTA. [1].
The region must work on improving the public trust in government and transit investment so
that the public will approve future transit funding for the region. The region must address
current concerns on transit, including the low public opinion of MARTA and the MARTA
funding crisis before additional transit investment will be supported by the public. In the
meantime, transit funding without the branding of MARTA will likely be the most publicly
favorable transit investments. Examples include the Atlanta Streetcar, the BeltLine, and
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GRTA Xpress bus operations.
5.2.6 Addressing Transit Governance
Before any additional funding initiative is attempted, the transit governance model must be
determined for the Atlanta region. Transit governance was attempted in the 2011 session
and failed at the last moment. The legislature disagreed on the issue of representation.
Many legislators supported a weighted transit governance model. The main disagreement
among the members was whether to pass a weighted model or an equal model of transit
governance [1]. The issue of power between the state and the city of Atlanta was again
a resonating issue. Transit governance, regardless of the model, must be determined to
ensure a functional and detailed project list. The vague descriptions and understanding of
the governance of regional transit projects on the list inated the issue of public distrust
in government. The most expensive projects lacked important details. An ideal transit
governance model would address the MARTA funding issues while re-branding MARTA in
some fashion. The model would create a funding umbrella while also allowing for improved
connectivity and smoother transitions among the agencies operating in the 10-county region.
5.2.7 The Project Selection Process and the Atlanta Regional Transportation
Roundtable
Many of those interviewed praised the process laid out in the legislation for project selec-
tion. Many believed the RTR was an ecient way to address local transportation needs and
select an agreeable project list. In many ways, the project list was a success. The project
list was unanimously approved by a range of local ocials with varying constituencies and
transportation needs. The project list was forward-thinking with 52 percent transit, ar-
guably too forward given the general anti-transit sentiments in the region. Though the
process was successful, it failed to seriously take into account general public opinion on
transit investment, economic development, and congestion mitigation. Another referendum
should include a similar process with a few small changes. The process should be shortened
to ensure public opinion does not shift between approval and the referendum. The process
should involve real public involvement that directly impacts the project list. The public
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involvement must be representative of the general public. The aws within the project list
and selection process created diculties for the ocial campaign and should be countered
by implementing strategies that ensure a project list with optimal levels of public approval.
5.2.8 The Campaign
The campaign was gifted many aws from the legislation and project selection process that
provided hurdles for proper campaign marketing strategies. Many of those interviewed
believe that the campaign was given an impossible list to sell to the public. The public
did not agree with economic development and the numbers on congestion mitigation were
impossible to sell or explain to the public. With a more cohesive transportation vision
and project list, the campaign could have designed a resonating marketing strategy. A
successful campaign must have an honest discussion with the public on the importance of
the referendum in terms of economic competitiveness; the campaign must sell job creation
over congestion mitigation. Focusing on the referendum's potential impact on the economy
might have garnered more support over the unsubstantial statistics following congestion
mitigation. Also, a successful campaign must address all criticisms through large amounts
of manpower and grass-roots eorts. The campaign spending must be weighted toward grass-
roots campaigning, especially during a recession. Visibly excessive campaign spending must
be avoided. Billboards and campaign advertisements did not resonate well in the region
and possibly will not resonate well in regions with characteristically high levels of public
distrust in government. One of the most successful portions of the campaign included the
campaign's ability to fund-raise close to $8 million dollars in campaign funding. Using the
funding that was acquired in smaller, more discrete amounts would have had a more positive
impact on the outcome of the referendum.
5.3 2013 Legislative Session
One member of the House addressed transportation funding in the 2013 session by saying
I just don't know that there is a need for it in this session [1]. Following this sentiment,
nothing surrounding transit, transit governance, or MARTA restructuring was passed in
the 2013 legislative session. Transportation funding was generally not entertained by the
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legislature. A few transportation-related bills made headlines in the media, but never were
passed into law.
5.3.1 Transportation Bills
During the campaign, the complaints of some members of the legislature were followed by
threats to address the matching requirements codied in the Transportation Investment Act
of 2010. The members pushed to remove the matching requirements in the 2013 session
through Senate Bill 73. The push fell on deaf ears in the legislature and never seriously
moved forward, being read and referred in late January [29].
One member of the House stated that it was the legislature's responsibility to protect the
taxpayers in Fulton and DeKalb County and ensure that we have a safety net in place that
encourages the privatization and eciencies in the system [1]. The House made a strong
push for privatization of MARTA in the 2013 legislative session with House Bill 264. The
push was fueled by a controversial release of a 3rd party audit that recommended MARTA
privatize certain functions to improve functionality. The bill introduced by the House in
the 2013 session required a restructuring of the MARTA board that essentially gave more
power to Republican mayors, a political trend that has been seen throughout the major
issues mentioned in previous chapters. The bill also required that MARTA privatize many
functions including technology support, human resources, and accounting, among others.
The bill was stalled in the Senate due to lack of support [53]. Many in the Senate did not
agree with the bill while pro-transit and labor union representatives vehemently opposed the
bill. MARTA asked to be allowed the exibility to privatize certain functions on their own
time without being mandated. Members of the House were angered by the Senate's inaction.
The House reacted by adding some of the same portions of the stalled bill to Senate Bill 155;
it was also unsuccessful [43]. The legislature did not pass a bill on privatization in the 2013
legislative session. The discussion will likely be continued during the 2014 session. Given the
lack of MARTA legislation, the 50/50 restriction will be reinstated June 2013 perpetuating
the MARTA funding crisis. Similarly, the funding issues of GRTA were also not addressed.
Currently, GRTA has yet to acquire an additional funding source for the June 2013 funding
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deadline.
House Bill 195 introduced an idea similar to the intergovernmental agreements alternative
listed in this chapter. The bill failed given the lack of public will to approach a transportation
funding initiative in the session [76]. After time passes and political will increases in the
legislature, a similar bill might garner enough support to pass the legislature. Given the
lack of transportation funding passed in the legislature, the region will continue to display




Governor Deal kept his promise made a week before the referendum to remove tolls on GA
400. The tolls are currently set to be removed in November of 2013. The removal of the
tolls is perceived by some as a political move. Regardless, though many in the public are
happy to see the tolls removed, the removal has seemed to have had little eect on the
overall public distrust in government. If anything, the political move negatively impacted
the public distrust in government a week prior to the election.
The Falcons Stadium
The Atlanta Falcons organization has been pushing for a new football stadium for years.
Recently, a proposal was brought to the public and the state legislature. The original plan
was to ask the state legislature to approve the increase in the bonding cap from the $200
million to $300 million in the 2013 session to allow the hotel-motel tax to fund a portion of
a new $1 billion dollar Falcons stadium. The remaining $700 million was to be funded by
private sources. After a large public outcry, the state legislature passed the issue to the city
of Atlanta. The public was angry about the possibility of replacing a relatively new stadium;
the current stadium, which opened in 1992, was only 20 years old and would be demolished
and transformed into a parking lot. On March 18, 2013, the Atlanta city council, along with
the support of Mayor Kasim Reed, passed a resolution that extended the hotel-motel tax to
2050 to fund at least $200 million toward the stadium. The remaining $800 million would
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be funded by private sources. The approval passed with continued outcry from the public.
The current stadium is set to be demolished and the new stadium will likely be built next
door by 2017. The new stadium will include a retractable-roof with seating ranging from
66,000 to 80,000 people. The discussion occurred less than a year after the overwhelming
defeat of the Atlanta referendum, a defeat which was attributed to the overall lack of public
trust in government. The Falcons stadium was an attempt to keep the Falcons from moving
to another city or to the suburbs, a threat made on several instances. However, the hotel-
motel tax has now been utilized by the stadium and cannot be used to fund transit or
transportation investment in the region. Many in the region believe the hotel-motel tax
could be one possibility for dedicated transit investment or solving the MARTA funding
crisis. The issue has had a perceived negative impact on public trust in government.
5.4 Summary
The Atlanta region is currently in a transportation crisis. Until another initiative is at-
tempted, the region will remain on a path toward high congestion, low quality of life, and
decreased competitiveness. The 2013 legislative session proved unsuccessful for transporta-
tion funding, transit governance, and transit funding. Other politics have become prominent
in the region and have raised more concerns on public trust in government. The Atlanta
region can implement the strategies and alternatives provided in chapter 4 and chapter 5 of
this thesis during a future attempt at transportation funding to provide for a more favorable
outcome. The regional sales tax will likely become a popular method for cities and regions
looking to acquire additional funding sources as federal and state gas taxes continue to de-
crease. Regionalism is a signicant issue that competitive cities and regions must address.
Other regions in the nation looking to attempt future similar referenda can implement the





The following pages include sample interview guides from dierent time periods throughout
the interview process. Interview Guides are included for executive committee members,
legislators, representatives from transportation agencies, representatives from the business
community, transportation professionals, the ocial campaign, and prominent members of
the opposition.
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Interview Guide: Executive Committee – 1st Round Before Referendum 
1. When and how did your involvement begin as part of the sales tax referendum? 
2. Please describe the process (and the factors that came into play) for your appointment or 
election to the Roundtable Executive Committee? 
3. The state has provided criteria that are to be usedwhen selecting a project list.  Which of 
these criteria are most important in your opinion?  Are there other considerations that you 
will include when making a recommendation to the Full Roundtable? 
4. To what extent have other individuals or organizations been involved in influencing the 
projects that the Roundtable will select (e.g., the C amber of Commerce, advocacy 
groups, local transportation officials, etc.)?  In your opinion, have some of these groups 
been more influential than others? 
5. How is the Roundtable providing a “regional” perspective on the project selection 
process?  
6. As of now, what chance do you give the sales tax of passing in your region and why?  
7. If the sales tax passes in your region, what are the factors that you think might have 
contributed to its passage?  
8. Similar to #7, if the sales tax does not pass in your region, what are the factors that you 















Interview Guide: Executive Committee – 2nd Round Before Referendum 
1. Can you go through your involvement with the project list during drafting, amendment, 
and approval?  What issues were most prevalent?   
2. Did any friction occur between the members of the Ex cutive Committee?  What was the 
most difficult discussion during the process? 
3. Are you satisfied with the approved project list?  For your area?  For the region?  
4. In your opinion, was the approval of the list “unanimous”? 
5. Can you describe the amendments to the approved project list and how they affected the 
outcome? 
6. What strategies did the Roundtable use to form a “regional” project list?  What do you 
think could have been done to make the project list more “regional”? 
7. How did the public hearings affect the final approved project list?   
8. To what extent have other individuals and organizations been involved in influencing the 
projects that the Roundtable selected (e.g., the Chamber of Commerce, advocacy groups, 
local transportation officials, etc.)?  In your opinion, have some of these groups been 
more influential than others? 
9. As of now, what chance do you give the sales tax of passing and why?  
10. What are the factors that you think might have contribu ed to its passing/not passing?  














Interview Guide: Legislator Before Referendum 
1. Can you describe your involvement with the Transportation Investment Act of 2010? 
2. Can you describe your involvement with previous attempts at similar legislation?  How 
would you describe the evolution of legislative efforts that culminated in TIA?  Was TIA 
the result of numerous years of prior efforts?  Or did it come about primarily on its own?  
3. In your opinion, do you think it is possible for the state to increase the gas tax for 
transportation funding?  Do you think it is politically possible for the state to amend the 
exclusivity for roads and bridges on the gas tax?  What issues do you see holding back a 
potential increase of the gas tax? 
4. Can you describe the reasoning behind the MARTA operations restrictions within the 
Transportation Investment Act of 2010? 
5. Can you describe the reasoning behind the timing of the vote to be held on July 31st? 
6. In the terms of MARTA’s 50/50 restriction, what is your opinion on why the restriction 
has not been lifted?   
7. I know there has been large opposition to the amount f transit funding on the project list 
for the Atlanta region.  What is your position with respect to the level of transit 
investment in the Atlanta region’s project list?  
8. Recently, the Sierra Club has come out in opposition of the TSPLOST.  The Sierra Club 
advocates instead for a primarily transit referendum.  Given your experience and 
background, would enabling such a referendum pass the General Assembly?   
9. If the TSPLOST does not pass, what will be the next move on the part of the state in 
providing additional transportation resources, if anything? 
10. In your opinion, why did the transit governance legislation fail?  Do you think failure to 
move any legislation will have an impact on the outc me of the TSPLOST in July? 
11. If you could go back and change the Transportation Investment Act of 2010, what would 
you change and why? 
12. If you could go back and change the project list, what would you change and why? 
13. Did you attend any public hearings for the TSPLOST in the region?   
14. As of now, what chance do you give the sales tax of passing and why in the Atlanta 
region? Other regions?  








Interview Guide: Legislator – After Referendum 
1. Please describe your involvement with the referendum from previous attempts at 
legislation to its failure to pass on July 31st? 
2. Did you expect the results of the referendum to be so far from projections?  What factors 
led to the failure of the referendum?   
3. What should be the next move for transportation finance in the Atlanta region?   
4. What should be the next step by the Georgia Legislature?  Have you heard of any 
discussions in the works?   
5. Why is Atlanta in a “transportation crisis?”  What are the factors that have contributed to 
this politically?  Socially? 
6. What is your opinion on the level of transit on theAtlanta region’s project list? 
7. Do you believe the public opposition of the Sierra Club was influential?  The Tea Party?  
The NAACP?  Was this combination of opposition surprising?   
8. What is your opinion of the effectiveness of the “ys” campaign?  The “no” campaign? 
9. In your opinion, what is the reasoning behind anti-rail sentiments in this region?  Anti-tax 
sentiments?  Distrust in government? 
10. After the vote failed, the Governor mentioned MARTA’s reputation as being one factor 
for failure.  Do you believe this was a factor?   
11. What was the reasoning behind the MARTA operations restrictions within the 
Transportation Investment Act of 2010?  In terms of MARTA’s 50/50 restriction, what is 
your opinion on why the restriction has not been lifted?  
12. Many are hopeful to see a smaller scale transit referendum in the near future for a smaller 
Atlanta region (3 or 5 core counties).  Would enabling such a referendum pass the 
Georgia General Assembly?  If so, would it pass in the proposed area? 
13. Many argue that Seattle is a good example for Atlanta to follow.  In your opinion, what is 
the best way to go about providing successful passage of a primarily transit referendum 
given Atlanta’s political environment?  Do you believe this is politically possible?   
14. Do you think failure to move any transit governance legislation played a role in the 
failure of the referendum?  Do you see transit governance legislation moving in the 
legislature soon?  If so, what form do you see it taking?  What would be your ideal transit 
governance model for this region?   
15. What was the reasoning for the timing of the vote?  Do you believe the timing of the vote 
played a role in the failure of the referendum?   
16. If you could go back and change the Transportation Investment Act of 2010, and the 
process it initiated, what would you change and why? 
17. What is your response to the current criticisms of the matching fees imposed on the failed 
regions within the bill? 
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Interview Guide: Transportation Agency - Before Referendum 
1. What role did MARTA play (if any) in prioritizing the Atlanta regional projects for TIA?  
For MARTA, what were the most important variables for project selection?  For the 
region (if different)? 
2. Was there ever an issue where the interest of the counties, City of Atlanta and the region 
conflicted during the project selection process? 
3. Are you satisfied with the approved and amended project list?  Who “won” in terms of 
the projects selected?  Who “lost?”  If you could go back and change the project list, what 
would you change and why? 
4. What was the reasoning behind the MARTA operations restrictions within the 
Transportation Investment Act of 2010?  In the terms of MARTA’s 50/50 restriction, 
what is your opinion on why the restriction has notbeen lifted?  
5. The Sierra Club opposes the referendum and advocates inst ad for a primarily transit 
referendum.  Given your experience and background, would enabling such a referendum 
pass the General Assembly?   
6. Why did the transit governance legislation fail?  Do you think failure to move any 
legislation will have an impact on the outcome of the TSPLOST in July? 
7. What was the reasoning behind the timing of the vot t  be held on July 31st? 
8. How successful has the TSPLOST campaign effort been? 
9. As of now, what chance do you give the sales tax of passing and why?  Given your 
experience, if the TSPLOST does not pass, what will be the next move on the part of the 
state in providing additional transportation resources, if anything? 
10. What are the factors that you think might contribute to its passing/not passing? 
11. What is your opinion on the claims that the Transportation Investment Act of 2010 is 
unconstitutional? 
12. If you could go back and change the Transportation Investment Act of 2010, what would 
you change and why? 
13. Why does commuter rail have such large opposition in the Atlanta region?   
14. Do you think it is possible for the state to increas  the gas tax for transportation funding?  
Do you think it is politically possible for the state to amend the exclusivity for roads and 






Interview Guide: Business Community – After Referendum 
1. Why is Atlanta in a “transportation crisis?”  What are the factors that have contributed to 
this politically?  Socially? 
2. When did the business community initially get involved in Georgia’s transportation 
funding crisis?  Can you give me a timeline of their involvement to the present?   
3. Did you expect the results of the referendum to be so far from projections?  What factors 
led to the failure of the referendum?   
4. If you could go back and change the Transportation Investment Act of 2010, and the 
process it initiated, what would you change and why? 
5. If you could go back and change the Atlanta region’s project list, what would you change 
and why? 
6. If you could go back and change the campaign in the Atlanta region, what changes would 
you make and why? 
7. Do you believe the public opposition of the Sierra Club was influential? The Tea Party?  
The NAACP?  Was this combination of opposition surprising?  
8. What should be the next move for transportation finance in the Atlanta region?   
9. What should be the next step by the Georgia Legislature?  Have you heard of any 
discussions in the works?  Realistically, what do you see happening in the upcoming 
legislative session? 
10. In your opinion, what is the reasoning behind anti-rail sentiments in this region?  Anti-tax 
sentiments?  Distrust in government? 
11. What is your opinion on the level of transit on theAtlanta region’s project list? 
12. What was the reasoning behind the MARTA operations restrictions within the 
Transportation Investment Act of 2010?  In terms of MARTA’s 50/50 restriction, what is 
your opinion on why the restriction has not been lifted?  
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Interview Guide: Transportation Professional/Speaker – After Referendum 
1. Can you describe your involvement with the referendum from the previous attempts at 
legislation to its failure to pass on July 31st? 
2. In your opinion, what factors led to the failure of the referendum?  Was there one that 
played a more significant role than others? 
3. What kind of repercussions do you see happening due to the failure of the referendum in 
the next few months?  Years?  Decades? 
4. What should be the next move on the part of Atlanta so that it does not get “lapped” 
assuming that the region will do more than simply adopt the Governor’s approach (that 
is, Plan B)?  What do you think of Governor Deal’s Plan B?  What are the implications of 
this approach to the Atlanta region? 
5. What is your opinion on the effectiveness of the “ys” campaign?  The “no” campaign? 
6. In your opinion, what is the reasoning behind anti-rail sentiments in this region?  Anti-tax 
sentiments?  Distrust in government? 
7. What was the reasoning behind the MARTA operations restrictions within the 
Transportation Investment Act of 2010?  In the terms of MARTA’s 50/50 restriction, 
what is your opinion on why the restriction has notbeen lifted?  
8. The Sierra Club opposed the referendum and advocated instead for a primarily transit 
referendum.  Would enabling such a referendum pass the Georgia General Assembly? 
9. Do you think failure to move any transit governance legislation played a role in the 
failure of the referendum?  Do you see transit governance moving in the legislature soon?  
If so, what form do you see it taking?  What would be your ideal transit governance 
model for this region?   
10. Do you believe the timing of the vote played a role in the failure of the referendum?  In 
your opinion, what was the reasoning for the timing of the vote? 
11. If you could go back and change the Transportation Investment Act of 2010, and the 
process it initiated, what would you change and why? 
12. Do you think it is possible for the state to increas  the gas tax for transportation funding?  
Do you think it is politically possible for the state to amend the exclusivity for roads and 
bridges on the gas tax?  What issues do you see holding back a potential increase of the 
gas tax? 
13. In your opinion, would commuter rail be a viable opti n for future transit investment 
endeavors in the region?  
14. What is your opinion on the Millenials and the role th y played during the referendum?   
15. Why hasn’t Atlanta invested in transportation over the past decade?  What are the factors 
that have contributed to this politically?  Socially? 
16. What is your advice to the region now that the referendum has failed? 
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Interview Guide: Campaign – Before Referendum 
1. Can you go through the decision making process as the campaign was formed?  Which 
prior campaigns did you look to emulate?   
2. Has the strategy of the campaign changed from the formation of the campaign to now?    
3. As we near July 31st, do you feel the campaign has been successful?   
4. Can you discuss the funding mechanisms for the campaign?   
5. Based on your heavy background in the business community, how influential do you feel 
the business community has been with the referendum throughout the entire process?  
6. What specific entities have been the campaigns mostinfluential source of verbal support?  
Financial support?  
7. What specific entities have been the most influential source of verbal opposition? How is 
the campaign countering their opposition? 
8. Why did the campaign wait until a few months before t  begin campaigning?  
9. How did you make the determination to focus on the suburban communities compared to 
the urban areas (all ads based on congestion)? 
10. Did you attend any public hearings in the region?  If so, do you believe the overall 
consensus has changed from your attendance until now?
11. What is the campaign’s response to the constitutionality of the legislation?  If there is an 
issue of constitutionality and the bill is ruled unco stitutional, what types of 
consequences do you foresee?  Given your background, what affect would it have on the 
business community?   
12. If you could go back and change the project list, what would you change and why? 
13. If you could go back and change the Transportation Investment Act of 2010, what would 
you change and why? 
14. As of now, what chance do you give the sales tax of passing in Atlanta and why? In the 
other 11 regions? 









Interview Guide: Opposition – Before Referendum 
1. Can you describe your involvement with the Transportation Investment Act of 2010? 
2. Can you briefly describe your background with the Georgia Tea Party and the 
Transportation Leadership Coalition?   
3. It has been argued that Atlanta needs transportation investment in order to remain 
economically viable for businesses.  What is your opini n on the level of need Atlanta 
faces?  
4. I know there has been large opposition to the amount f transit funding on the project list 
for the Atlanta region.  What is your position with respect to the level of transit 
investment in the Atlanta region’s project list?  
5. What would be your ideal Plan B?  What would be the tim frame? 
6. In your opinion, do you think it is possible for the state to increase the gas tax for 
transportation funding?  Do you think it is politically possible for the state to amend the 
exclusivity for roads and bridges on the gas tax?  What issues do you see holding back a 
potential increase of the gas tax? 
7. Recently, the Sierra Club has come out in opposition of the TSPLOST.  The Sierra Club 
advocates instead for a primarily transit referendum.  Would you support a primarily 
transit referendum?     
8. If the TSPLOST does not pass, what should be the next move on the part of the state in 
providing additional transportation resources? 
9. If you could go back and change the Transportation Investment Act of 2010, what would 
you change and why? 
10. Did you attend any public hearings for the TSPLOST in the region?  Before the 
formation of the project list?  During?  After?  Inyour opinion, did the public hearings 
influence the outcome of the project list?     
11. If you could go back and change the project list, what would you change and why? 
12. As of now, what chance do you give the sales tax of passing and why in the Atlanta 
region? Other regions?  











HOUSE BILL 277 OF 2010
The following list summarizes the specics of House Bill 277 of 2010:
• Specic responsibilities of the commissioner of GDOT;
• Creation of the GDOT director of planning, appointed by the governor and approved
by majority of House and Senate Transportation Committee;
• Specic responsibilities of the director of planning of GDOT;
• Suspension of the MARTA 50/50 restriction for three years;
• Change in membership of the MARTA board of directors;
• Allow expansion of MARTA to Gwinnett, Clayton, and Cobb Counties by approval of
public referendum;
• Creation of the Georgia Coordinating Committee for Rural and Human Services Trans-
portation of the Governor's Development Council;
• Sales tax exemption for jet fuel for qualifying airlines at qualifying airports, fuel used
for o-road heavy-duty equipment (farm, agricultural, or locomotive), fuel used for
propulsion of licensed public highway motor vehicles, fuel used for public mass transit,
and the sale or lease of motor vehicles (only taxed on the rst $5000);
• Creation of 12 special tax districts corresponding to the boundaries of existing regional
commissions;
• Special district sales tax subject to the requirement of referendum approval;
• Sales tax shall be imposed within the special district for a period of 10 years;
• Any tax shall be at a rate of one percent;
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• The current cap on local sales and use taxes will be removed for the purpose of the
one percent sales tax;
• Limiting the establishment of a fund or funds which would provide 20 or more years
of maintenance and operations costs from the proceeds of the sales tax that would be
used to construct, nance, or otherwise develop transit capital projects;
• MARTA shall not be authorized to use proceeds of the sales tax for maintenance and
operations costs of existing infrastructure;
• Regional transportation roundtable for each special district consisting of two represen-
tatives from each county (one chairperson, sole commissioner, mayor or CEO of the
county governing authority and one mayor elected by the mayors);
• Counties with more than 90 percent of the population residing in municipal corpora-
tions shall have the mayor serve as an additional representative (this only applied to
Atlanta);
• The regional transportation roundtable shall elect ve representatives to serve as an
executive committee with non-voting members of the House and Senate (two from the
House and one from the Senate);
• Before November 10, 2010, mayors of each county shall elect a mayoral representative
for the regional transportation roundtable;
• The GDOT director of planning shall write the state recommended criteria for the
investment list of transportation projects, recommended to include performance goals,
allocation of investment in alignment with performance, and execution of projects by
November 15, 2010;
• The state scal economist shall develop an estimate, including growth, of sales tax
proceeds which shall be used for recommended criteria;
• Comments on criteria from local governments or MPOs shall be made no later than
September 30, 2010;
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• Any amendment or approval of criteria shall be enacted by a majority vote of present
members of the regional transportation roundtable;
• After approval of criteria, a report shall be provided to local governments, MPOs,
local legislators, and the GDOT commissioner;
• Upon receipt of the report, the parties shall submit projects to the GDOT director of
planning;
• The GDOT director of planning shall assemble a list of example investments for each
district's investment criteria which is not required to be scally constrained within the
budget and submit the list to each executive committee for consideration;
• A scally constrained draft list shall be developed and delivered by the executive
committee and GDOT director of planning by August 15, 2011;
• The GDOT director of planning must provide a statement of public benet for each
project such as congestion mitigation, increased lane capacity, public safety, and eco-
nomic development;
• The draft investment list shall be considered by the regional transportation roundtable
and approved by a majority of present members;
• At least two public meetings must be held prior to the nal regional transportation
roundtable meeting;
• Comments from local governments, MPOs, and local legislators are permitted two
weeks prior to the nal meeting;
• Should the roundtable reject the list, amendments may be made on the list, requiring
majority vote;
• Should the roundtable fail to approve an investment list, the district shall be in grid-
lock and will not hold an election until 24 months has passed. The gridlock district
will also be required to provide 50 percent match for GDOT local maintenance and
improvement grants until an election is held;
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• The nal investment list shall be delivered by October 15, 2011;
• The rst election shall be held on the general statewide primary in 2012;
• The exact wording of the ballot question for each district;
• If one-half of the votes in the entire special district vote in favor, then the tax shall
be levied and the local governments shall provide 10 percent match for GDOT local
maintenance and improvement grants for the duration of the sales tax. If not, the
election shall not be repeated for 24 months after the month of the election and the
local governments shall provide a 30 percent match for GDOT local maintenance and
improvement grants until the tax is approved;
• The approval of the tax shall not diminish alternative funds allocated to the district;
• Collection of the tax shall begin on the rst day of the next quarter;
• The tax shall cease either on the nal day of the 10-year period or at the point the
collections equals the estimated amount to be raised;
• In the event of expiration of the tax or rejection of the tax, elections may be held on
the statewide general primary;
• The commission shall contract with GDOT for all projects with the exception of bus
and rail mass transit systems in which the commission will contract with GRTA;
• A yearly independent audit shall be completed on each district and a nontechnical
report shall be annually published no later than December 15 of each year;
• 25 percent of the proceeds shall go to local governments within the district which
the tax is levied. 15 percent of the proceeds shall go to local governments wholly
contained within a single MPO (this only applied to Atlanta). The percentages shall
be continually allocated to each local government by multiplying the Local Assistance
Road Program (LARP) factor for each local government by the total amount of funds;
159
• If excess proceeds are collected those proceeds shall be distributed among the local
governments in the district;
• A Citizen Review Panel shall be created for each district which votes in favor of the
tax. The panel will be composed of three citizens of the district appointed by the
Speaker of the House and two citizens of the district appointed by the lieutenant
governor. The panel shall meet at least three days each year and be charged with
review of the administration of the projects and programs included on the approved
investment list;
• The tax shall not be subject to balancing;
• The creation of a Transit Governance Study Commission to address future legislation
for transit governance.





House Bill 277 (AS PASSED HOUSE AND SENATE)
By: Representatives Smith of the 129th, Harbin of the 118th, Sheldon of the 105th, Burkhalter
of the 50th, Shaw of the 176th, and others 
A BILL TO BE ENTITLED
AN ACT
To enact the "Transportation Investment Act of 2010"; to provide for a short title; to amend1
Title 32 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to highways, bridges, and ferries,2
so as to provide for certain powers and duties of the Department of Transportation; to3
provide for certain responsibilities of the commissioner of transportation; to provide for4
certain responsibilities of the director of planning; to suspend restrictions on the use by5
public transit authorities of local sales and use tax proceeds; to change the membership of6
the board of directors of the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority; to provide for a7
Georgia Coordinating Committee for Rural and Human Services Transportation; to amend8
Title 48 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to revenue and taxation, so as9
to provide for legislative findings and intent; to provide for the creation of special districts;10
to provide for a special district transportation sales and use tax in such special districts; to11
provide for definitions; to provide for an exemption from the cap on the imposition of local12
sales and use taxes; to provide for the development of an investment list of projects; to13
provide for a referendum; to provide for the rate and manner of imposition of such tax; to14
provide for collection and administration of such tax; to provide for use of the proceeds of15
such tax; to provide for returns; to provide for distribution and expenditure of proceeds; to16
provide for annual reporting; to provide for regional Citizens Review Panels; to provide for17
tax credits; to provide for certain exemptions; to provide for the effect on any local sales and18
use taxes; to provide for judicial actions; to amend Title 50 of the Official Code of Georgia19
Annotated, relating to state government, so as to provide for the creation of the Transit20
Governance Study Commission; to provide for related matters; to provide for effective dates;21
to repeal conflicting laws; and for other purposes.22
BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF GEORGIA:23
SECTION 1.24






Title 32 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to highways, bridges, and ferries,27
is amended by revising subsection (a) of Code Section 32-2-41, relating to the powers and28
duties of the commissioner of transportation, as follows:29
"(a)  As the chief executive officer of the department, the commissioner shall have direct30
and full control of the department.  He or she shall possess, exercise, and perform all the31
duties, powers, and authority which may be vested in the department by law, except those32
duties, powers, and authority which are expressly reserved by law to the board or the33
director of planning.  The commissioner's principal responsibility shall be the faithful34
implementation of transportation plans produced by the director of planning and approved35
by the Governor and the State Transportation Board, subject to the terms of such36
appropriations Acts as may be adopted from time to time.  The commissioner shall also be37
responsible for the duties and activities assigned to the commissioner in Article 5 of38
Chapter 8 of Title 48.  When the board is not in regular or called session, the commissioner39
shall perform, exercise, and possess all duties, powers, and authority of the board except:40
(1)  Approval of the advertising of nonnegotiated construction contracts; and41
(2)  Approval of authority lease agreements.42
The commissioner shall also have the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain43
and to execute all contracts, authority lease agreements, and all other functions except those44
that cannot legally be delegated to him or her by the board."45
SECTION 2.46
Said title is further amended by revising Code Section 32-2-43, relating to the responsibilities47
of the director of planning, as follows:48
"32-2-43.49
(a)  There shall be a director of planning appointed by the Governor subject to approval by50
a majority vote of both the House Transportation Committee and the Senate Transportation51
Committee.  The director shall serve during the term of the Governor by whom he or she52
is appointed and at the pleasure of the Governor.  Before assuming the duties of his or her53
office, the director shall qualify by giving bond with a corporate surety licensed to do54
business in this state, such bond to be in the amount of $500,000.00 and payable to the55
Governor and his or her successors in office.  The bond shall be subject to the approval of56
the Governor and shall be conditioned on the faithful discharge of the duties of the office.57
The premium for the bond shall be paid out of the funds of the department.58
(b)  The director of planning's principal responsibility shall be the development of59
transportation plans, including the development of the state-wide strategic transportation60





pursuant to the provisions of Code Section 32-2-3 and Code Section 32-2-22, strategic62
transportation plans pursuant to the provisions of Code Section 32-2-41.1, and benchmarks63
and value engineering studies pursuant to the provisions of Code Section 32-2-41.2, in64
consultation with the board, the Governor, and the commissioner.  The director shall also65
be responsible for the duties and activities assigned to the director in Article 5 of Chapter66
8 of Title 48.  The director shall be the director of the Planning Division of the department67
and shall possess, exercise, and perform all the duties, powers, and authority which may68
be vested in such division by law and are necessary or appropriate for such purpose, except69
those duties, powers, and authority which are expressly reserved by law to the board or the70
commissioner."71
SECTION 3.72
Said title is further amended by adding new Code sections immediately following Code73
Section 32-9-12 to read as follows:74
"32-9-13.75
Provisions in all laws, whether general or local, including but not limited to the76
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority Act of 1965 approved March 10, 1965 (Ga.77
L. 1965, p. 2243), as amended, that set forth restrictions on the use by public transit78
authorities of annual proceeds from local sales and use taxes shall be suspended for the79
period beginning on the effective date of this Code section and continuing for three years.80
The greater discretion over such funds shall not abrogate the obligation of the public transit81
authority to comply with federal and state safety regulations and guidelines.  Newly82
unrestricted funds shall be utilized, subject to total funding, to maintain the level of service83
for the transit system as it existed on January 1, 2010.  Furthermore, except as had been84
previously contracted to by the public transit authority prior to January 1, 2010, no funds85
newly unrestricted during this suspended period shall be used by a public transit authority86
to benefit any person or other entity for any of the following: annual cost-of-living or merit87
based salary raises or increases in hourly wages; increased overtime due to such wage88
increases; payment of bonuses; or to  increase the level of benefits of any kind.89
32-9-14.90
(a)  Any provisions to the contrary in the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority Act91
of 1965, approved March 10, 1965 (Ga. L. 1965, p. 2243), as amended, notwithstanding,92
the terms of all members of the board of directors of the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid93
Transit Authority shall terminate on December 31, 2010, and the board shall be94





(b)  Effective January 1, 2011, the board of directors of the authority shall be composed of96
11 voting members and one nonvoting member.  Of the voting members: three members97
shall be residents of the City of Atlanta to be nominated by the mayor and elected by the98
city council; four members shall be residents of DeKalb County to be appointed by the99
DeKalb County Board of Commissioners and at least one of such appointees shall be a100
resident of that portion of DeKalb County lying south of the southernmost corporate101
boundaries of the City of Decatur and at least one of such appointees shall be a resident of102
that portion of DeKalb County lying north of the southernmost corporate boundaries of the103
City of Decatur; three members shall be residents of Fulton County to be appointed by the104
local governing body thereof, and one of such appointees shall be a resident of that portion105
of Fulton County lying south of the corporate limits of the City of Atlanta and two of such106
appointees shall be residents of that portion of Fulton County lying north of the corporate107
limits of the City of Atlanta.  The commissioner of transportation shall be a voting member108
of the board and the executive director of the Georgia Regional Transportation Authority109
shall be a nonvoting member of the board.  The governing body that appoints a member110
shall appoint successors thereto for terms of office of four years in the same manner that111
such governing body makes its other appointments to the board.112
(c)  All appointments shall be for terms of four years except that a vacancy caused113
otherwise than by expiration of term shall be filled for the unexpired portion thereof by the114
local governing body that made the original appointment to the vacant position, or its115
successor in office.  A member of the board may be appointed to succeed himself or herself116
for one four-year term.  Appointments to fill expiring terms shall be made by the local117
governing body prior to the expiration of the term, but such appointments shall not be made118
more than 30 days prior to the expiration of the term.  Members appointed to the board119
shall serve for the terms of office specified in this Code section and until their respective120
successors are appointed and qualified.121
(d)  The local governing bodies of Clayton, Cobb, and Gwinnett Counties may, any other122
provision of this Code section to the contrary notwithstanding, negotiate, enter into, and123
submit to the qualified voters of their respective counties the question of approval of a124
rapid transit contract between the county submitting the question and the authority.  The125
local governing bodies of these counties shall be authorized to execute such rapid transit126
contracts prior to the holding of a referendum provided for in Section 24 of the127
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority Act of 1965, approved March 10, 1965 (Ga.128
L. 1965, p. 2243), as amended; provided, however, that any such rapid transit contract shall129
not become valid and binding unless the same is approved by a majority of those voting in130
said referendum, which approval shall also be deemed approval of further participation in131





contract shall be a participant in the authority, and its rights and responsibilities shall,133
insofar as possible, be the same as those belonging to Fulton and DeKalb Counties, and the134
local governing body of the county may then appoint two residents of the county to the135
board of directors of the authority, to serve a term ending on the thirty-first day of136
December in the fourth full year after the year in which the referendum approving said137
rapid transit contract was held, in which event the board of directors of the authority shall,138
be composed also of such additional members.139
(e)  No person shall be appointed as a member of the board who holds any other public140
office or public employment except an office in the reserves of the armed forces of the141
United States or the National Guard; any member who accepts or enters upon any other142
public office or public employment shall be disqualified thereby to serve as a member.143
(f)  A local governing body may remove any member of the board appointed by it for144
cause.  No member shall be thus removed unless the member has been given a copy of the145
allegations against him or her and an opportunity to be publicly heard in his or her own146
defense in person with or by counsel with at least ten days' written notice to the member.147
A member thus removed from office shall have the right to a judicial review of the148
member's removal by an appeal to the superior court of the county of the local governing149
body which appointed the member, but only on the ground of error of law or abuse of150
discretion.  In case of abandonment of the member's office, conviction of a crime involving151
moral turpitude or a plea of nolo contendere thereto, removal from office, or152
disqualification under subsection (e) of this Code section, the office of a member shall be153
vacant upon the declaration of the board.  A member shall be deemed to have abandoned154
the member's office upon failure to attend any regular or special meeting of the board for155
a period of four months without excuse approved by a resolution of the board, or upon156
removal of the member's residence from the territory of the local governing body that157
appointed the member.158
(g)  Each appointed member of the board, except the chairperson, shall be paid by the159
authority a per diem allowance, in an amount equal to that provided by Code Section160
45-7-21 for each day on which that member attends an official meeting of the board, of any161
committee of the board, or of the authority's Pension Committee, Board of Ethics, or Arts162
Council; provided, however, that said per diem allowance shall not be paid to any such163
member for more than 130 days in any one calendar year.  If the chairperson of the board164
is an appointed member of the board, the chairperson shall be paid by the authority a per165
diem allowance in the same amount for each day in which the chairperson engages in166
official business of the authority, including but not limited to, attendance of any of the167





incurred by that member in the performance of that member's duties as authorized by the169
board.  A board member shall not be allowed employee benefits.170
(h)  The board shall elect one of its members as chairperson and another as vice171
chairperson for terms to expire on December 31 of each year to preside at meetings and172
perform such other duties as the board may prescribe.  The presiding officer of the board173
may continue to vote as any other member, notwithstanding the member's duties as174
presiding officer, if the member so desires.  The board shall also elect from its membership175
a secretary and a treasurer who shall serve terms expiring on December 31 of each year.176
A member of the board may hold only one office on the board at any one time.177
(i)  The board shall hold at least one meeting each month.  The secretary of the board shall178
give written notice to each member of the board at least two days prior to any called179
meeting that may be scheduled, and said secretary shall be informed of the call of such180
meeting sufficiently in advance so as to provide for the giving of notice as above.  A181
majority of the total membership of the board, as it may exist at the time, shall constitute182
a quorum.  On any question presented, the number of members present shall be recorded.183
By affirmative vote of a majority of the members present, the board may exercise all the184
powers and perform all the duties of the board, except as otherwise hereinafter provided185
or as limited by its bylaws, and no vacancy on the original membership of the board, or186
thereafter, shall impair the power of the board to act.  All meetings of the board, its187
executive committee, or any committee appointed by the board shall be subject to Chapter188
14 of Title 50.189
(j)  Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Code section, the following actions by the190
board shall require the affirmative vote of one more than a majority of the total191
membership of the board as it may exist at the time:192
(1)  The issuance and sale of revenue bonds or equipment trust certificates;193
(2)  The purchase or lease of any privately owned system of transportation of passengers194
for hire in its entirety, or any substantial part thereof.  Prior to the purchase or lease of195
any such privately owned system a public hearing pertaining thereto shall have been held196
and notice of such public hearing shall have been advertised; provided, however, that no197
sum shall be paid for such privately owned system of transportation in excess of the fair198
market value thereof determined by a minimum of two appraisers qualified to appraise199
privately owned systems of transportation and approved by a majority of the local200
governments participating in the financing of such purchase;201
(3)  The award of any contract involving $100,000.00 or more for construction,202
alterations, supplies, equipment, repairs, maintenance, or services other than professional203





resolution may delegate to the general manager the general or specific authority to enter205
into contracts involving less than $100,000.00;206
(4)  The grant of any concession; and207
(5)  The award of any contract for the management of any authority owned property or208
facility.209
(k)  The board shall appoint and employ, as needed, a general manager and a general210
counsel, none of whom may be members of the board or a relative of a member of the211
board, and delegate to them such authority as it may deem appropriate.  It may make such212
bylaws or rules and regulations as it may deem appropriate for its own government, not213
inconsistent with this Code section, including the establishment of an executive committee214
to exercise such authority as its bylaws may prescribe.215
(l)  The treasurer of the authority and such other members of the board and such other216
officers and employees of the authority as the board may determine shall execute corporate217
surety bonds, conditioned upon the faithful performance of their respective duties.  A218
blanket form of surety bond may be used for this purpose.  Neither the obligation of the219
principal or the surety shall extend to any loss sustained by the insolvency, failure, or220
closing of any depository which has been approved as a depository for public funds.221
(m)(1)  In addition to the requirements of subsection (i) of this Code section, each222
member of the board shall hold a meeting once each 12 months with the local governing223
body that appointed such member.  The secretary of the board shall give written notice224
to each member of the board, to each local governing body, and to the governing225
authority of each municipality in the county in which there is an existing or proposed rail226
line at least two days prior to any meeting that may be scheduled, and said secretary shall227
be informed of the call of such meeting sufficiently in advance so as to provide for giving228
such notice.  These meetings shall be for the purpose of reporting to the local governing229
bodies on the operations of the authority and on the activities of the board and making230
such information available to the general public.  No activity that requires action by the231
board shall be initiated or undertaken at any meeting conducted under this subsection.232
(2)  The board shall submit once each three months a written report on the operations of233
the authority and on the activities of the board to each local governing body that appoints234
a member of the board."235
SECTION 4.236







The General Assembly finds that there exist a number of programs designed to provide240
rural and human services transportation and that frequently these services are provided over241
large geographic areas through various funding sources which are frequently targeted to242
narrowly defined client bases.  The sheer number of such programs lends itself to a need243
for coordination among the programs and agencies which implement them so as to best244
assist economies in purchasing equipment and operating these many programs, to better245
serve the taxpayers of the state in ensuring the most cost-effective delivery of these246
services, and to best serve the clients utilizing the transportation services provided through247
these programs.248
32-12-2.249
There is created the Georgia Coordinating Committee for Rural and Human Services250
Transportation of the Governor's Development Council.251
32-12-3.252
The Georgia Coordinating Committee for Rural and Human Services Transportation and253
its advisory subcommittees shall meet not less often than quarterly.  Administrative254
expenses of the committee shall be borne by the Governor's Development Council.  The255
members of the committee shall receive no extra compensation or reimbursement of256
expenses from the state for their services as members of the committee.257
32-12-4.258
The Georgia Coordinating Committee for Rural and Human Services Transportation shall259
establish the State Advisory Subcommittee for Rural and Human Services Transportation260
which shall consist of the State School Superintendent and the commissioners of the261
Department of Transportation, Department of Human Services, Department of Behavioral262
Health and Developmental Disabilities, Department of Community Health, Department of263
Labor, the Governor's Development Council, and the Department of Community Affairs264
or their respective designees.  The commissioner of transportation or his or her designee265
shall serve as chairperson of the State Advisory Subcommittee for Rural and Human266
Services Transportation.  The Georgia Coordinating Committee for Rural and Human267
Services Transportation may also establish such additional advisory subcommittees as it268
deems appropriate to fulfill its mission which shall consist of a representative of each269





this state and may include other local government representatives; private and public sector271
transportation providers, both for profit and nonprofit; voluntary transportation programs272
representatives; public transit system representatives, both rural and urban; and273
representatives of the clients served by the various programs administered by the agencies274
represented on the State Advisory Subcommittee for Rural and Human Services275
Transportation.  Members of advisory committees shall be responsible for their own276
expenses and shall receive no compensation or reimbursement of expenses from the277
Georgia Coordinating Committee for Rural and Human Services Transportation, the State278
Advisory Subcommittee for Rural and Human Services Transportation, or the state for their279
services as members of an advisory committee.280
32-12-5.281
The Georgia Coordinating Committee for Rural and Human Services Transportation shall282
examine the manner in which transportation services are provided by the participating283
agencies represented on the committee.  Such examination shall include but not be limited284
to:285
(1)  An analysis of all programs administered by participating agencies, including capital286
and operating costs, and overlapping or duplication of services among such programs,287
with emphasis on how to overcome such overlapping or duplication;288
(2)  The means by which transportation services are coordinated among state, local, and289
federal funding source programs;290
(3)  The means by which both capital and operating costs for transportation could be291
combined or shared among agencies, including at a minimum shared purchase of vehicles292
and maintenance of such vehicles;293
(4)  An analysis of those areas which might appropriately be consolidated to lower the294
costs of program delivery without sacrificing program quality to clients, including shared295
use of vehicles for client trips regardless of the funding source which pays for their trips;296
(5)  An analysis of state of the art efforts to coordinate rural and human services297
transportation elsewhere in the nation, including at a minimum route scheduling so as to298
avoid duplicative trips in a given locality;299
(6)  A review of any limitations which may be imposed by various federally funded300
programs and how the state can manage within those limitations as it reviews possible301
sharing opportunities;302
(7)  An analysis of how agency programs interact with and impact state, local, or regional303






(8)  An evaluation of potential cost sharing opportunities available for clients served by306
committee agencies so as to maximize service delivery efficiencies and to obtain the307
maximum benefit on their behalf with the limited amount of funds available; and308
(9)  An analysis of possible methods to reduce costs, including, but not limited to, greater309
use of privatization.310
32-12-6.311
No later than July 1 of each year, the Governor's Development Council shall submit the312
preliminary report of the Georgia Coordinating Committee for Rural and Human Services313
Transportation to the members of the State Advisory Subcommittee for Rural and Human314
Services Transportation.  Comments and recommendations may be submitted to the315
Governor's Development Council for a period of 30 days.  No later than September 1 of316
each year, the Governor's Development Council shall submit a final report to the317
Governor's Office of Planning and Budget for review and consideration.  The report shall318
address each of the specific duties enumerated in Code Section 32-12-5 and such other319
subject areas within its purview as the Governor's Development Council shall deem320
appropriate.  Each report shall focus on existing conditions in coordination of rural and321
human services transportation within the state and shall make specific recommendations322
for means to improve such current practices.  Such recommendations shall address at a323
minimum both their cost implications and impact on client service.  No later than January324
15 of each year, the Governor's Office of Planning and Budget shall submit the final report325
of the Governor's Development Council and any affiliated budget recommendations to the326
presiding officers of the General Assembly, with copies of said report sent to the327
chairpersons of the transportation committees, the appropriations committees, and the328
health and human services committees of each chamber of the General Assembly."329
SECTION 5.330
Title 48 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to revenue and taxation, is331
amended by revising subsection (b) of Code Section 48-8-6, relating to limitations on local332
imposition of certain taxes, as follows:333
"(b)  There shall not be imposed in any jurisdiction in this state or on any transaction in this334
state local sales taxes, local use taxes, or local sales and use taxes in excess of 2 percent.335
For purposes of this prohibition, the taxes affected are any sales tax, use tax, or sales and336
use tax which is levied in an area consisting of less than the entire state, however337
authorized, including such taxes authorized by or pursuant to constitutional amendment,338






(1)  A sales and use tax for educational purposes exempted from such limitation under341
Article VIII, Section VI, Paragraph IV of the Constitution;342
(2)  Any tax levied for purposes of a metropolitan area system of public transportation,343
as authorized by the amendment to the Constitution set out at Georgia Laws, 1964, page344
1008; the continuation of such amendment under Article XI, Section I, Paragraph IV(d)345
of the Constitution; and the laws enacted pursuant to such constitutional amendment;346
provided, however, that the exception provided for under this paragraph shall only apply347
in:348
(A)  In a county in which a tax is being imposed under subparagraph (a)(1)(D) of Code349
Section 48-8-111 in whole or in part for the purpose or purposes of a water capital350
outlay project or projects, a sewer capital outlay project or projects, a water and sewer351
capital outlay project or projects, water and sewer projects and costs as defined under352
paragraph (3)(4) of Code Section 48-8-200, or any combination thereof and with353
respect to which the county has entered into an intergovernmental contract with a354
municipality, in which the average waste-water system flow of such municipality is not355
less than 85 million gallons per day, allocating proceeds to such municipality to be used356
solely for water and sewer projects and costs as defined under paragraph (3)(4) of Code357
Section 48-8-200.  The exception provided for under this paragraph subparagraph shall358
apply only during the period the tax under said subparagraph (a)(1)(D) is in effect.  The359
exception provided for under this paragraph subparagraph shall not apply in any county360
in which a tax is being imposed under Article 2A of this chapter; or361
(B)  In a county in which the tax levied for purposes of a metropolitan area system of362
public transportation is first levied after January 1, 2010, and before November 1, 2012.363
Such tax shall not apply to the following:364
(i)  The sale or use of jet fuel to or by a qualifying airline at a qualifying airport.  For365
purposes of this division, a 'qualifying airline' means any person which is authorized366
by the Federal Aviation Administration or another appropriate agency of the United367
States to operate as an air carrier under an air carrier operating certificate and which368
provides regularly scheduled flights for the transportation of passengers or cargo for369
hire.  For purposes of this division, a 'qualifying airport' means any airport in the state370
that has had more than 750,000 takeoffs and landings during a calendar year; and371
(ii)  The sale of motor vehicles;372
(3)  In the event of a rate increase imposed pursuant to Code Section 48-8-96, only the373
amount in excess of the initial 1 percent sales and use tax and in the event of a newly374
imposed tax pursuant to Code Section 48-8-96, only the amount in excess of a 1 percent375
sales and use tax; and376





(5)  A sales and use tax levied under Article 5 of this chapter.378
If the imposition of any otherwise authorized local sales tax, local use tax, or local sales379
and use tax would result in a tax rate in excess of that authorized by this subsection, then380
such otherwise authorized tax may not be imposed."381
SECTION 6.382
Title 48 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to revenue and taxation, is383




The local governments of the State of Georgia are of vital importance to the state and its388
citizens.  The state has an essential public interest in promoting, developing, sustaining, and389
assisting local governments.  The General Assembly finds that the design and construction390
of transportation projects is a critical local government service for which adequate funding391
is not presently available.  Many transportation projects cross multiple jurisdictional392
boundaries and must be coordinated in their design and construction.  The General393
Assembly finds that the most efficient means to coordinate and fund such projects is394
through the creation of special districts that correspond with the boundaries of existing395
regional commissions.  The purpose of this article is to provide for special districts that will396
enable the coordinated design and construction of transportation projects that will develop397
and promote the essential public interests of the state and its citizens at the state, regional,398
and local levels.  The General Assembly intends through the creation of such special399
districts to enable the citizens within each district to decide in an election whether to400
authorize the imposition of a special district transportation sales and use tax to fund the401
projects on an investment list collaboratively developed by the affected local governments402
and the state.  This article shall be construed liberally to achieve its purpose.403
48-8-241.404
(a)  There are created within this state 12 special districts.  The geographical boundary of405
each special district shall correspond with and shall be coterminous with the geographical406
boundary of the applicable region of the 12 regional commissions provided for in407
subsection (f) of Code Section 50-8-4.408
(b)  When the imposition of a special district sales and use tax is authorized according to409





of referendum approval and the other requirements of this article, a special sales and use411
tax shall be imposed within the special district for a period of ten years which tax shall be412
known as the special district transportation sales and use tax.413
(c)  Nothing in this article shall be construed as limiting the establishment of a fund or414
funds which would provide at least 20 years of maintenance and operation costs from415
proceeds of the special district transportation sales and use tax used to construct, finance,416
or otherwise develop transit capital projects; provided, however, that the Metropolitan417
Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, created by an Act approved March 10, 1965 (Ga. L. 1965,418
p. 2243), as amended, shall not be authorized to use any proceeds from the special district419
transportation sales and use tax for expenses of maintenance and operation of such portions420
of the transportation system of such authority in existence on January1, 2011.421
(d)  Any tax imposed under this article shall be at the rate of 1 percent.  Except as to rate,422
a tax imposed under this article shall correspond to the tax imposed by Article 1 of this423
chapter.  No item or transaction which is not subject to taxation under Article 1 of this424
chapter shall be subject to a tax imposed under this article, except that a tax imposed under425
this article shall not apply to:426
(1)  The sale or use of any type of fuel used for off-road heavy-duty equipment, off-road427
farm or agricultural equipment, or locomotives;428
(2)  The sale or use of jet fuel to or by a qualifying airline at a qualifying airport;429
(3)  The sale or use of fuel that is used for propulsion of motor vehicles on the public430
highways.  For purposes of this paragraph, a motor vehicle means a self-propelled vehicle431
designed for operation or required to be licensed for operation upon the public highways;432
(4)  The sale or use of energy used in the manufacturing or processing of tangible goods433
primarily for resale; or434
(5) For motor fuel as defined under paragraph (9) of Code Section 48-9-2 for public mass435
transit.436
The tax imposed pursuant to this article shall only be levied on the first $5,000.00 of any437
transaction involving the sale or lease of a motor vehicle.  The tax imposed pursuant to this438
article shall be subject to any sales and use tax exemption which is otherwise imposed by439
law; provided; however, that the tax levied by this article shall be applicable to the sale of440
food and beverages as provided for in division (57)(D)(i) of Code Section 48-8-3.441
48-8-242.442
As used in this article, the term:443
(1)  'Commission' means the Georgia State Financing and Investment Commission;444





(A)  All costs of acquisition, by purchase or otherwise, construction, assembly,446
installation, modification, renovation, extension, rehabilitation, operation, or447
maintenance incurred in connection with any project of the special district or any part448
thereof;449
(B)  All costs of real property or rights in property, fixtures, or personal property used450
in or in connection with or necessary for any project of the special district or for any451
facilities related thereto, including but not limited to the cost of all land, interests in452
land, estates for years, easements, rights, improvements, water rights, and connections453
for utility services; the cost of fees, franchises, permits, approvals, licenses, and454
certificates; the cost of securing any such franchises, permits, approvals, licenses, or455
certificates; the cost of preparation of any application therefor; and the cost of all456
fixtures, machinery, equipment, furniture, and other property used in or in connection457
with or necessary for any project of the special district;458
(C)  All costs of engineering, surveying, planning, environmental assessments, financial459
analyses, and architectural, legal, and accounting services and all expenses incurred by460
engineers, surveyors, planners, environmental scientists, fiscal analysts, architects,461
attorneys, accountants, and any other necessary technical personnel in connection with462
any project of the special district;463
(D)  All expenses for inspection of any project of the special district;464
(E)  All fees of any type charged to the special district in connection with any project465
of the special district;466
(F)  All expenses of or incidental to determining the feasibility or practicability of any467
project of the special district;468
(G)  All costs of plans and specifications for any project of the special district;469
(H)  All costs of title insurance and examinations of title with respect to any project of470
the special district;471
(I)  Repayment of any loans for the advance payment of any part of any of the472
foregoing costs, including interest thereon and any other expenses of such loans;473
(J)  Administrative expenses of the special district and such other expenses as may be474
necessary or incidental to any project of the special district or the financing thereof; and475
(K)  The establishment of a fund or funds or such other reserves as the commission may476
approve with respect to the financing and operation of any project of the special district.477
Any cost, obligation, or expense incurred for any of the purposes specified in this478
paragraph shall be a part of the cost of the project of the special district and may be paid479
or reimbursed as otherwise authorized by this article.480
(3)  'County' means any county created under the Constitution or laws of this state.481





(5)  'Director' means the director of planning provided for in Code Section 32-2-43.483
(6)  'LARP factor' means the sum of one-fifth of the ratio between the population of a484
local government's jurisdiction and the total population of the special district in which485
such local government is located plus four-fifths of the ratio between the paved and486
unpaved centerline road miles in the local government's jurisdiction and the total paved487
and unpaved centerline road miles in the special district in which such local government488
is located.489
(7)  'Local government' means any municipal corporation, county, or consolidated490
government created by the General Assembly or pursuant to the Constitution and laws491
of this state.492
(8)  'Metropolitan planning organization' or 'MPO' means the policy board of an493
organization created and designated to carry out the metropolitan transportation planning494
process as defined in 23 C.F.R. Section 450.495
(9)  'Municipal corporation' means any incorporated city or town in this state.496
(10)  'Project' means, without limitation, any new or existing airports, bike lanes, bridges,497
bus and rail mass transit systems, freight and passenger rail, pedestrian facilities, ports,498
roads, terminals, and all activities and structures useful and incident to providing,499
operating, and maintaining the same.  The term shall also include direct appropriations500
to a local government for the purpose of serving as a local match for state or federal501
funding.502
(11)  'Regional transportation roundtable' or 'roundtable' means a conference of the local503
governments of a special district created pursuant to this article held at a centralized504
location within the district as chosen by the director for the purpose of establishing the505
investment criteria and determining projects eligible for the investment list for the special506
district.  The regional transportation roundtable shall consist of two representatives from507
each county, including the chairperson, sole commissioner, mayor, or chief executive508
officer of the county governing authority and one mayor elected by the mayors of the509
county; provided, however, that, in the event such an election ends in a tie, the mayor of510
the municipal corporation with the highest population determined using the most recently511
completed United States decennial census shall be deemed to have been elected as a512
representative unless that mayor is already part of the roundtable.  In such case, the513
mayor of the municipal corporation with the second highest population shall be deemed514
to have been elected as a representative.  If a county has more than 90 percent of its515
population residing in municipal corporations, such county shall have the mayor of the516
municipal corporation with the highest population determined using the most recently517
completed United States decennial census as an additional representative.  The regional518





serve as an executive committee.  The executive committee shall also include two520
members of the House of Representatives selected by the chairperson of the House521
Transportation Committee and one member of the Senate selected by the chairperson of522
the Senate Transportation Committee.  Each member of the General Assembly appointed523
to the executive committee shall be a nonvoting member of the executive committee and524
shall represent a district which lies wholly or partially within the region represented by525
the executive committee.  The executive committee shall not have more than one526
representative from any one county, but any member of the General Assembly serving527
on the executive committee shall not count as a representative of his or her county.528
(12)  'Special Regional Transportation Funding Election Act' means an Act specifically529
and exclusively enacted for the purpose of ordering that a referendum be held for the530
reimposition of the special district transportation sales and use tax within the region that531
includes the districts, in their entirety or any portion thereof, of the members from a local532
legislative delegation in the General Assembly.  A majority of the signatures of the533
legislative delegation for a majority of the counties within the region shall be required for534
the bill to be placed upon the local calendar of each chamber.  This method shall be535
exclusively used for this purpose and no other bill shall be placed or voted upon on the536
local calendar utilizing this method of qualification for placement thereon.  This Act shall537
be treated procedurally by the General Assembly as a local Act and all counties within538
the region shall receive the legal notice requirements of a local Act.539
(13)  'State-wide strategic transportation plan' means the official state-wide transportation540
plan as defined in paragraph (6) of subsection (a) of Code Section 32-2-22.541
(14)  'State-wide transportation improvement program' means a state-wide prioritized542
listing of transportation projects as defined in paragraph (7) of subsection (a) of Code543
Section 32-2-22.544
(15)  'Transportation improvement program' means a prioritized listing of transportation545
projects as defined in paragraph (8) of subsection (a) of Code Section 32-2-22.546
48-8-243.547
(a)  Within 60 calendar days following approval by the Governor of the state-wide strategic548
transportation plan, the State Transportation Board shall consider the state-wide strategic549
transportation plan in accordance with the provisions of subsection (c) of Code Section550
32-2-22.  Upon approval of the state-wide strategic transportation plan by the State551
Transportation Board, the director shall provide in written form to the local governments552
and any MPO's within each special district across the state recommended criteria for the553
development of an investment list of projects and programs.  The establishment of such554





Section 32-2-41.1 and the state-wide strategic transportation plan.  The recommended556
criteria shall include performance goals, allocation of investments in alignment with557
performance, and execution of projects.  The state fiscal economist shall develop an558
estimate of the proceeds of the special district transportation sales and use tax for each559
special district using financial data supplied by the department.  Such estimate shall include560
reasonable ranges of anticipated growth, if any.  The director shall include such estimates561
and ranges in the recommended criteria for developing the draft investment list.  Any local562
government or MPO desiring to submit comments on the recommended criteria shall make563
such submission to the director no later than September 30, 2010.  On or before November564
10, 2010, the mayors in each county shall elect the mayoral representative to the regional565
transportation roundtable and notify the county commission chairperson and the director566
of that mayor's name.  The director shall accept comments from any MPO located wholly567
or partially within each special district in finalizing the recommended district criteria in a568
written report on or before November 15, 2010.  Such report shall also include notice of569
the date, time, and location of the first regional transportation roundtable for each special570
district for the purpose of considering the recommended district criteria and for electing571
members of the executive committee for each special district.  Any amendment to the572
recommended criteria, approval of such criteria, and election of the executive committee573
shall be enacted by a majority vote of the representatives present at the roundtable meeting.574
Upon approval of the criteria, the director shall promptly deliver a report to the575
commissioner of transportation, local governments, any MPO located wholly or partially576
within each special district and the members of the General Assembly whose districts lie577
wholly or partially within each special district detailing the criteria approved by the578
roundtable.579
(b)  With regard to any area of a special district that is not part of an MPO, following580
receipt of the report provided for in subsection (a) of this Code section, and after receiving581
comments, if any, from members of the General Assembly whose districts lie wholly or582
partially within such area, the local governments in such area may submit projects to the583
director to assemble a list of example investments for such special district that comport584
with the special district's investment criteria.  With regard to any area of a special district585
that is part of an MPO, following receipt of the report provided for in subsection (a) of this586
Code section, and after receiving comments, if any, from members of the General587
Assembly whose districts lie wholly or partially within such area, the local governments588
may submit projects to the director and to the MPO for the director to use to assemble a list589
of example investments for such special district that comport with the special district's590
investment criteria.  The list of example investments for each special district shall not be591





generated by each special district's sales and use tax and shall be submitted to the executive593
committee for each regional transportation roundtable for consideration.  The executive594
committee in collaboration with the director shall choose from the list of example595
investments to create the draft investment list, which shall be approved by majority vote596
of the executive committee.  Such draft investment list shall be fiscally constrained within597
the ranges of revenues projected to be generated by the special district sales and use tax,598
as determined by the state fiscal economist.  The special district's draft investment list as599
approved by the executive committee shall be considered by the regional transportation600
roundtable.  The director shall deliver the draft investment list to the local governments,601
MPO's, and members of the General Assembly whose districts lie wholly or partially602
within each special district for each special district not later than August 15, 2011.  The603
director shall include in the draft investment list a statement of the specific public benefits604
to be expected upon the completion of each project on the investment list and how the605
special district's investment criteria are furthered by each project.  Examples of specific606
public benefits include, but are not limited to, congestion mitigation, increased lane607
capacity, public safety, and economic development.  The director shall include in such608
delivery notice of the date, time, and location of each district's executive committee609
meeting and final regional transportation roundtable.  Prior to holding the final regional610
transportation roundtable, the executive committee shall hold, after proper notice to the611
public, at least two public meetings in the region for the purpose of receiving public612
comment on the draft regional investment list.  The executive committee shall prepare and613
deliver to all members of the regional roundtable and the director a summary of the public614
comment on the regional investment list.  The local governments, MPO's, and members of615
the General Assembly whose districts lie wholly or partially within such special district616
may submit comments on the draft investment list addressed to both the director and the617
executive committee no later than two weeks prior to the dates of the final regional618
transportation roundtable and the executive committee meeting, respectively, for the619
special district.  At the final regional transportation roundtable, the draft investment list620
approved by the executive committee shall be considered for approval by a majority vote621
of the representatives present at the roundtable.  Should the roundtable reject the draft622
investment list approved by the executive committee, the roundtable then may negotiate623
amendments that meet the district's investment criteria to the draft investment list, which624
shall be chosen from the list of example investments for each special district, each voted625
on separately and requiring a majority vote of the representatives present at the roundtable626
for approval. Upon consideration of all offered amendments, upon motion, the roundtable627
shall vote as to the approval of the amended draft list, requiring a majority vote of the628





provided to the director.  On or before October 15, 2011, the director shall deliver such list630
to the commission, the commissioner of transportation, the executive director of the631
Georgia Regional Transportation Authority, local governments, MPO's, and members of632
the General Assembly whose districts lie wholly or partially within each special district for633
each special district.  The approved investment list shall include:634
(1)  The specific transportation projects to be funded;635
(2)  The anticipated schedule of such projects;636
(3)  The approximate cost of such projects; and637
(4)  The estimated amount of net proceeds to be raised by the tax including the amount638
of proceeds to be distributed to local governments pursuant to subsection (e) of Code639
Section 48-8-249.640
If a roundtable does not approve the original draft investment list or an amended draft641
investment list on or before October 15, 2011, then a special district gridlock shall be642
declared by the director and no election shall be held in such special district.  The question643
of levying the tax shall not be submitted to the voters of the special district until after 24644
months immediately following the month in which the special district gridlock was645
reached.646
(c)  In the event a special district gridlock is declared, the local governments in such special647
district shall be required to provide a 50 percent match for any local maintenance and648
improvement grants by the Department of Transportation.  Such 50 percent match649
requirement shall remain in place until the special district roundtable approves an650
investment list meeting the special district's investment criteria and an election is held651
within the special district on the levy of the special district transportation sales and use tax.652
Part 2653
48-8-244.654
(a)  Simultaneously with the director's delivery of the approved investment list in655
accordance with subsection (b) of Code Section 48-8-243, the roundtable shall deliver a656
notice to the election superintendents of each county within the respective special districts.657
Upon receipt of the notice, the election superintendents shall issue the call for an election658
for the purpose of submitting the question of the imposition of the tax to the voters within659
each special district.  The election superintendents shall issue the call and shall conduct the660
election in the manner authorized under Code Section 21-2-540.  The first election shall661
be held on the date of the general state-wide primary in 2012.  The election superintendents662





immediately preceding the date of the election in the official organs of their respective664
counties.665
(b)  The ballot submitting the question of the levy of the special district transportation tax666
authorized by this article to the voters within each special district shall have written or667
printed thereon the following:668
'(  )  YES669
 670
(  )  NO671
 672
Shall _______ County's transportation system and the transportation
network in this region and the state be improved by providing for a 1
percent special district transportation sales and use tax for the purpose of
transportation projects and programs for a period of ten years?'
(c)  All persons desiring to vote in favor of levying the tax shall vote 'Yes' and all persons673
opposed to levying the tax shall vote 'No.'  If more than one-half of the votes cast674
throughout the entire special district are in favor of levying the tax, then the tax shall be675
levied as provided in this article; otherwise the tax shall not be levied and the question of676
levying the tax shall not again be submitted to the voters of the special district until after677
24 months immediately following the month in which the election was held.  Each election678
superintendent shall hold and conduct the election under the same rules and regulations as679
govern special elections.  Each election superintendent shall canvass the returns from his680
or her county, declare the result of the election in that county, and certify the result to the681
Secretary of State.  The Secretary of State shall compile the results from each county in the682
special district, declare the result of the election in the special district, and certify the result683
to the governing authority of each local government and MPO within the special district684
and the state revenue commissioner.  The expense of the election in each county within685
each special district shall be paid from funds of each county.686
(d)  In the event a special district sales and use tax election is held and the voters in a687
special district do not approve the levy of the special district transportation sales and use688
tax, the local governments in such special district shall be required to provide a 30 percent689
match for any local maintenance and improvement grants by the Department of690
Transportation for transportation projects and programs for at least 24 months and until691
such time as a special district sales and use tax is approved. In the event the voters in a692
special district approve the levy of the special district transportation sales and use tax, the693
local governments in such special district shall be required to provide a 10 percent match694
for any local maintenance and improvement grants by the Department of Transportation695
for transportation projects and programs for the duration of the levy of the special district696






The approval of the levy of the special district transportation sales and use tax in a special699
district shall not in any way diminish the percentage of funds allocated to a special district700
or any of the local governments within a special district under the provisions of subsection701
(c) of Code Section 32-5-27.  The amount of funds expended in a special district shall not702
be decreased due to the use of proceeds from the special district transportation sales and703
use tax to construct transportation projects that have a high priority in the state-wide704
strategic transportation plan.  If a special district constructs a project on the approved705
investment list using proceeds from the special district tax, then the state funding under706
subsection (c) of Code Section 32-5-27 shall not be diverted to priority projects in other707
special districts.708
48-8-245.709
(a)  If the imposition of the special district transportation sales and use tax is approved at710
the special election, the collection of such tax shall begin on the first day of the next711
succeeding calendar quarter beginning more than 80 days after the date of the election.712
With respect to services which are regularly billed on a monthly basis, however, the tax713
shall become effective with respect to and the tax shall apply to services billed on or after714
the effective date specified in the previous sentence.715
(b)  The tax shall cease to be imposed on the earliest of the following dates:716
(1)  On the final day of the ten-year period of time specified for the imposition of the tax;717
or718
(2)  As of the end of the calendar quarter during which the state revenue commissioner719
determines that the tax has raised revenues sufficient to provide to the special district net720
proceeds equal to or greater than the amount specified as the estimated amount of net721
proceeds to be raised by the special district transportation tax.722
(c)(1)  No more than a single 1 percent tax under this article may be collected at any time723
within a special district.724
(2)  Upon the enactment by the General Assembly of a Special Regional Transportation725
Funding Election Act and the adoption of resolutions by the governing bodies of a726
majority of the counties within a special district in which a tax authorized by this article727
is in effect, an election may be held for the reimposition of the tax while the tax is in728
effect.  Proceedings for the development of an investment list and for the reimposition729
of a tax shall be in the same manner as provided for in Code Section 48-8-243.730
(3)  Following the expiration of the special district transportation sales and use tax under731
this article, or following a special election in which voters in a special district rejected the732





Transportation Funding Election Act and the adoption of resolutions by the governing734
bodies of a majority of counties within a special district, an election may be held for the735
imposition of a tax under this article in the same manner as provided in this article for the736
initial imposition of such tax.  Such subsequent election shall be held on the date of a737
state-wide general primary.  The development of the investment list for such special738
district shall follow the dates established in Code Section 48-8-243 with the years739
adjusted appropriately, and such schedule shall be posted on a website developed by the740
state revenue commissioner to be used exclusively for matters related to the special741
district transportation sales and use tax within 30 days of the later of the state revenue742
commissioner's receipt of notice from the final county governing body required to adopt743
a resolution or of the passage of the Special Regional Transportation Funding Election744
Act by the General Assembly.745
48-8-246.746
A tax levied pursuant to this article shall be exclusively administered and collected by the747
state revenue commissioner for the use and benefit of the special district imposing the tax.748
Such administration and collection shall be accomplished in the same manner and subject749
to the same applicable provisions, procedures, and penalties provided in Article 1 of this750
chapter; provided, however, that all moneys collected from each taxpayer by the state751
revenue commissioner shall be applied first to such taxpayer's liability for taxes owed the752
state; and provided, further, that the state revenue commissioner may rely upon a753
representation by or in behalf of the special district or the Secretary of State that such a tax754
has been validly imposed, and the state revenue commissioner and the state revenue755
commissioner's agents shall not be liable to any person for collecting any such tax which756
was not validly imposed.  Dealers shall be allowed a percentage of the amount of the tax757
due and accounted for and shall be reimbursed in the form of a deduction in submitting,758
reporting, and paying the amount due if such amount is not delinquent at the time of759
payment.  The deduction shall be at the rate and subject to the requirements specified under760
subsections (b) through (f) of Code Section 48-8-50.761
48-8-247.762
Each sales tax return remitting taxes collected under this article shall separately identify763
the location of each retail establishment at which any of the taxes remitted were collected764
and shall specify the amount of sales and the amount of taxes collected at each765
establishment for the period covered by the return in order to facilitate the determination766
by the state revenue commissioner that all taxes imposed by this article are collected and767






The proceeds of the tax collected by the state revenue commissioner in each special district770
under this article shall be disbursed as soon as practicable after collection to the Georgia771
State Financing and Investment Commission to be maintained in a trust fund and772
administered by the commission on behalf of the special district imposing the tax.  Such773
proceeds for each special district shall be kept separate from other funds of the commission774
and shall not in any manner be commingled with other funds of the commission.775
48-8-249.776
(a)  The proceeds received from the tax authorized by this article shall be used within the777
special district receiving proceeds of the tax exclusively for the projects on the approved778
investment list for such district as provided in subsection (b) of Code Section 48-8-243.779
Authorized uses of tax proceeds in connection with such projects shall include the cost of780
project defined in paragraph (2) of Code Section 48-8-242.781
(b)  The commission shall be responsible for the proper application of the proceeds782
received from the tax authorized by this article for the approved investment list for each783
special district.  The commission shall delegate the management of the budget, schedule,784
execution, and delivery of the projects contained in the approved investment list as follows:785
(1)  The commission shall contract with the Department of Transportation for all786
transportation projects except bus and rail mass transit systems and passenger rail in any787
special district the boundaries of which are not wholly contained within a single MPO;788
and789
(2)  The commission shall contract with the Georgia Regional Transportation Authority790
only for projects that are bus and rail mass transit systems and passenger rail within any791
special district the boundaries of which are wholly contained within a single MPO.792
Upon entering into contracts with the Department of Transportation or the Georgia793
Regional Transportation Authority as provided above, the commission shall dispense funds794
upon the request of the commissioner of transportation or the executive director of the795
Georgia Regional Transportation Authority, which request shall include certification of the796
completion of the project or project element for which funds are requested.  Payment shall797
be made promptly upon approval by the construction division or the financing and798
investment division of the commission, and such payments shall not require any other799
official action by the commission.  The use of funds so dispensed shall be subject to review800
and audit by the construction division and the financing and investment division of the801
commission and action by the commission upon receipt of complaint or if otherwise802
warranted.  The Department of Transportation and Georgia Regional Transportation803





progress and performance in the execution, schedule, and delivery of projects on the805
approved investment list.806
(c)  In managing the execution, schedule, and delivery of the projects on the approved807
investment list for a special district, the Department of Transportation or Georgia Regional808
Transportation Authority, as appropriate, shall determine whether a project should be809
designed and constructed by the Department of Transportation, by a local government, or810
by another public or private entity.  In making such determination the following shall be811
considered:812
(1)  Whether such project is on the state-wide transportation improvement program, the813
state-wide strategic transportation plan, or a transportation improvement program;814
(2)  The type and estimated cost of the project;815
(3)  The location of the project and whether it encompasses multiple jurisdictions;816
(4)  The experience of a local government or governments or a public or private entity in817
designing and constructing such project as set forth in an application in a form to be818
provided by the commissioner of transportation or the executive director of the Georgia819
Regional Transportation Authority; and820
(5)  The recommendation of the MPO, if any, for such special district.821
Following the decision, the Department of Transportation, the local government or822
governments, or another public or private entity as determined under this subsection shall823
contract for implementing the projects in accordance with applicable state and federal824
requirements.825
(d)  The commission shall maintain or cause to be maintained an adequate record-keeping826
system for each project funded by a special district transportation sales and use tax.  An827
annual audit shall be paid for by each special district and conducted by an independent828
auditing firm as selected by the commission.  Such audit shall include a schedule which829
shows for each such project the original estimated cost, the current estimated cost if it is830
not the original estimated cost, amounts expended in prior years, and amounts expended831
in the current year.  Such audit shall verify and test expenditures sufficient to provide832
assurances that the schedule is fairly presented in relation to the financial statements.  The833
audit report on the financial statements shall include an opinion, or disclaimer of opinion,834
as to whether the schedule is presented fairly in all material respects in relation to the835
financial statements taken as a whole.836
(e)  Twenty-five percent of the proceeds received from the tax authorized by this article837
shall be distributed to the local governments within the special district in which the tax is838
imposed if such special district's boundaries are not coterminous with an MPO.  Fifteen839
percent of the proceeds received from the tax authorized by this article shall be distributed840





special district's boundaries are wholly contained within a single MPO.  Such percentages842
shall be allocated to each local government by multiplying the LARP factor of each local843
government by the total amount of funds to be distributed to all the local governments in844
the special district.  Proceeds described in this subsection shall be distributed to the local845
governments on an ongoing basis as they are received by the commission.  Such proceeds846
shall be used by the local governments only for transportation projects as defined in847
paragraph (10) of Code Section 48-8-242 and may also serve as the local match as required848
for state transportation projects and grants.  If a special district receives from the tax net849
proceeds in excess of the investment list approved by the roundtable for the imposition of850
the tax or in excess of the actual cost of the project or projects on such investment list, then851
such excess proceeds shall be distributed among the local governments within the special852
district in accordance with this subsection.853
48-8-250.854
Not later than December 15 of each year, the state revenue commissioner shall publish, on855
the website created pursuant to paragraph (3) of subsection (c) of Code Section 48-8-245,856
a simple, nontechnical report which shows for each project in the investment list approved857
by the director the original estimated cost, the current estimated cost if it is not the original858
estimated cost, amounts expended in prior years, and amounts expended in the current year859
with respect to each such project.  The report shall also include a statement of what860
corrective action the commissioner of transportation and the executive director of the861
Georgia Regional Transportation Authority intend to implement with respect to each862
project which is underfunded or behind schedule and a statement of any surplus funds863
which have not been expended for a project.864
48-8-251.865
(a)  There is created a Citizens Review Panel for each special district in which voters866
approved the levy of the special district sales and use tax to be composed of three citizen867
members appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and two citizen868
members appointed by the Lieutenant Governor.  Each member must be a resident of the869
special district of which Citizens Review Panel they are appointed to serve.870
(b)  In the event that any vacancy for any cause shall occur in the membership of the871
committee, such vacancy shall be filled by an appointment made by the official authorized872
by law to make such appointment within 45 days of the occurrence of such vacancy.873
(c)  The panel shall, by majority vote of those members present and voting, elect from their874





(d)  The panel shall meet in regular session at least three days each year either at the state876
capitol in Atlanta or at such other meeting place within the state and may have such other877
additional meetings as may be called by the chairperson or by a majority of the members878
of the panel upon reasonable written notice to all members of the panel.  Further, the879
chairperson of the panel is authorized from time to time to call meetings of subcommittees880
of the panel which are established by panel policy at places inside or outside the state881
when, in the opinion of the chairperson, the meetings of the subcommittee are needed to882
attend properly to the panel's business.  A majority of the panel shall constitute a quorum883
for the transaction of all business.  Any power of the panel may be exercised by a majority884
vote of those members present at any meeting at which there is a quorum.885
(e)  Members shall receive for each day of actual attendance at meetings of the panel and886
the subcommittee meetings the per diem and transportation costs prescribed in Code887
Section 45-7-21, and a like sum shall be paid for each day actually spent in studying the888
transportation needs of the state or attending other functions as a representative of the889
panel, not to exceed ten days in any calendar year, but no member shall receive such per890
diem for any day for which such member receives any other per diem pursuant to such891
Code section.  In addition, members shall receive actual transportation costs while traveling892
by public carrier or the legal mileage rate for the use of a personal automobile in893
connection with such attendance and study.  Such per diem and expense shall be paid from894
the funds of the special district's revenues from the special district sales and use tax upon895
presentation, by members of the panel, of vouchers approved by the chairperson.896
(f)  The panel shall be charged with review of the administration of the projects and897
programs included on the approved investment list.  The panel may make such898
recommendations to and require such reports from the Department of Transportation, the899
Georgia Regional Transportation Authority, any other agency or instrumentality of the900
state, any political subdivision of the state, and any agency or instrumentality of such901
political subdivisions as it may deem appropriate and necessary from time to time in the902
interest of the region.903
(g)  Upon the completion of a project on the investment list, the panel shall annually review904
the specific public benefits identified in the investment list to ascertain the degree to which905
such benefits have been attained.  This benefit review report shall be delivered to the906
director and the state revenue commissioner and shall be published on the website created907
pursuant to paragraph (3) of subsection (c) of Code Section 48-8-245.908
(h)  Beginning January 1, 2013, and annually thereafter, the panel shall provide a report to909
the General Assembly of its actions during the previous year.  The report shall be available910
for public inspection on the website created pursuant to paragraph (3) of subsection (c) of911





progress on each project on the investment list for the region, including the amount of913
funds spent on each project.914
48-8-252.915
Where a special district transportation sales and use tax under this article has been paid916
with respect to tangible personal property by the purchaser either in another special district917
within the state or in a tax jurisdiction outside the state, the tax may be credited against the918
tax authorized to be imposed by this article upon the same property.  If the amount of sales919
or use tax so paid is less than the amount of the use tax due under this article, the purchaser920
shall pay an amount equal to the difference between the amount paid in the other tax921
jurisdiction and the amount due under this article.  The state revenue commissioner may922
require such proof of payment in another local tax jurisdiction as he or she deems necessary923
and proper.  No credit shall be granted, however, against the tax imposed under this article924
for tax paid in another jurisdiction if the tax paid in such other jurisdiction is used to obtain925
a credit against any other sales and use tax levied in the special district.926
48-8-253.927
No tax provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the sale of tangible personal928
property which is ordered by and delivered to the purchaser at a point outside the929
geographical area of the special district in which the tax is imposed regardless of the point930
at which title passes, if the delivery is made by the seller's vehicle, United States mail, or931
common carrier or by private or contract carrier licensed by the Surface Transportation932
Board or the Georgia Public Service Commission.933
48-8-254.934
(a)  As used in this Code section, the term 'building and construction materials' means all935
building and construction materials, supplies, fixtures, or equipment, any combination of936
such items, and any other leased or purchased articles when the materials, supplies,937
fixtures, equipment, or articles are to be utilized or consumed during construction or are938
to be incorporated into construction work pursuant to a bona fide written construction939
contract.940
(b)  No tax provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the sale or use of building and941
construction materials when the contract pursuant to which the materials are purchased or942
used was advertised for bid prior to the voters' approval of the levy of the tax and the943
contract was entered into as a result of a bid actually submitted in response to the944






Subject to the approval of the House and Senate Transportation Committees, the state947
revenue commissioner shall have the power and authority to promulgate such rules and948
regulations as shall be necessary for the effective and efficient administration and949
enforcement of the collection of the special district transportation sales and use tax950
authorized by this article.951
48-8-256.952
The tax authorized by this article shall not be subject to any allocation or balancing of state953
and federal funds provided for by general law, nor may such proceeds be considered or954
taken into account in any such allocation or balancing."955
SECTION 7.956
Title 50 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to state government, is amended957
by adding a new Code section as follows:958
"50-32-5.959
(a)  The State of Georgia, particularly the metropolitan Atlanta region, faces a number of960
critical issues relating to its transportation system and ever-increasing traffic congestion.961
In light of the dwindling resources available to help solve the problems, it is imperative that962
all available resources be used to maximum efficiency in order to alleviate the gridlock in963
and around the metropolitan Atlanta region.  There exists a need for a thorough964
examination of our current transportation system and the methodical development of965
legislative proposals for a regional transit governing authority in Georgia.966
(b)  In order to find practical, workable solutions to these problems, there is created the967
Transit Governance Study Commission to be composed of: four Senators from the Atlanta968
Regional Commission area to be appointed by the Lieutenant Governor, four969
Representatives from the Atlanta Regional Commission area to be appointed by the970
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the chairperson of the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid971
Transit Oversight Committee, the chairperson of the Atlanta Regional Commission, the972
chairperson of the Regional Transit Committee of the Atlanta Regional Commission, one973
staff member from the Atlanta Regional Commission to be selected by the chairperson of974
the Atlanta Regional Commission, the executive director of the Georgia Regional975
Transportation Authority, the general manager of the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit976
Authority, and the directors of any other county transit systems operating in the Atlanta977
Regional Commission area.978
(c)  The commission shall elect, by a majority vote, one of its legislative members to serve979





appropriate.  The commission shall meet at least quarterly at the call of the chairperson.981
The commission may conduct such meetings and hearings at such places and at such times982
as it may deem necessary or convenient to enable it to exercise fully and effectively its983
powers, perform its duties, and accomplish its objectives and purposes as contained in this984
Code section.985
(d)  All officers and agencies of the three branches of state government are directed to986
provide all appropriate information and assistance as requested by the commission.987
(e)  The commission shall undertake a study of the issues described in this Code section988
and recommend specific legislation which the commission deems necessary or appropriate.989
Specifically, the commission shall prepare a preliminary report on the feasibility of990
combining all of the regional public transportation entities into an integrated regional991
transit body.  This preliminary report shall be completed on or before December 31, 2010,992
and be delivered to the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, and the Speaker of the House993
of Representatives.  The commission shall make a final report of its findings and994
recommendations, with specific language for proposed legislation, if any, on or before995
August 1, 2011, to the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, and the Speaker of the House996
of Representatives.  The commission shall stand abolished on August 1, 2011, unless997
extended by subsequent Act of the General Assembly.998
(f)  The Atlanta Regional Commission in conjunction with the Georgia Regional999
Transportation Authority and the department's director of planning shall utilize federal and1000
state planning funds to continue the development of the Atlanta region's Concept 3 transit1001
proposal, including assessment of potential economic benefit to the region and the state,1002
prioritization of corridors based on highest potential economic benefit and lowest1003
environmental impact, and completion of environmental permitting.  Any new transit1004
management instrumentality created as a result of the Transit Governance Study1005
Commission created pursuant to this Code section shall participate in the Concept 31006
development activities that remain incomplete at the time of the creation of the new1007
regional transit body."1008
SECTION 8.1009
This Act shall become effective upon its approval by the Governor or upon its becoming law1010
without such approval, except that Part 2 of Article 5 of Chapter 8 of Title 48 as set forth in1011
Section 6 of this Act shall become effective January 1, 2011.1012
SECTION 9.1013
All laws and parts of laws in conflict with this Act are repealed.1014
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Appendix C
DRAFT AND FINAL CRITERIA
The timeline for the Atlanta region, the draft criteria for the 11 regions and the Atlanta
region, the responses to comments submitted on the Atlanta region criteria, and the approved
criteria for the Atlanta region are included on the following pages.
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Stage:
Step: 1 2 3 4 5
Date:
Upon approval of 
Statewide Strategic 
Transportation Plan 
(by the Governor & State 
Transportation Board) **
September 30, 2010 November 10, 2010 November 15, 2010




GDOT Director of Planning
Local governments, MPOs, & 
General Assembly Members
Local governments GDOT Director of Planning
Meeting #1 
of the Regional 
Transportation 
Roundtable
Activity: Provides local gov'ts & MPOs 
with district draft investment 
criteria 
(derived from the Statewide 
Strategic Transportation 
Plan**)
Submit comments on the 
criteria to the Director of 
Planning
Submit names of 




investment criteria for each 
district
1. May amend investment 
criteria for its district
2. Considers and approves 
investment criteria
3. Select members of its 
Executive Committee
Stage:
Step: 6 7 8 9 10
Date:
Expected to occur 
Spring/Summer 2011
Expected to occur 
Spring/Summer 2011
by August 15, 2011
At least 2 weeks prior to 
Final Roundtable meeting




Local governments & MPOs GDOT Director of Planning
Roundtable's Executive 
Committee
Local governments, MPOs, & 
General Assembly Members
Meeting #2 
of the Regional 
Transportation 
Roundtable
Activity: Submit project requests to 
the Director of Planning 
(after receiving comments 
from members of the 
General Assembly within 
the special district)
1. Uses districts' 
investment criteria and 
local project requests to 
create list of example 
investments ("long list")




1. Creates the district's 
draft investment list (must 
be chosen from the list of 
example investments) , 
including a statement of 
public benefits of each 
project
2. Sends draft list to MPOs 
and local officials
1. Submit comments on 
the Executive Committee's 
draft investment list
2. Hold at least 2 public 
meetings in the region 
(completed prior to final 
Rountable meeting)
A. Approves or amends 
Executive Committee's  draft 
investment list
B. Does not approve an 
investment list for its region's 
voters to consider, then 
regional "gridlock" is declared 
and no investment list is sent 
to the ballot in that region
Transportation Investment Act of 2010: Attachment B
Timeline for Creation of Invesment Critieria and Lists
LC 34 2763ERS - As Passed Version (see Section 6 of the legislation for more detailed information)
STAGE 1: Setting Districts' Investment Criteria * in O.C.G.A. 48-8-243 (a)








Region's local governments' 
match for GDOT grants is 
30%
Region's citizens vote
Region's voters Approve 
Transportation Sales Tax
Region's voters reject 
Transportation Sales Tax
Region's local governments' 
match for GDOT grants is 
10%
Revenues collected for 10 
years and are held in each 
Region's trust fund at GSFIC
Region enters 
24-month waiting period 
before voters can reconsider 
tax levy
GDOT constructs and 
operates voter-approved 
investment projects
GRTA constructs and 
operates voter-approved only 
transit investment projects 









  * Criteria is specified as transportation network performance goals, allocation of investments to programs that can deliver the performance goals, and execution of projects.
** The Statewide Strategic Transportation Plan is based on the state’s transportation investment policies in Georgia law and and includes multiple economic development goals such as 
      growth in private sector employment, reliable commutes, and freight movement efficiencies.  The Strategic Plan is currently in final as of April 10, 2010, and was approved by the 
      Governor on June 2, 2010 when HB 277 was signed into law.  The State Transportation Board subsequently approved the Strategic Plan at the June Board meeting. 
STAGE 3: Regional Participation and Vote in O.C.G.A. 48-8-244
A. Regional Transportation Roundtable 
approves 
an investment list
B. Regional Transportation Roundtable 
does not approve investment list
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Attachment C 
Draft Criteria for Special Tax Districts outside of Atlanta Region 
(Note:  At this time, the draft criteria are the same for all 11 districts outside of Atlanta.  We expect some variation as the process continues) 
 
Recommended Criteria for the Development of an Investment List of Projects and Program 




Outcomes - The following desired outcomes drove the development of the draft investment criteria: 
 Strategic use of funds to achieve the best value for taxpayers' dollars and improvement of the region’s 
transportation network. 
 Transportation projects delivered on time and on budget. 
 Public support for projects funded by the regional sales tax and public trust that state and local 
governments will deliver on their promises. 
 
Guiding Principles - The following principles guided the development of the draft investment criteria: 
 Investment list is developed with a focus on deliverability.  
 Projects are from existing plans and/or studies (for example, the GDOT work program, MPO long 
range plan and short range program,  county transportation studies, etc.). 
 Investment list is consistent with the policies of the Statewide Strategic Transportation Plan and the 
MPO’s plan if applicable. 
 Investment list encourages effective multimodal solutions that appeal to a broad spectrum of the 
region’s citizens. 
 
Framework for Investment Criteria 
 
The final investment list of projects to be funded by the Transportation Investment Act’s (TIA) regional 
transportation sales tax referendum will be developed by first setting investment allocation target ranges 
for each program area (see #1 on page 2 ) based on the Statewide Strategic Transportation Plan (SSTP) 
and the MPO long range plan, if applicable. These will be used to align the Unconstrained Example 
Investment List (UEIL) with performance goals for each program area within the revenue expected to be 
available.  Next, projects being considered for support by the TIA revenue will be evaluated using 
qualitative screening criteria (see #on page 2) designed to allow further consideration of projects that 
align with the SSTP and MPO plans(if applicable) and can be delivered within the timeframe of the 
regional sales tax.   
 
The Transportation Investment Act also requires that the criteria include performance goals and that 
projects on the investment list include a “statement of expected public benefits.”  Performance goals and 
public benefits analysis are inter-related and become one of the many tools to assist the Director of 
Planning to formulate the Unconstrained Example Investment List.  The performance goals and public 
benefits will be provided along with the Unconstrained Example Investment List at a later date. The kind 
of metrics that will be used to determine the public benefit will come from the SSTP and MPO plans, if 
applicable.  Ultimately, they are intended to assist the Roundtable in selecting the best projects and to 
allow the region’s citizens a solid evaluation of the use of their sales tax dollars.    
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Draft Criteria for Special Tax Districts outside of Atlanta Region 
 
1. Draft Investment Allocation Target Ranges 
 
a. Minimum and maximum investment goals (for the 10-year period) for program areas will 
support implementation of the Statewide Strategic Transportation Plan and MPO plan, if 
applicable. 
 
b. Program areas and allocation ranges: 
 
Program Areas Target Ranges 
Roadway Capital 50-70% 
Transit Capital 0-10% 
Transit Operations and Maintenance 0-10% 
Safety 15-30% 
Traffic Operations 0-20% 
Non-motorized (Bike/Pedestrian) 0-5% 
Freight and Logistics 2-10% 
Aviation 0-5% 
Roadway and Bridge Maintenance(Asset Management)              0-5% 
 
2. Draft Screening Criteria by Program Area 
 
a. Roadway Capital  
i. The projects that qualify under “roadway capital” serve origins or destinations of 
trips to/from employment and activity centers throughout the region.  These 
projects could be roadway widenings, interchanges, interstate improvements, 
economic development corridors, etc. 
ii. Emphasis will be on the construction phase, but projects can be included in the 
Unconstrained Example Investment List which are able to demonstrate 
assurances of deliverability of any funded phase within the 10 year sales tax 
period, including preliminary engineering, environmental reviews, and right-of-
way. 
iii. The Director of Planning recommends prioritization of the project selection as 
follows: (Tiers reflect the level of certainty in deliverability) 
a) Tier One – Projects that have construction phases which can begin within six 
years of the start of the regional sales tax. 
b) Tier Two – Projects which have an approved concept report with no other 
work completed. 
c) Tier Three – Projects recommended and endorsed by the local governments, 
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b. Transit Capital 
i. Generally, projects included in the investment list should have shown 
considerable progress to assure deliverability within the 10 year sales tax period. 
Emphasis will be placed on the construction phase or acquisition of capital 
equipment. 
ii. Transit capital projects should have a contingency plan to operate or liquidate 
assets if future operating funds are based on a renewal of HB 277. 
iii. Transit service for the proposed project should ultimately connect to employment 
centers or activity centers in the region and provide increased mobility for 
individuals.   
iv. Capital expenditures may include new, systematic replacement, upgrades, 
refurbishment, etc 
 
c. Transit Operations and Maintenance 
i. Any funding must first serve to enhance the existing local or regional transit 
systems in operation as of January 1, 2011.  After the existing systems are 
brought up to a state of good repair, operations and maintenance funding from 




i. Projects which align with the key emphasis areas of the Governor’s Strategic 
Highway Safety Plan (SHSP.) 
ii. Priority is given to projects that correct or improve a road location or feature with 
high potential for safety improvement, or addresses a specific highway safety 
deficiency.  The objective of each project is to reduce fatalities and serious 
injuries. 
iii. Projects may include intersection improvements to address safety concerns, 
shoulder widening, pedestrian/bicycle safety improvements, projects that 
eliminate hazards at rail-roadway crossings, traffic calming measures, installation 
of guardrails, crash attenuators, traffic signals, signage, and pavement marking 
improvement projects, etc. 
e. Traffic Operations and High Tech Traffic Solutions 
i. Projects which improve or enhance the region’s intelligent transportation system 
network, incident management program, or signal coordination and timing where 
applicable. 
ii. Projects address an existing operational issue resulting in an improved level of 
service or reduction in delay or other congestion costs. 
f. Non-motorized 
i. Projects which are identified in a Bike/Ped Plan. 
ii. Projects which provide connectivity to a regional employment or activity center. 
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iii. Projects which provide connection to existing or planned transit including bus 
stops and multi-modal centers. (Note: Off-roadway paths/streetscapes, etc. 
should be pursued using the 25% discretionary share.) 
g. Freight and Logistics 
i. Projects which address the demand for goods movement into, out of, and within 
the state as identified through the Statewide Freight and Logistics Study 
(ongoing). 
ii. Projects which enhance the flow of freight transported by trucks and/or rail. 
iii. Projects which facilitate the transfer of freight between modes. In particular, 
projects that improve the flow of freight into/out of Georgia’s existing ports. 
h. Aviation 
i. Projects at new or existing non-commercial service airports which are contained 
in the airport's 5-year Airport Capital Improvement Program submitted annually 
to the GA DOT and FAA. The types of projects included in this area are 
runways, taxiways, aprons, and navigational aids. 
ii. Projects which are consistent with the goals and objectives of Georgia's 
Statewide Aviation System Plan. 
i. Roadway and Bridge Maintenance (asset management) 
 
i. Priority for resurfacing/rehabilitation needs is on state routes or routes that are 
considered regionally significant as defined by roads that connect regional 
employment centers.  Priority will be based on PACES and bridge ratings 
provided by GDOT.  (Note:  Off-system resurfacing should be pursued using the 
25% discretionary share.)  
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REGIONAL CRITERIA FOR THE  
ATLANTA 10-COUNTY SPECIAL TAX DISTRICT 
 
 
 These Regional Criteria for development of an investment list of projects and programs were 
developed based on the Final Recommended Criteria from the GDOT Director of Planning, 
11/8/10, and refined by Roundtable Members during recent Conference Calls.  Content changes 
are underscored. 




Framework for the Atlanta Region Investment Criteria 
 
Definitions: 
 Unconstrained Example Investment List – an example list of projects that comport with approved 
criteria developed by the Director of Planning; list does not have to be fiscally constrained. 
 Constrained Draft Investment List – developed from the Unconstrained Example Investment List by 
the Roundtable’s Executive Committee in collaboration with the Director of Planning; list is fiscally 
constrained by the projected revenue of a 10-year sales tax. 
 Constrained Final investment List – developed from the Constrained Draft Investment List (and 
amended with projects from the Unconstrained Example Investment List, if needed) by the 
Roundtable and approved; list is fiscally constrained by the projected revenue of a 10-year sales tax 
and deliverable within the 10 year timeframe. 
 Discretionary Funds- 15% of all revenue collected by the sales tax will be redistributed to the counties 
and cities within the region using the LARP factor (a combination of population and lane miles).  Each 
jurisdiction will determine how to spend these dollars.  Projects are not subject to the criteria or the 
Roundtable’s approval.  However, these projects will play an important role in the public’s approval 
of a regional sales tax. 
 
Process: 
 After the criteria are approved by the Roundtable, the Director of Planning, in collaboration with ARC 
and local jurisdictions, will develop the Unconstrained Example Investment List by evaluating the 
extent to which submitted projects satisfy the approved screening criteria.   
 Projects that meet the criteria, align with the SSTP and PLAN 2040, area currently listed I an approved 
plan and can be delivered within the timeframe of the regional sales tax will be eligible for inclusion 
on the Unconstrained Example Investment List. 
 Next, the Director of Planning will determine the specific public benefits to be expected upon the 
completion of each project on the Unconstrained Example Investment List and asses how each 
project furthers the goals of the Atlanta region’s investment criteria.  A number of performance 
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measures will be used to evaluate each project’s contribution.  Metrics from the Statewide Strategic 
Transportation Plan and Plan 2040 will be used to determine the public benefit for each project.  The 
performance measures and public benefits will be provided along with the Unconstrained Example 
Investment List to the Roundtable and the Executive Committee.  These are intended to assist the 
Executive Committee and the Roundtable in selecting the best projects and provide the region’s 
citizens a solid evaluation of the use of their sales tax dollars. 
 The Executive Committee in collaboration with the Director of Planning will use all this information 
and extensive public feedback to create the Constrained Draft Investment List from the 
Unconstrained Example Investment List (due to the Roundtable no later than August 15, 2011).  The 
law only requires two public hearings, but it is the intention of the Atlanta Roundtable to do 
extensive public outreach including polling and public forums throughout this process. 
 The Roundtable may also use this information to amend the Constrained Draft Investment List with 
projects from the Unconstrained Example Investment List to create the Final Investment List 
(Roundtable must approve by October 15, 2011).   
 Finally, if the regional sales tax referendum is approved by the voters of a special district, the Director 
of Planning will track and report on the funding, execution, and performance of the projects in the 
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Final Recommended Criteria for the Atlanta 10-County Special Tax District 
 
 
I.  The project list should support the performance goals of the Statewide Strategic Transportation 
Plan: 
 Support Georgia’s economic growth and competitiveness.  
 Ensure safety and security.  
 Maximize the value of Georgia’s assets, getting the most out of the existing network. 
 Minimize the impact on the environment.  
 
 
II.  The project list should achieve the following outcomes:  
 Achieve the best value for taxpayers' dollars and improve the region’s transportation network.  
 Transportation projects1 delivered on time and on budget.  
 Public support for projects funded by the regional sales tax and public trust that state and local 
governments will deliver on their promises.  
 Investments should improve regional mobility. 
 
 
III.  The project list development should be guided by the following principles: 
 Investment list is developed with a focus on deliverability.  
 Projects should come from existing plans and/or studies (for example, the GDOT work program, 
ARC long range plan and short range program, ARC Congestion Management Process, county 
transportation studies, etc.).  
 Investment list is consistent with the policies of the SSTP and policies of the Atlanta Region’s 
PLAN 2040.  
 Investment list encourages effective multimodal solutions that appeal to a broad spectrum of the 
region’s citizens and address the region’s rapidly growing older adult population. 
                                                          
1
 “Project” means, without limitation, any new or existing airports, bike lanes, bridges, bus and rail mass transit systems, 
freight and passenger rail, pedestrian facilities, ports, roads, terminals, and all activities and structures useful and incident to 
providing, operating, and maintaining the same. The term shall also include direct appropriations to a local government for 
the purpose of serving as a local match for state or federal funding. 
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 The project list should demonstrate regional equity in order to ensure it attracts the support of 
voters from the entire region.  Regional equity will be measured by the outcomes of specific 
projects not the dollar amounts spent on projects in specific jurisdictions. 
 Both the unconstrained and final list of projects may include “packaged projects” that address 
connectivity issues for the regional transportation network.  These projects can include, but are 
not limited to, last mile connectivity, bicycle, pedestrian safety and capital resurfacing and 
rehabilitation projects.  
 
 The criteria are designed to create a list of projects that have public support, can be delivered, 
and produce results for the citizens.  The criteria are intended to be interpreted with enough 
flexibly to achieve these objectives and to create an overall list that is supported by the 
roundtable and the citizens of the region. 
 
 
IV.  Projects will be evaluated by the following criteria: 
 
a.  Applicable to All Program Areas 
 
i. Emphasis will be on the construction phase or acquisition of capital equipment; however 
project phases other than construction can be included in the Unconstrained Example 
Investment List.  Preference will be given for preliminary engineering, right-of-way, and 
environmental reviews which ultimately deliver a construction project within the 10-year 
sales tax period. 
 
ii. Each project phase included in the investment list, and each phase necessary to complete the 
same, regardless of funding source, must demonstrate full funding.  For projects with 
preliminary engineering and/or right-of-way funded by Transportation Investment Act 
revenue, construction funds must be shown in the Atlanta region’s long range transportation 
plan adopted by ARC.   
 
iii. Emphasis will be on delivery.  All project phases funded with Transportation Investment Act 
revenue should be able to be completed or underway within ten years.  The Director of 
Planning recommends that approximately 40% of the total expected Transportation 
Investment Act funding should be allocated to project phases that could be completed or 
underway within six years of the start of the regional sales tax, and the remaining funds 
should be allocated to projects that could be completed or underway within ten years of the 
start of the regional sales tax.  (Excludes 15% discretionary local share to be distributed by 
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b. Roadway Capital  
 
The projects that qualify under “roadway capital” serve origins or destinations of trips to/from 
and within major existing and proposed employment and activity centers throughout the region.2  
Qualified roadway capital projects should improve the most congested regional corridors as 
determined through ARC’s Congestion Management Process, Regional Strategic Transportation 
System and Regional Thoroughfare Network.  These projects could be new roads, roadway 
widenings, interchanges, interstate improvements, bridges, etc. 
 
c.  Roadway and Bridge Maintenance (asset management)  
 
i. Priority for resurfacing/rehabilitation needs are for facilities on the Regional Strategic 
Transportation System developed by the ARC, with emphasis on connecting major regional 
employment or activity centers. Priority will be based on risk and on PACES ratings provided 
by GDOT.  (Note: Off-system resurfacing should be pursued using the 15% discretionary 
share.)  
 
ii. Bridge maintenance and replacement shall be determined based on ratings provided by 
GDOT. 
 
d.  Safety and Traffic Operations 
i. Safety 
a) Projects that align with the key emphasis areas of the Governor’s Strategic Highway Safety 
Plan (SHSP). 
b) Priority is given to projects that correct or improve a road location or feature with high 
potential for safety improvement, or addresses a specific highway safety deficiency.  The 
objective of each project must be to reduce fatalities and serious injuries.  
c) Projects may include intersection improvements to address safety concerns, shoulder 
widenings, pedestrian/bicycle safety improvements, hazard eliminations at rail-roadway 
crossings, traffic calming measures, installation of guardrails, crash attenuators, traffic 
signal upgrades, signage, and pavement marking improvement projects, etc.  
ii. Traffic Operations 
a) Projects that improve or enhance the region’s intelligent transportation system network, 
incident management program, or signal coordination and timing.  
b) Projects addressing an existing operational issue resulting in an improved level of service 
or reduction in delay or other congestion costs. 
 
                                                          
2
 Major regional employment and activity centers are Region Centers and Regional Town Centers as defined in ARC’s PLAN 
2040 Regional Development Guide. 
201
Adopted by the Atlanta Roundtable, 12/17/10 
 
 
Regional Criteria for the Atlanta Special Tax District Page 6 
 
e.  Freight and Logistics  
i. Projects that address the demand for goods movement into, out of, and within the state as 
identified through the Statewide Freight and Logistics Study (ongoing), the Atlanta Regional 
Freight Mobility Plan and the Atlanta Strategic Truck Route Master Plan adopted by the ARC.  
ii. Projects that enhance the flow of freight transported by trucks and/or rail.  
iii. Projects that facilitate the transfer of freight between modes. 
 
f.  Aviation  
i. Projects at new or existing airports that are contained in the airport's 5-year Airport Capital 
Improvement Program submitted annually to GDOT and FAA.  The types of projects included 
in this area are runways, taxiways, aprons, and navigational aids.  
ii. Projects consistent with the goals and objectives of Georgia's Statewide Aviation System Plan.  
 
g.  Bicycle and Pedestrian  
i. Projects consistent with the Atlanta Region’s Bicycle and Pedestrian Plan.  
ii. Projects that provide connectivity to/from or within a major regional employment or activity 
center.  
iii. Projects that provide connection to/from existing or planned transit including bus stops and 
multi-modal centers.  
(Note: Projects such as landscaping and recreational paths should be pursued using the 15% 
discretionary share.)  
 
h.  Transit3 Capital  
i. To comply with the Transportation Investment Act Section 7, the highest consideration will be 
given to the projects that are most highly prioritized by ARC (in conjunction with the Director 
of Planning and GRTA) per economic benefit, lowest environmental impact, and completion 
of environmental permitting (O.C.G.A. 50-32-5 (f)).  Capital expenditures may include new, 
systematic replacement, upgrades, refurbishment, and other capital project expenditures. 
ii. New fixed guideway facilities should also include a 20-year operating plan.  Funds for the 
operations may come from any identified source including Transportation Investment Act 
transit operation funds and its authorized reserves under O.C.G.A. 48-8-241(c). 
iii. Transit projects should be part of an existing system or have independent utility.  
                                                          
3
 Transit means any new or existing bus and rail mass transit systems, passenger rail, and all activities and structures useful 
and incident to providing, operating, and maintaining the same. 
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iv. Transit service for the proposed project should satisfy at least two of following: 
a) cross a county border; 
b) directly serve a major regional employment or activity center;  
c) carry a forecasted average 4,000 weekday boardings upon opening; and/or 
d) connect to an existing or under construction fixed guideway facility as defined by FTA. 
v. Transit projects should serve areas with land use ordinances that enable increased 
development densities around stops and stations.  
 
i.  Transit Operations and Maintenance  
Any funding must first preserve the existing regional transit service.  After the existing service is 
addressed, operations and maintenance funding from the regional sales tax would then be allocated to 
new transit projects.  Existing regional service is defined as the transit service in operation in the Atlanta 
Region as of January 1, 2011 (consistent with the Transportation Investment Act or any amendments) 
that satisfies at least two of following: (1) crosses a county border; (2) directly serves a major regional 
employment or activity center; (3) carries an average of 4,000 weekday boardings; and/or (4) connects 
to an existing or under construction fixed guideway facility as defined by FTA. 
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APPENDIX A:  Illustrative Investment Guidelines 
 
The table below serves only as a guide as to how investments can be allocated to meet the goals of 





Illustrative Estimate Over 10 
Years Based on Draft Economic 
Projections4, ($) 
Roadway Capital   20% - 50%  $1.5 - $3.7 Billion 
Roadway & Bridge Maintenance 
(Asset Management)  
 0% - 10%  $0  - $740 Million 
Safety and Traffic Operations  5% - 15%      $37 Million - $1.1 Billion 
Freight & Logistics   0% - 5%   $0 - $370 Million 
Aviation   0% - 5%   $0 - $370 Million 
Bicycle and Pedestrian   1% - 5%  $74 - $370 Million 
Transit Capital   10% - 40%  $74 Million - $3.0 Billion 
Transit Operations & Maintenance   5% - 20%  $37 Million - $1.5 Billion 
 
                                                          
4
 These numbers may change based on the final projections to be provided by the State Economist.  
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All projects from the long-range regional transportation plan, 
transportation improvement program, statewide transportation 
improvement program, and the Atlanta region’s transit vision, Concept 
3, should be eligible and should be included on the example 
investment list. 
 
The criteria should explicitly include a call by the Planning Director for 
the submission to the regional round table, as part of the 
Unconstrained Example Investment List, all projects on existing 
transportation plans and all projects submitted by MPOs, regional 
commissions and local governments in each region. 
There is a balance between deliverability, strategy, and support. The 
Transportation Investment Act is expected to generate less revenue 
than the total cost of all projects in such plans and programs over the 
10 years.  The criteria help ensure the limited funds will be invested in 
strategic projects that have popular support and can be delivered 
within the 10-year time frame of the regional sales tax. 
 
While there will be no formal call for projects, local governments and 
MPOs will have an opportunity to identify their priorities. 
Projects that are not from existing plans or studies but that have public 
support or local government council or board approval should be 
eligible and should be included on the example investment list. 
Limiting projects to those from existing plans or studies indicates a 
level of prior public scrutiny and support.  Such projects are more likely 
to be strategic, supported, and deliverable. 
Add livability to the guiding principles. Livability principles are embedded in the Statewide Strategic 
Transportation Plan and ARC’s Plan 2040. Therefore, there will be 
projects on the list that include livability aspects. 
Use the five Plan 2040 objectives ARC has adopted to guide the 
development of a regional goal and subsequent performance goals. 
As stated in the guiding principles, the investment list will be 
consistent with the policies of the Statewide Strategic Transportation 
Plan and Plan 2040 in the Atlanta Special Tax District.   
Add "Maximizing the value of Georgia's existing transportation assets” 
as a guiding principle. 
The performance goals have been identified as the four strategic goals 
set by the Statewide Strategic Transportation Plan, which include 
"Maximizing the value of Georgia's existing transportation assets.” 
Regional equity should be a factor in determining the project list. Regional equity is a key provision of the Transportation Investment 
Act.  Each county has equal representation (i.e., the county 
commission chair and one mayor from a city within the county) and 
equal votes on its special district’s Regional Transportation 
Roundtable.  (An exception is made for a county that has more than 90 
percent of its population residing in cities.  Such a county will have one 
additional representative.)  The Roundtable approves the Final 
Investment List by majority vote. 
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Investment Criteria Framework 
COMMENTS RESPONSES 
The revised Draft Criteria due November 15th should include the 
performance goals called for in the Transportation Investment Act. 
The performance goals as adopted in the Statewide Strategic 
Transportation Plan are included in the final recommended criteria.   
Performance metrics and public benefit analysis should be made 
available for public comment at same time as allocation ranges and 
qualitative screening criteria. 
Performance measures and expected public benefits will be provided 
along with the Unconstrained Example Investment List. 
 
There is a need to preserve the roundtable's flexibility (e.g., by 
removing priority tiers). 
Criteria are required by the Transportation Investment Act, are 
designed to frame the discussion, and should address deliverability, 
strategy, and support while retaining flexibility. 
Will analysis of performance goals and public benefit be prepared by 
GDOT alone, or will the Roundtable have input into this as well? 
The Transportation Investment Act requires the Planning Director to 
provide the expected public benefits along with the Draft Constrained 
Investment List.  The Planning Director may solicit input from the 
Roundtable at his discretion. 
A revised framework for the investment criteria should start with (1) 
evaluating project performance, (2) then establishing project mix 
(program allocation), and (3) finally checking deliverability. 
This has already been done.  The Statewide Strategic Transportation 
Plan evaluated a number of programs (e.g., arterial capacity projects, 
HOT lanes, employment center transit circulators) as well as a number 
of program “portfolios” (e.g., mostly transit, mostly roads, a mix of 
roads and transit) to determine which would perform best at various 
levels of funding.  The best performing portfolio was used as the 










Allocation Target Ranges 
COMMENTS RESPONSES 
We received many comments on the draft investment allocation target 
ranges: 
 The ranges are too restrictive and should be eliminated; 
 The ranges are too broad; 
 Increase the minimum range level above zero to ensure 
funding for each program; 
 Combine programs; 
 "Special tax district funds should be prioritized to offset 
funding limitations in other areas” by funding the transit, 
safety, non-motorized, etc. as much as possible; 
 Consider allocation ranges based upon expected benefits of 
programs 
 Roadway Capital should have the highest percentage; 
 Reduce Roadway Capital funding; 
 Increase Transit Capital funding; 
 Reduce Transit Capital funding; 
 Increase Transit O&M funding; 
 Increase Safety funding; 
 Decrease Safety funding; 
 Increase Traffic Operations funding; 
 Eliminate Non-Motorized funding; 
 Increase Freight & Logistics funding; 
 Increase Aviation funding; 
 Increase Roadway and Bridge Maintenance funding. 
The draft investment criteria are designed to help the roundtables 
select projects for the Transportation Investment Act funding that can 
be delivered on time and that advance the state's and district’s 
strategic transportation goals.  The Transportation Investment Act 
requires that the Planning Director propose criteria based on 
performance, allocation, and execution. 
  
The intention of the criteria is to assist the roundtable in carrying on a 
discussion that is, in part, strategic and outcomes oriented.  The 
roundtable members will have a good feel for the important projects 
in their respective jurisdictions.  Investment allocation target ranges 
help begin the discussion of how much is appropriate to spend on the 
various transportation programs (e.g., new roadway capacity, new 
transit capacity, safety) to produce results throughout the region.  The 
investment allocation target ranges highlight the tradeoffs associated 
with spending more or less in one program compared to the other 
programs.  These allocation target ranges should be used in the 
development of the constrained Final Investment Lists from the Draft 
Unconstrained Investment Lists.  (The allocation target ranges were 
not intended to be used to develop the Draft Unconstrained 
Investment Lists.)   
 
The draft target ranges were based initially on the Statewide Strategic 
Transportation Plan, but constrained by other factors such as 
deliverability, availability of other fund sources, etc.  They are generally 
quite broad, in recognition of the fact that the roundtables will have 
many factors to consider when developing the investment lists.  They 
are meant to serve as a starting point for discussion and consideration 
by the roundtables.   
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Add Agricultural Commerce to Freight & Logistics. This type of amendment may be worthwhile in several special districts. 
Every special district of the state has its own unique set of needs, and 
it may be a topic for discussion by the regional roundtables. We 
believe the Roadway Capital and Freight and Logistics program areas 
could suffice for projects related to agricultural commerce. 
Passenger rail should be a program, even if it cannot be built in the 10 
years. The sales tax could still pay for preliminary engineering , etc. 
Engineering and construction for passenger rail could be eligible in the 
Transit Capital program. 
Need a program focused on natural disasters, acts of god, 
emergencies. 
A detailed project list must be developed on which the public will vote.  
It is unclear how projects focused on natural disasters, acts of god, and 
emergencies could be specified before such events occur, and “lump 
sum” funds reserved for projects to be identified after the vote are not 
allowed. 
Change Non-Motorized to “Complete Streets” or Bicycle and 
Pedestrian. 
The term “Complete Streets” is still relatively new and has not made its 
way into common everyday language among the general public. Rather 
than using this term, the program title has been changed to Bicycle 
and Pedestrian. The purpose of this change is to clarify to the voting 
public the types of projects included in this program.   
Change Roadway Capital to “Roadway and Bridge Capital.” New or widened bridges are included in the Roadway Capital program. 
Need an additional program for projects of National, Statewide and 
Cross-regional significance. 
National, statewide, and cross-regional projects are eligible within 
other programs.  The Transportation Investment Act requires that 
funds raised within a special district be spent within the special district, 
therefore in order to fund projects that cross more than one district, 
an allocation formula would need to be developed between the 
districts or other funding sources utilized.  
Increase bicycle and pedestrian funding. The lower end in the investment allocation target range for this 
program has been increased to one percent (1%) to enable taxpayers 
that do not drive to benefit from the regional sales tax.   
Combine programs to increase flexibility. The final draft criteria include a change to consolidate Safety and 
Traffic Operations into a single program. These programs have 








General Screening Criteria Comments 
COMMENTS RESPONSES 
The screening criteria should prioritize public-private partnership (P3) 
projects or other projects that can leverage other funding sources 
(CIDs, etc.) 
P3 projects are an important part of the transportation solution in the 
state. However, P3 projects create practical difficulties for 
Transportation Investment Act funding given the length of time 
required for negotiations and resolving funding uncertainties.  P3 
projects are eligible. 
A criterion should be established for each program that provides 
consideration for projects that have no other funding source. 
While funding availability is an important consideration for developing 
the Unconstrained Example Investment List, other factors such as 
strategic goals, deliverability, public appeal, and performance will be 
considered as well. 
It seems as though Transit Capital projects are being held to a higher 
standard than Roadway Capital projects. 
 
Several changes have been made to the criteria to address this issue.  
A new section has been added that applies to all programs equally, 
including Roadway Capital and Transit Capital. However, these two 
modes of transportation are inherently different and therefore still 
require their own unique criteria.   
The definition of “regional transit” needs to be reevaluated. The multi-
county requirement is too restrictive. 
Changes have been made to expand and clarify the definition of 
regional transit.  Regional transit need not cross a county border as 
long as it possesses at least two of the four key attributes identified in 
the final recommended criteria. 
The criteria should be tailored to each region’s unique needs. Each region will have its own criteria. 
Criteria should focus upon needs, not wants of the region and 
incorporate LOS, current/projected traffic counts, crash data, industrial 
& economic growth, etc. 
The criteria may be altered by the Regional Transportation 
Roundtables to better reflect each Special District’s specific needs.  
Performance measures will be released along with the Unconstrained 
Example Investment List and may include measures like LOS and crash 
data. 
Economic development criteria should be included in the screening 
analysis for project selection. 
Economic development was a prime consideration in the Statewide 
Strategic Transportation Plan, and the project list will be developed 
with consideration given to economic development goals. 
Screening criteria allocates 75% of funds almost exclusively to “STIP” 
projects, which essentially are state maintained facilities. Locals 
(outside of the Atlanta Special District) should not be expected to 
make due with 25% of funds. 
The criteria are not limited to STIP projects. The intention of the 
criteria is to assist the roundtable in carrying on a discussion that is, in 
part, strategic and outcomes oriented.  The roundtable members will 
have a good feel for the important projects in their respective 
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jurisdictions.   
Criteria refer to eligible projects as those “throughout the region.” 
Does this apply to roads providing connectivity to another region? 
Yes.  Roads providing connectivity to another region are considered 
potentially part of those “throughout the region.” 
Use a different word than “tiers,” as this is a term used by DCA for tax 
credit allocations. 








Roadway Capital Criteria 
COMMENTS RESPONSES 
More than just construction phases should be funded with the regional 
sales tax funds. 
The criteria allow for phases other than construction to be funded, 
however the emphasis should be placed on construction.  It is critical 
that projects are built, and the value of the sales tax is visible to each 
district’s citizenry during the 10-year life of the regional sales tax.   
In the Metro Atlanta special district, the connectivity of the regional 
road network should be given emphasis (i.e. cross-regional 
connectivity or inter- and intra-regional connectivity). 
Roadway capital projects that are among the most congested regional 
corridors as determined through ARC’s Congestion Management 
Process will improve regional connectivity and are eligible per the draft 
criteria.   
Congestion should be the main criterion for roadway capital projects. Congestion is an important factor; however the Statewide Strategic 
Transportation Plan identifies other important factors, such as reliable 
trips, access to employment centers, and safety. Project deliverability 
and funding commitment are also important, and all of these factors 
should be considered when developing the Final Investment List. 
The tiers are too restrictive and should be revised. The tiers have been replaced by the criterion, applicable to all 
programs, that project phases funded by Transportation Investment 
Act funds should be completed within ten years of the start of the 
regional sales tax.  Project phases that are not expected to be 
completed within the ten-year life of the sales tax should not be 
included in the Unconstrained Example Investment List. 
What constitutes a major activity or employment center? In the Atlanta special district, major employment and activity centers 
are Regional Centers and Regional Town Centers as defined in ARC’s 
PLAN 2040 Regional Development Guide.  In all other special districts, 
major employment and activity centers may be identified at the 








Safety and Traffic Operations Criteria 
COMMENTS RESPONSES 
The criteria should document reductions in crash frequency or severity 
based on the Highway Safety Manual. 
Reductions in crash frequency and/or severity are important. The 
specific safety related performance measure(s) will be released along 
with the Unconstrained Example Investment List. 
Intersection improvements should be prioritized in the safety program. 
 
Criteria should include analysis of pedestrian crossings on state routes. 
Both of these project types are important, and they are both eligible to 
receive funding under the Safety and Traffic Operations program. The 
performance measures used to select projects will be released along 








Bicycle and Pedestrian Criteria (formerly Non-Motorized Criteria) 
COMMENTS RESPONSES 
Not all bicycle and pedestrian plans will result in a list of projects. 
Therefore, the criterion should be reworded to reflect that projects 
should be consistent with these plans rather than identified within 
them. 
 
The criterion requiring connectivity to regional activity centers should 
also be inclusive of projects within said areas. 
Both of these suggestions help clarify the intent of the criteria; 
therefore, they have been included in the final draft. 
 
Eliminate the notation that off-roadway and streetscape projects 
should be funded by local disbursements. 
The notation has been revised; however, there are still distinctions 
made as to what should be funded with the regional sales tax funds. 
Mention of off-roadway paths has been eliminated and replaced with 
“recreational paths.” The purpose of this change is to reflect that off-
roadway paths may serve a regional commuting purpose. The 
distinction between an off-roadway path and a recreational path is 
based upon the path’s ability to be utilized year-round at all times of 
the day.  For example, a path which is not lit for use at dusk or 
nighttime would be considered a recreational path. 
 
Additionally, the reference to streetscapes has been replaced with the 
term “landscaping.” As a distinction, streetscape projects may enhance 
the width of sidewalks, add landscaping, traffic buffers, street 
furniture, etc. These items as a whole establish an environment which 
may promote increased pedestrian usage of existing or expanded 
facilities. Landscaping projects are often a component of a 
streetscaping project that utilized alone may not promote the usage of 










Allow funds to be awarded to both commercial and non-commercial 
airports. 
This criterion has been revised to reflect this comment in recognition 
of the commercial and non-commercial dual purpose many airports 








Roadway and Bridge Maintenance Criteria 
COMMENTS RESPONSES 
Expand focus beyond regional employment centers. For purposes of consistency with the criteria in other programs, the 
criterion has been re-worded to include major activity centers. 
 
Eliminate the prioritization of funds toward state routes or routes 
connecting regional employment centers. 
These funds, should they be approved by special district voters, are 
intended to be utilized in the advancement of strategic projects that 
may have the greatest impact on the region.  The resurfacing of 
primarily local routes should be funded by local disbursements of the 
sales tax or other funding source. 
 
Please note, an additional criterion has been added to the program 
which specifically addresses bridge maintenance and replacement. 
Because of the cost associated with these types of improvements and 
their importance to the safety and well-being of motorists, there is not 
a specific restriction based upon route types which limit eligibility. 
Agricultural roadways designated as Tier 1 and Tier 2 facilities by the 
Department of Community Affairs should be included as being eligible 
for maintenance funds. 
This type of amendment to the criteria may be worthwhile in several 
special districts. Every special district of the state has its own unique 









Transit Capital Criteria 
COMMENTS RESPONSES 
What exactly does transit encompass? 
 
Transit is defined in the Transportation Investment Act as any new or 
existing bus and rail mass transit system(s), passenger rail, and all 
activities and structures useful and incident to providing, operating, 
and maintaining the same. 
What items are covered under Transit Capital? 
 
Per the criteria, items covered under Transit capital include “new, 
systematic replacement, upgrades, refurbishment, and other capital 
project expenditures.” 
What project phases are covered under Transit Capital? 
 
There is an emphasis being placed upon the construction phase or 
acquisition of capital equipment; however, the criterion now more 
clearly states that other phases of project delivery are eligible for 
funding as well. 
It seems as though Transit Capital projects are being treated differently 
and to a higher standard than Roadway Capital projects. 
Several changes have been made to the criteria to address this issue.  
A new section has been added that applies to all programs equally, 
including Roadway Capital and Transit Capital. However, these two 
modes of transportation are inherently different and therefore also 
require their own unique criteria.   
The tiers are too restrictive and should be revised. The tiers have been replaced by the criterion, applicable to all 
programs, that project phases funded by Transportation Investment 
Act funds should be completed within ten years of the start of the 
regional sales tax.  Project phases that are not expected to be 
completed within the ten-year life of the sales tax should not be 








Transit Operations and Maintenance Criteria 
COMMENTS RESPONSES 
Precluding expansion in favor of maintenance could eliminate some 
popular and effective transit projects from moving forward. 
This criterion does not prohibit funding new transit service. It states 
that funds should be allocated to preserving existing service before the 
operation and maintenance of new service.  Therefore, if a regional 
roundtable were to dedicate enough funds to transit operations and 
maintenance, it may be possible to fund existing as well as new or 
expanded transit services.  
Eliminate the definition of “core” transit service as a system of service 
in place as of January 1, 2011; 
 
Eliminate reference to funding ineligibility for MARTA services in place 
as of the same date. 
The term “core” has been removed from the final recommended 
criteria.  The definition of existing transit service (i.e., in operation as of 
January 1, 2011) has been retained.  In the case of the Atlanta special 
district, the definition of regional transit has been expanded to include 
four key attributes, at least two of which should be satisfied in order 
for the service to qualify for Transportation Investment Act Transit 
Operations and Maintenance funds. 
 
The limitations on funding MARTA operations are contained in the 
Transportation Investment Act. However, the draft criteria have been 
altered so that they reference the Transportation Investment Act 
rather than use the specific Transportation Investment Act language.  If 
the legislature amends the Transportation Investment Act in the future 
to remove these limitations, MARTA would be eligible for operations 
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REGIONAL CRITERIA FOR THE  
ATLANTA 10-COUNTY SPECIAL TAX DISTRICT 
 
 
 These Regional Criteria for development of an investment list of projects and programs were 
developed based on the Final Recommended Criteria from the GDOT Director of Planning, 
11/8/10, and refined by Roundtable Members during recent Conference Calls.  Content changes 
are underscored. 




Framework for the Atlanta Region Investment Criteria 
 
Definitions: 
 Unconstrained Example Investment List – an example list of projects that comport with approved 
criteria developed by the Director of Planning; list does not have to be fiscally constrained. 
 Constrained Draft Investment List – developed from the Unconstrained Example Investment List by 
the Roundtable’s Executive Committee in collaboration with the Director of Planning; list is fiscally 
constrained by the projected revenue of a 10-year sales tax. 
 Constrained Final investment List – developed from the Constrained Draft Investment List (and 
amended with projects from the Unconstrained Example Investment List, if needed) by the 
Roundtable and approved; list is fiscally constrained by the projected revenue of a 10-year sales tax 
and deliverable within the 10 year timeframe. 
 Discretionary Funds- 15% of all revenue collected by the sales tax will be redistributed to the counties 
and cities within the region using the LARP factor (a combination of population and lane miles).  Each 
jurisdiction will determine how to spend these dollars.  Projects are not subject to the criteria or the 
Roundtable’s approval.  However, these projects will play an important role in the public’s approval 
of a regional sales tax. 
 
Process: 
 After the criteria are approved by the Roundtable, the Director of Planning, in collaboration with ARC 
and local jurisdictions, will develop the Unconstrained Example Investment List by evaluating the 
extent to which submitted projects satisfy the approved screening criteria.   
 Projects that meet the criteria, align with the SSTP and PLAN 2040, area currently listed I an approved 
plan and can be delivered within the timeframe of the regional sales tax will be eligible for inclusion 
on the Unconstrained Example Investment List. 
 Next, the Director of Planning will determine the specific public benefits to be expected upon the 
completion of each project on the Unconstrained Example Investment List and asses how each 
project furthers the goals of the Atlanta region’s investment criteria.  A number of performance 
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measures will be used to evaluate each project’s contribution.  Metrics from the Statewide Strategic 
Transportation Plan and Plan 2040 will be used to determine the public benefit for each project.  The 
performance measures and public benefits will be provided along with the Unconstrained Example 
Investment List to the Roundtable and the Executive Committee.  These are intended to assist the 
Executive Committee and the Roundtable in selecting the best projects and provide the region’s 
citizens a solid evaluation of the use of their sales tax dollars. 
 The Executive Committee in collaboration with the Director of Planning will use all this information 
and extensive public feedback to create the Constrained Draft Investment List from the 
Unconstrained Example Investment List (due to the Roundtable no later than August 15, 2011).  The 
law only requires two public hearings, but it is the intention of the Atlanta Roundtable to do 
extensive public outreach including polling and public forums throughout this process. 
 The Roundtable may also use this information to amend the Constrained Draft Investment List with 
projects from the Unconstrained Example Investment List to create the Final Investment List 
(Roundtable must approve by October 15, 2011).   
 Finally, if the regional sales tax referendum is approved by the voters of a special district, the Director 
of Planning will track and report on the funding, execution, and performance of the projects in the 
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Final Recommended Criteria for the Atlanta 10-County Special Tax District 
 
 
I.  The project list should support the performance goals of the Statewide Strategic Transportation 
Plan: 
 Support Georgia’s economic growth and competitiveness.  
 Ensure safety and security.  
 Maximize the value of Georgia’s assets, getting the most out of the existing network. 
 Minimize the impact on the environment.  
 
 
II.  The project list should achieve the following outcomes:  
 Achieve the best value for taxpayers' dollars and improve the region’s transportation network.  
 Transportation projects1 delivered on time and on budget.  
 Public support for projects funded by the regional sales tax and public trust that state and local 
governments will deliver on their promises.  
 Investments should improve regional mobility. 
 
 
III.  The project list development should be guided by the following principles: 
 Investment list is developed with a focus on deliverability.  
 Projects should come from existing plans and/or studies (for example, the GDOT work program, 
ARC long range plan and short range program, ARC Congestion Management Process, county 
transportation studies, etc.).  
 Investment list is consistent with the policies of the SSTP and policies of the Atlanta Region’s 
PLAN 2040.  
 Investment list encourages effective multimodal solutions that appeal to a broad spectrum of the 
region’s citizens and address the region’s rapidly growing older adult population. 
                                                          
1
 “Project” means, without limitation, any new or existing airports, bike lanes, bridges, bus and rail mass transit systems, 
freight and passenger rail, pedestrian facilities, ports, roads, terminals, and all activities and structures useful and incident to 
providing, operating, and maintaining the same. The term shall also include direct appropriations to a local government for 
the purpose of serving as a local match for state or federal funding. 
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 The project list should demonstrate regional equity in order to ensure it attracts the support of 
voters from the entire region.  Regional equity will be measured by the outcomes of specific 
projects not the dollar amounts spent on projects in specific jurisdictions. 
 Both the unconstrained and final list of projects may include “packaged projects” that address 
connectivity issues for the regional transportation network.  These projects can include, but are 
not limited to, last mile connectivity, bicycle, pedestrian safety and capital resurfacing and 
rehabilitation projects.  
 
 The criteria are designed to create a list of projects that have public support, can be delivered, 
and produce results for the citizens.  The criteria are intended to be interpreted with enough 
flexibly to achieve these objectives and to create an overall list that is supported by the 
roundtable and the citizens of the region. 
 
 
IV.  Projects will be evaluated by the following criteria: 
 
a.  Applicable to All Program Areas 
 
i. Emphasis will be on the construction phase or acquisition of capital equipment; however 
project phases other than construction can be included in the Unconstrained Example 
Investment List.  Preference will be given for preliminary engineering, right-of-way, and 
environmental reviews which ultimately deliver a construction project within the 10-year 
sales tax period. 
 
ii. Each project phase included in the investment list, and each phase necessary to complete the 
same, regardless of funding source, must demonstrate full funding.  For projects with 
preliminary engineering and/or right-of-way funded by Transportation Investment Act 
revenue, construction funds must be shown in the Atlanta region’s long range transportation 
plan adopted by ARC.   
 
iii. Emphasis will be on delivery.  All project phases funded with Transportation Investment Act 
revenue should be able to be completed or underway within ten years.  The Director of 
Planning recommends that approximately 40% of the total expected Transportation 
Investment Act funding should be allocated to project phases that could be completed or 
underway within six years of the start of the regional sales tax, and the remaining funds 
should be allocated to projects that could be completed or underway within ten years of the 
start of the regional sales tax.  (Excludes 15% discretionary local share to be distributed by 
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b. Roadway Capital  
 
The projects that qualify under “roadway capital” serve origins or destinations of trips to/from 
and within major existing and proposed employment and activity centers throughout the region.2  
Qualified roadway capital projects should improve the most congested regional corridors as 
determined through ARC’s Congestion Management Process, Regional Strategic Transportation 
System and Regional Thoroughfare Network.  These projects could be new roads, roadway 
widenings, interchanges, interstate improvements, bridges, etc. 
 
c.  Roadway and Bridge Maintenance (asset management)  
 
i. Priority for resurfacing/rehabilitation needs are for facilities on the Regional Strategic 
Transportation System developed by the ARC, with emphasis on connecting major regional 
employment or activity centers. Priority will be based on risk and on PACES ratings provided 
by GDOT.  (Note: Off-system resurfacing should be pursued using the 15% discretionary 
share.)  
 
ii. Bridge maintenance and replacement shall be determined based on ratings provided by 
GDOT. 
 
d.  Safety and Traffic Operations 
i. Safety 
a) Projects that align with the key emphasis areas of the Governor’s Strategic Highway Safety 
Plan (SHSP). 
b) Priority is given to projects that correct or improve a road location or feature with high 
potential for safety improvement, or addresses a specific highway safety deficiency.  The 
objective of each project must be to reduce fatalities and serious injuries.  
c) Projects may include intersection improvements to address safety concerns, shoulder 
widenings, pedestrian/bicycle safety improvements, hazard eliminations at rail-roadway 
crossings, traffic calming measures, installation of guardrails, crash attenuators, traffic 
signal upgrades, signage, and pavement marking improvement projects, etc.  
ii. Traffic Operations 
a) Projects that improve or enhance the region’s intelligent transportation system network, 
incident management program, or signal coordination and timing.  
b) Projects addressing an existing operational issue resulting in an improved level of service 
or reduction in delay or other congestion costs. 
 
                                                          
2
 Major regional employment and activity centers are Region Centers and Regional Town Centers as defined in ARC’s PLAN 
2040 Regional Development Guide. 
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e.  Freight and Logistics  
i. Projects that address the demand for goods movement into, out of, and within the state as 
identified through the Statewide Freight and Logistics Study (ongoing), the Atlanta Regional 
Freight Mobility Plan and the Atlanta Strategic Truck Route Master Plan adopted by the ARC.  
ii. Projects that enhance the flow of freight transported by trucks and/or rail.  
iii. Projects that facilitate the transfer of freight between modes. 
 
f.  Aviation  
i. Projects at new or existing airports that are contained in the airport's 5-year Airport Capital 
Improvement Program submitted annually to GDOT and FAA.  The types of projects included 
in this area are runways, taxiways, aprons, and navigational aids.  
ii. Projects consistent with the goals and objectives of Georgia's Statewide Aviation System Plan.  
 
g.  Bicycle and Pedestrian  
i. Projects consistent with the Atlanta Region’s Bicycle and Pedestrian Plan.  
ii. Projects that provide connectivity to/from or within a major regional employment or activity 
center.  
iii. Projects that provide connection to/from existing or planned transit including bus stops and 
multi-modal centers.  
(Note: Projects such as landscaping and recreational paths should be pursued using the 15% 
discretionary share.)  
 
h.  Transit3 Capital  
i. To comply with the Transportation Investment Act Section 7, the highest consideration will be 
given to the projects that are most highly prioritized by ARC (in conjunction with the Director 
of Planning and GRTA) per economic benefit, lowest environmental impact, and completion 
of environmental permitting (O.C.G.A. 50-32-5 (f)).  Capital expenditures may include new, 
systematic replacement, upgrades, refurbishment, and other capital project expenditures. 
ii. New fixed guideway facilities should also include a 20-year operating plan.  Funds for the 
operations may come from any identified source including Transportation Investment Act 
transit operation funds and its authorized reserves under O.C.G.A. 48-8-241(c). 
iii. Transit projects should be part of an existing system or have independent utility.  
                                                          
3
 Transit means any new or existing bus and rail mass transit systems, passenger rail, and all activities and structures useful 
and incident to providing, operating, and maintaining the same. 
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iv. Transit service for the proposed project should satisfy at least two of following: 
a) cross a county border; 
b) directly serve a major regional employment or activity center;  
c) carry a forecasted average 4,000 weekday boardings upon opening; and/or 
d) connect to an existing or under construction fixed guideway facility as defined by FTA. 
v. Transit projects should serve areas with land use ordinances that enable increased 
development densities around stops and stations.  
 
i.  Transit Operations and Maintenance  
Any funding must first preserve the existing regional transit service.  After the existing service is 
addressed, operations and maintenance funding from the regional sales tax would then be allocated to 
new transit projects.  Existing regional service is defined as the transit service in operation in the Atlanta 
Region as of January 1, 2011 (consistent with the Transportation Investment Act or any amendments) 
that satisfies at least two of following: (1) crosses a county border; (2) directly serves a major regional 
employment or activity center; (3) carries an average of 4,000 weekday boardings; and/or (4) connects 
to an existing or under construction fixed guideway facility as defined by FTA. 
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APPENDIX A:  Illustrative Investment Guidelines 
 
The table below serves only as a guide as to how investments can be allocated to meet the goals of 





Illustrative Estimate Over 10 
Years Based on Draft Economic 
Projections4, ($) 
Roadway Capital   20% - 50%  $1.5 - $3.7 Billion 
Roadway & Bridge Maintenance 
(Asset Management)  
 0% - 10%  $0  - $740 Million 
Safety and Traffic Operations  5% - 15%      $37 Million - $1.1 Billion 
Freight & Logistics   0% - 5%   $0 - $370 Million 
Aviation   0% - 5%   $0 - $370 Million 
Bicycle and Pedestrian   1% - 5%  $74 - $370 Million 
Transit Capital   10% - 40%  $74 Million - $3.0 Billion 
Transit Operations & Maintenance   5% - 20%  $37 Million - $1.5 Billion 
 
                                                          
4


















TIA‐AR‐030 I‐285 North at SR 400 ‐ Interchange Improvements Roadway I‐285 Corridor Fulton  $      112,500,000  $    337,500,000  $                       ‐    $       450,000,000 
TIA‐AR‐037
MARTA North Heavy Rail Line Extension to SR 140 ‐ 
Project Development Activities Transit North Subregion Fulton  $        37,000,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $          37,000,000 
TIA‐AR‐040 I‐85 North at I‐285 ‐ Interchange Improvements Roadway I‐285 Corridor DeKalb  $        26,500,000  $      26,500,000  $                       ‐    $          53,000,000 
TIA‐AR‐041
GRTA Xpress System ‐ Operations and Capital Funding for 




Disabilities Transit Regional Regional  $        17,000,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $          17,000,000 































































































































































Subregion Atlanta  $      435,940,345   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $       435,940,345 






















Subregion Atlanta  $        50,000,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $          50,000,000 
TIA‐CH‐001 Bells Ferry Road at Little River ‐ Bridge Replacement Roadway
Northwest 
Subregion Cherokee  $          7,000,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $            7,000,000 
TIA‐CH‐005
SR 140 (Hickory Flat Highway) from East Cherokee Drive 
to Mountain Road ‐ Widening Roadway North Subregion Cherokee  $        70,000,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $          70,000,000 
TIA‐CH‐006
SR 140 (Hickory Flat Highway) from I‐575 to East Cherokee 
Drive ‐ Widening Roadway North Subregion Cherokee  $        70,000,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $          70,000,000 
TIA‐CH‐009
SR 140 (Hickory Flat Highway / Arnold Mill Road) from 
Mountain Road to Fulton County Line ‐ Widening Roadway North Subregion Cherokee  $        50,000,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $          50,000,000 
TIA‐CL‐002
Atlanta to Griffin Commuter Rail ‐ Region 3 (Fulton, 
Clayton and Henry Counties) Transit South Subregion Clayton  $        20,000,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $          20,000,000 
TIA‐CL‐004
Conley Road from I‐285 to SR 54 (Jonesboro Road) ‐ 
Widening Roadway South Subregion Clayton  $        28,500,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $          28,500,000 
TIA‐CL‐005
Jonesboro Connector from US 19/41 (Tara Boulevard) to 
Lake Jodeco Road ‐ New Alignment Roadway South Subregion Clayton  $        15,000,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $          15,000,000 






ette  $          8,100,000   $      32,080,000   $                       ‐     $          40,180,000 
TIA‐CL‐013
SR 85 from Adams Drive to I‐75 South (includes 
interchange) ‐ Widening Roadway South Subregion Clayton  $        17,200,000   $      16,950,000   $                       ‐     $          34,150,000 
TIA‐CL‐014
SR 85 from Pointe South Parkway to Roberts Drive ‐ 
Widening Roadway South Subregion Clayton  $        22,200,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $          22,200,000 
TIA‐CL‐018
US 19/41 (Tara Boulevard) from I‐75 South to Battle Creek 










Subregion Cobb  $          9,800,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $            9,800,000 
TIA‐CO‐013 I‐75 North at Windy Hill Road ‐ Interchange Improvements Roadway
Northwest 





















Subregion Cobb  $        14,500,000   $      15,500,000   $                       ‐     $          30,000,000 
TIA‐CO‐018 McCollum Airport ‐ New Air Traffic Control Tower Aviation
Northwest 
Subregion Cobb  $          2,500,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $            2,500,000 
TIA‐CO‐020 McCollum Airport ‐ Runway Approach Lighting System Aviation
Northwest 




















Subregion Cobb  $          9,000,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $            9,000,000 
Enhanced Premium Transit Service ‐ Acworth / Kennesaw  Northwest  Cobb/Atlant
TIA‐CO‐035 / Town Center to MARTA Arts Center Station Transit Subregion a  $      689,000,000   $                       ‐     $         6,000,000   $       695,000,000 
TIA‐CO‐037 Windy Hill Road / Terrell Mill Connector ‐ New Alignment Roadway
Northwest 



































































dale  $        27,000,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $          27,000,000 
TIA‐DK‐033
North Indian Creek Drive from SR 10 (Memorial Drive) to 





Subregion DeKalb  $        25,000,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $          25,000,000 
TIA‐DK‐043
Panola Road from Thompson Mill Road to US 278 
(Covington Highway) ‐ Widening Roadway East Subregion DeKalb  $        15,150,000   $      15,150,000   $                       ‐     $          30,300,000 
TIA‐DK‐048
Rockbridge Road from SR 10 (Memorial Drive) to SR 124 
(Rock Chapel Road) ‐ Corridor Improvements Roadway East Subregion DeKalb  $          7,500,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $            7,500,000 
TIA‐DK‐055 I‐20 East at Panola Road ‐ Interchange Improvements Roadway East Subregion DeKalb  $        10,600,000   $      10,600,000   $                       ‐     $          21,200,000 
US 23 (Buford Hwy) / SR 141 (Peachtree Industrial  Central 
TIA‐DK‐057 Boulevard) Connector ‐ New Alignment Roadway Subregion DeKalb  $        25,000,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $          25,000,000 
TIA‐DK‐059
Perimeter Center Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) 
Program Roadway North Subregion DeKalb  $          1,000,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $            1,000,000 
TIA‐DK‐069
Mt Vernon Road from Fulton County Line to Dunwoody 
Club Drive ‐ Corridor Improvements Roadway North Subregion DeKalb  $        12,000,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $          12,000,000 
TIA‐DO‐002
I‐20 West from I‐285 West to SR 5 ‐ ITS and Western 
Regional Traffic Control Center Roadway West Subregion Douglas  $          9,500,000   $         9,500,000   $                       ‐     $          19,000,000 
TIA‐DO‐003
SR 92 from Fairburn Road to Dallas Highway ‐ Phases I, II 
and III Realignment Roadway West Subregion Douglas  $        24,500,000   $      24,500,000   $                       ‐     $          49,000,000 
TIA‐DO‐006
Lee Road / South Sweetwater Road from I‐20 West to US 
78 (Bankhead Highway) ‐ Widening Roadway West Subregion Douglas  $        18,900,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $          18,900,000 
TIA‐DO‐007
US 78 (Veterans Memorial Highway) from SR 6 (Thornton 
Road) to Sweetwater Road ‐ Widening Roadway West Subregion Douglas  $        20,000,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $          20,000,000 
TIA‐DO‐009
Dorris Road Multiuse Path Phase 1 ‐ Transportation 
Center to Prestley Mill Road Bike/Ped West Subregion Douglas  $             650,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $               650,000 
TIA‐DO‐010
Dorris Road Multiuse Path Phase 2 ‐ Prestley Mill Road 








































Subregion Fayette  $        12,000,000   $      12,000,000   $                       ‐     $          24,000,000 
TIA‐FA‐010 South Industrial Park Path Connection Bike/Ped
Southwest 
Subregion Fayette  $          1,210,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $            1,210,000 
TIA‐FA‐013
SR 92 from Jimmy Mayfield Boulevard to McBride Road ‐ 





Subregion Fayette  $          5,900,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $            5,900,000 
Southwest 













Subregion Fayette  $        20,000,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $          20,000,000 
TIA‐FN‐002
SR 120 (Kimball Bridge Road) from State Bridge Road to 
Jones Bridge Road ‐ Widening Roadway North Subregion Fulton  $        21,000,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $          21,000,000 
TIA‐FN‐003
SR 120 (Old Milton Parkway) from SR 400 to Kimball 
Bridge Road ‐ Widening Roadway North Subregion Fulton  $        37,000,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $          37,000,000 
TIA‐FN‐005
SR 120 (Old Milton Parkway) at SR 400 and Morris Road ‐ 
Interchange/Intersection Improvements Roadway North Subregion Fulton  $          1,900,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $            1,900,000 
TIA‐FN‐007
Rucker Road from Hardscrabble Road to Willis Road ‐ 
Operational Improvements Roadway North Subregion Fulton  $        19,000,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $          19,000,000 
TIA‐FN‐013
Hammond Drive from SR 9 (Roswell Road) to SR 400 ‐ 
Improvements Roadway North Subregion Fulton  $        10,000,000   $                       ‐     $      23,500,000   $          33,500,000 
TIA‐FN‐014
SR 400 from I‐285 North to Spalding Drive ‐ Collector 
Distributor Lanes Roadway North Subregion Fulton  $      160,000,000   $      30,000,000   $                       ‐     $       190,000,000 
TIA‐FN‐030
SR 140 (Arnold Mill Road) from Cherokee County Line to 























Improvements Roadway North Subregion Fulton  $        20,400,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $          20,400,000 
TIA‐FN‐036
SR 140 (Houze Road) from Rucker Road to Mansell Road ‐ 
Operational Improvements Roadway North Subregion Fulton  $        18,600,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $          18,600,000 
TIA‐FN‐043
SR 120 (Abbotts Bridge Road) from Parsons Road (east of 










Subregion Fulton  $        60,250,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $          60,250,000 
TIA‐FS‐008 I‐85 South at SR 74 ‐ Interchange Improvements Roadway
Southwest 
Subregion Fulton  $        11,250,000   $      11,250,000   $                       ‐     $          22,500,000 
Butner Road at SR 6 (Camp Creek Parkway) Intersection 
Improvements and Butner Road over SR 6 (Camp Creek  Southwest 
TIA‐FS‐016 Parkway) Bridge Replacement Roadway Subregion Fulton  $          3,500,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $            3,500,000 

































































Subregion Gwinnett  $          1,850,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $            1,850,000 
TIA‐GW‐031 I‐85 North Transit Corridor (all phases) Transit
Northeast 


























Subregion Gwinnett  $        46,000,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $          46,000,000 
TIA‐GW‐057 SR 316 at Harbins Road ‐ Grade Separation Roadway
Northeast 
Subregion Gwinnett  $        23,000,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $          23,000,000 
TIA‐GW‐058 SR 316 at Hi Hope Road / Cedars Road ‐ Grade Separation Roadway
Northeast 
Subregion Gwinnett  $        61,900,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $          61,900,000 
TIA‐GW‐059 SR 316 at US 29 ‐ Grade Separation Roadway
Northeast 





Subregion Gwinnett  $      296,000,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $       296,000,000 
TIA‐GW‐067
US 78 (Main Street) at SR 124 (Scenic Hwy) ‐ Intersection 










Subregion Gwinnett  $        39,300,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $          39,300,000 
TIA‐GW‐073 Gwinnett County Bus Services Transit
Northeast 



















































Subregion Henry  $        27,000,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $          27,000,000 
TIA‐M‐001 MARTA Train Control Systems Upgrade Transit Regional Regional  $          4,440,000  $                       ‐    $                       ‐    $            4,440,000 
TIA‐M‐002 MARTA Elevator and Escalator Rehabilitation Program Transit Regional Regional  $        97,600,000   $                       ‐     $      21,100,000   $       118,700,000 
TIA‐M‐003 MARTA Unified Transit Communication Infrastructure Transit Regional Regional  $        27,200,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $          27,200,000 
TIA‐M‐004
MARTA Passenger Information System, Audio Visual 
Information System and Wayfinding Transit Regional Regional  $        30,500,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $          30,500,000 
TIA‐M‐005 MARTA Tunnel and Platform Lighting Upgrade Transit Regional Regional  $        28,000,000  $                       ‐    $                       ‐    $          28,000,000 
TIA‐M‐006 MARTA Tunnel Ventilation Rehabilitation Transit Regional Regional  $             700,000  $                       ‐    $                       ‐    $               700,000 
TIA‐M‐007 MARTA Electrical Power Rehabilitation Transit Regional Regional  $      248,800,000  $      60,000,000  $      45,600,000  $       354,400,000 
TIA‐M‐008 MARTA Track Rehabilitation Transit Regional Regional  $          5,600,000  $                       ‐    $                       ‐    $            5,600,000 
TIA‐M‐009 MARTA Aerial Structure Rehabilitation Transit Regional Regional  $        90,000,000  $                       ‐    $         2,700,000  $          92,700,000 
TIA‐M‐014 MARTA Airport Station Improvements Transit Regional Regional  $          7,160,000  $                       ‐    $                       ‐    $            7,160,000 







nta  $      700,000,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $       700,000,000 
TIA‐RO‐001
Sigman Road from Lester Road to Dogwood Connector ‐ 























Road ‐ Widening Roadway East Subregion Rockdale  $        11,400,000   $                       ‐     $                       ‐     $          11,400,000 
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